The "Battle" of Limestone Ridge

In Burnished Rows of Steel we are treated in Chapter 5 Part 1 to the only real “Canadian” contribution to the war effort in full. That would be the so called “battle” at Limestone Ridge. In a poorly disguised effort to conceal the sheer historical parallelism the battle is called Limestone Ridge instead of Ridgeway with the serial numbers filed off.

The author is condescendingly dismissive of the Canadians who would serve the crown, variously calling them dupes or colonel blimps, blithely assuming that not a single man or musket more could be mustered versus his own sloppily collected 25,000.

In fact the author has spent a great deal of time dismissing the Canadians as losers and insists (to the point of absurdity) that the single battle of Ridgeway in 1866 is the be all to end all of Canadian fighting prowess. One might think to question the logic of such a comparison if it were made regarding the United States Army in terms of appealing to Red Cloud’s War in 1866 in order to say the United States Army lacks skill or smarts, but the author evidently finds such logic completely reasonable so we must go on.

The specifics of this early campaign into Canada West are not entirely clear. We have a crossing of 30,000 men in the Detroit Frontier, and then the only real action being a brief siege of London (Canada West). The big piece of the chapter comes when we get to “not Ridgeway”.

We have an American force of roughly 2 Divisions crossing the Niagara frontier laid out as such:

II Corps, Department of the Lakes

Commanding General: Brigadier General A.M. McCook

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Isaac F. Quinby

Corps troops - 3rd Ohio Cavalry Regiment (Col. Lewis Zahm); 4th Ohio Cavalry Regiment (Col. John Kennett); Battery H, 5th US Artillery – Capt. William R. Terrill; Lt. Howard M. Burnham

2nd Division - Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood;

1st Brigade – Col. Edward N. Kirk: 29th Indiana, 30th Indiana, 34th Illinois, 77th Pennsylvania;

2nd Brigade – Col. August Willich: 15th Ohio, 49th Ohio; 32nd Indiana, 39th Indiana;

3rd Brigade – Col. John F. Miller: 1st Wisconsin, 38th Indiana, 78th Pennsylvania, 79th Pennsylvania;

Division Artillery – Capt. William R. Terrill; Battery A, 1st Ohio Artillery; Battery D, 1st Ohio Artillery; Independent Pennsylvania Battery B;

3rd Division – Brig. Gen. Ormsby M. Mitchel;

1st Brigade – Col. John B. Turchin: 10th Illinois, 19th Illinois, 24th Illinois, 37th Indiana;

2nd Brigade – Col. Joshua W. Sill: 2nd Ohio, 21st Ohio, 33rd Ohio; 10th Wisconsin;

3rd Brigade – Col. Jacob Ammen: 6th Ohio, 18th Ohio, 24th Ohio; 36th Indiana;

Division Artillery – Capt. Cyrus O. Loomis; Battery A, 1st Michigan Artillery; Battery E, 1st Ohio Artillery; 5th Indiana Battery;

This we are told amounts to about 16,000 men. In response the Canadians have:

To the east, along the Niagara, the British forces were slightly stronger; although almost all the regulars had been withdrawn to Montreal and the Richelieu, initially for the fruitless attack on Rouse’s Point and then for the defense of Fort Lennox and Montreal itself. Other than a single company of Royal Canadian Rifles and some service personnel, the forces on the Niagara frontier were almost entirely local troops, a mix of volunteers and service militia. The subsequent fighting was noteworthy as being the first and only such action fought entirely under “Canadian” leadership.
The defending forces amounted to a mixed garrison of regulars, mostly Royal Canadian Rifles, and service militia in the fortified posts of Fort Mississauga; Fort Drummond; and Fort George. They were commanded by Major Kenneth M. Moffat, of the RCR, and were concentrated at the north end of the river, on or near the old Queenstown Heights battlefield.

And:

When the long-anticipated alarm was sounded, orders went out to Canadian militia and volunteer units across the region, from as far away as Toronto. As the Americans crossed and began forming up, the Canadians were moving east from Port Colborne and south from Saint Catherine’s via Stevensville; the goal was for all the available troops to rendezvous on Limestone Ridge, forcing the Americans to deploy for battle and delaying their movement to the west; then the combined force would fall back to the west and north, eventually moving back to Hamilton. The Canadian forces amounted to a mixed brigade of some 3,000 men drawn from the 6th Militia District, headquartered in Hamilton, and with one battalion of volunteers, the 2nd Battalion, a Toronto unit that had been formed in 1856. The men of the volunteer battalion were in dark-green “rifle” uniforms, while some of the 6th Brigade’s militiamen were in the traditional red coats; others were in a mix of uniforms and civilian overcoats. The two volunteer batteries and the provisional battery of naval militia each had six muzzle-loading 9 pounders; the volunteer infantry had Pattern 1853 Enfields, while the service militia were equipped with a mix of Enfield rifles and older rifles and smoothbore muskets. The cavalrymen, mounted for the most part on their own horses, had a mix of carbines, revolvers, and sabers. Their commander, Colonel Alfred Booker, 37, was a wealthy English-born merchant from Hamilton; he been commissioned in the militia in 1851, helped organize the Hamilton battery in 1856, and was named district commander in 1861.

The Canadian Order of Battle is laid out (such as it is):
6th Militia Brigade (Hamilton District) – Lt. Col. Alfred Booker
Adjutant and chief of the staff – Maj. H. V. Villiers
2nd Volunteer Rifle Battalion - Maj. Alex T. Fulton
Hamilton Service Militia Battalion - Lt. Col. R. A. Clarke
Cavalry: Maj. H.B. Bull (St. Catherine’s Troop, Grimsby Troop);
Artillery: Hamilton Field Battery, Port Colborne Field Battery,
Hamilton Naval Company (organized as artillery and pioneers)

Now strangely there is no mention made of the Royal Canadian Rifles here but we can assume the author just forgot.

Now it’s curious how the alarm is “long anticipated” but evidently the Canadians have done nothing to prepare, such as raising more men, organizing defences, or drilling their militia. This despite having 6 months from the first alarm in October to when the Confederates raided the border, to the outbreak of hostilities in April, but I guess the Canadians are just lazy?

There are a few problems with this order of battle however, the first and not the least being we have no idea how the Canadians are apparently being organized. What it seems that the author has tried to do is organize the militias as ad-hoc brigades by district. This is an admirable guess, but the research falls flat on the face of it.

For starters, the Hamilton District should be labelled as the 7^th Militia Brigade, as Hamilton is the 7^th Militia District according to the organization drawn up in that time period by the militia. So properly, this should be the 7^th Militia Brigade (Hamilton District).

Booker is also slightly problematic. He was slated to serve as a staff officer to the British commander on the Niagara Frontier, local Major General George T. C. Napier (appointed December 1861, page 471), and would most likely have been promoted to a colonelcy as he was historically. Though that aside his position is roughly correct, but one would assume command of a brigade would be given to any one of the dozen British officers assigned to Canada to organize the militia.

Moving on let’s address the order of battle. For some reason the 2^nd Battalion “The Queen’s Own Volunteer Rifles of Toronto” has been sent to the Niagara Frontier. One assumes this is because they were present at Ridgeway in 1866, but let us ignore that for a moment. They are confusingly commanded by a “Maj. Alex T. Fulton” despite the fact that Fulton, in 1863 no less, is only acaptain commanding the 10th “Highland” company of the Queen’s Own. In truth in 1862 the battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. William Smith Durie, and under him were Majors George Brooke, and Alexander M. Smith under him, all appointed in April 1860.

Then we have the nebulous “Hamilton Service Militia Battalion” under Lt. Col. R. A. Clarke. Problematically there is no Lt. Col. R. A. Clarke on the lists in 1862-63. We do have a Lt. Col. George K. Chisholm and a Lt. Col. Isaac Buchanan however. Buchanan actually held his first command in 1837 against the rebels in Upper Canada, and served on the Niagara frontier! There was also a battalion formed in December 1862, the 13^th Battalion Volunteer Infantry, which Buchanan was placed in command of. One assumes, since it had more than twocompanies established before 1862 that it would fall in the authors stated requirements for being established in a war time call up, but this might be too fair to the Canadians so evidently not. Either way, the 13^th really ought to be on that list.

Chisholm most likely ought to be leading his own battalion as well but I digress.

The remaining problems with the order of battle come from the supporting troops. There are actually four companies of cavalry in Military District 7, the 1^st and 2^nd Wentworth Troops (Maj. Thomas Roberston, senior officer) the Grimsby Troop (Maj. Conrad Teeter) and the St. Catherine’s Troop (Maj. Thomas Bate). Of these the St. Catherine’s Troop and the Grimsby Troop are mentioned, but the Wentworth troops are completely ignored, and confusingly Bull (who is the most junior officer of them all) is placed in command. One might expect an ad hoc regiment might be formed here under command of Bate who was commissioned in 1855, making him the senior officer.

Next is the artillery (not given an officer) which consists of the Hamilton Field Battery, and the non existent Port Colborne Field Battery. In 1862 you actually had the Hamilton Field Battery and the Welland Canal Field Battery, as well as the Dundas and St. Catherine’s companies of foot artillery. Now since Maj. Villiers was detached as brigade major historically (and chief of the staff here) command of any ad hoc artillery brigade would fall to Lt. Col. William Notman(1856) of the Dundas Foot company.

Finally is the Hamilton Naval Company, bizarrely armed as pioneers rather than serving aboard the Passport on the Great Lakes. One might think this could make sense for the Marine company at Oakville, but the Hamilton Naval Company would have much work to do on Lake Ontario rather than be tramping around with the grunts at Ridgeway.

So in summation there are more questions than answers in this order of battle, but let’s do a brief correction for the author shall we?

7th Militia Brigade (Hamilton District)

Col. Alfred Booker Commanding

Chief of the Staff: Maj. H. V. Villiers

2nd Battalion “The Queens Own” Volunteer Rifles (Lt. Col. William S. Durie)

13th Battalion Volunteer Rifles (Lt. Col. Isaac Buchanan) 10cos

7th District Provisional Battalion (Lt. Col. George K. Chisholm) 10cos

Oakville Marine Company (Capt. Duncan Chisholm)(attached as pioneers)

Cavalry: (Major Thomas Bate) 4cos (1 and 2 Wentworth Troops, Grimsby Troop, St. Catherine’s Troop)

Artillery: (Lt. Col. William Notman) (Hamilton Field Battery, Dundas Foot Artillery, St. Catherine’s Foot Artillery)*

*We shall assume the Welland Battery is on duty along the canal.

Now this assumes all the various battalions and companies are at full strength, the infantry at 840 men, the cavalry at 55 men, the artillery at roughly 75, and this force comes to a total strength of 3049 men (absent staff) and assuming the Royal Canadian Rifles got attached then 3150. Not a bad guess by the author.

Let’s just discuss why even absent all this, the whole battle as portrayed is farcical, first the framing:

Booker’s troops, although generally young and utterly inexperienced, were willing to fight and moved quickly toward the ridge, some on foot, others on horseback, and still more by rail; Bull’s cavalry, serving as the advance guard, met the 3rd and 4th Ohio cavalry regiments about mid-day between Stevensville and Ridgeway, and became heavily engaged. Infantry and artillery from both sides arrived, led by Mitchel’s 3rd Brigade, and the engagement became general; the Canadians began taking up hasty positions on the ridge itself. As more American troops came up, however, as Fulton wrote later, “the situation of the Volunteers and militia was thereby rendered most critical, as it seemed improbable we could hold our position.” The American forces in the field eventually numbered some 16,000, including both Wood’s and Mitchel’s divisions, with seven batteries. The American infantry outnumbered the men from Upper Canada by more than five to one; the artillery by more than two to one; despite the rain and mud, the guns got forward.

Now the battle:

After a half day of skirmishing by the cavalry and Ammen’s brigade, the American artillery – including Terrill’s regular battery H, assigned to reinforce Loomis’ battalion - was in position and began a heavy bombardment of the Canadian militia’s position on the ridge. Terrill, a Virginian and regular (USMA, ‘53) whose father and brother served the Confederacy, had something to prove, and he promptly did so, opening “such a fire upon the British (sic) as they had never seen,” as Loomis wrote. Turchin’s brigade moved forward on the right (northern) flank, and Sill’s on the left (southern) flank; under that much pressure, and after an hour or so of constant fighting, the result was pre-ordained. 

“A scene of confusion ensued,” as Fulton wrote, and Booker’s force was routed, with only the Volunteer Rifles maintaining much cohesion. Among the casualties and prisoners were the student soldiers of the University Rifle Company of Volunteers from Toronto, which had marched out with the 2nd Battalion; they included two professors and more than a score of young men who had fought - and died - on the ridge. 

Booker was unable to regroup his men at Ridgeway, and retired with his mounted staff and battered cavalry to Port Colborne; the mass of militia infantry and artillery – some 2,000 men - surrendered on the muddy field shortly before dusk. Fulton, wounded, was among the last to surrender, offering his sword to Terrill; the Virginian returned it, reportedly saying “Major, you are as true to your oath and country as I have been to mine; keep your sword.”

Valiant little, but ultimately doomed, stand right? Just as the poor deluded Canadians must stand aside in the face of the mighty Americans.

Well aside from that the whole set up is a farce. For starters the limestone ridge in question would make a terrible defensive position attempting to stop anyone coming from the south, or Buffalo if they landed at Fort Erie.

The ridge itself rises some 30 feet facing west and running along the appropriately named Ridge Road, with roadways connecting it to Port Erie and Port Colborne at the extreme south end of the ridge. North and south the ground is lower at the edges, but this offers no advantage when facing east. The ground is perfect to deflect an attack coming from the north or the west, but completely useless to defend against an attack coming from the east. This would be a singularly poor choice of ground for the Canadian militia to offer battle if engaging an American force coming from Fort Erie. It would be far superior for an American force to occupy.

Even ignoring that point however, we get little understanding of the battle. And with the above geography in mind it should have been child’s play for the Union forces to cut off the Canadians and surround them. Yet evidently by a failure of understanding in the geography the author chooses to have the Canadian command staff and cavalry quit the field in a rout, if only to once again stick it to the Canadians by saying they would run or surrender.

The idea that Booker would abandon his men also flies in the face of his performance at Ridgeway, where even after he bungled the historic fight by mistakenly ordering the square formation, he attempted to rally his men the whole way. However, here we have historical parallelism gone mad and somehow Booker fails to rally his men at the village of Ridgeway, yet the Canadians also surrender on the muddy field at Limestone Ridge

What's odder is that the battle at Ridgeway only took place historically because the Canadians were moving to attack the Fenians who were blocking the path north, and tellingly much of the fighting took place below the ridge proper.

All this of course can be attributed to simple research failure. Though with the authors previous comments, one has to wonder whether this was malicious intent, or just lazy.