California Dreaming (5)

Welcome to the final section of this mammoth examination of the British assault on San Francisco. If you'd like, check out parts 1, 2, 3,or 4; alternatively, press on for the epic conclusion.


Defenders (revisited)

Even the short description of British troops being humiliatingly defeated in an amphibious assault contains flaws. We are told that 'some 3,500 men, regulars and volunteers, infantry and cavalry, marched out and took Knox’s brigade from the east'. As there are 5,000 men defending the bay, this suggests there are only 1,500 men not involved in the assault. However, this is impossible.

For a start, there are 156 guns to be manned, each of which needs a gun crew. In the Royal Artillery, 'the usual "working party" or "detachment" for a garrison gun is 1 non-commissioned officer and 9 men, and for the rapid firing required in coast batteries all that number should be artillerymen'. Assuming, then, nine men per gun, and an appropriate proportion of NCOs, officers and trumpeters, we arrive at an estimate of 1,671 men in the forts serving the artillery. Gun crews for heavy guns generally consisted of six men, but the three surplus crew allowed for here would be required to replace men exhausted from running guns in and out and those injured and killed in the course of the battle.

However, artillery is not all. There should also be infantry stationed elsewhere in the bay- not just to protect Benicia Arsenal and the Mare Island Navy Yard from Confederate sympathisers, but also to defend the fortifications at Angel and Yerba Buena islands and Lime Point from landings. After all, even though TFSmith knows the British are going to be landing at Land's End, the Union do not.

Needless to say, TFSmith is evidently completely unaware of all these factors. The complete fantasy world in which BROS and its author exist may best be seen in the following description of Fort Point:

The fort was under the direct command of Major William Austine.. His command included two regular batteries, B and H, of the 3rd Artillery, and Company K, of the 9th Infantry... They were supported by Col. Thomas N. Cazneau’s 2nd California Militia (Heavy Artillery), assembled from existing separate companies raised in San Francisco and heavily drilled over the spring; in total, the garrison numbered 1,300

In reality, the actual garrison at full strength was intended to be 550 officers and men. In early 1865, the presence of 465 officers and men required the construction of additional one-story barracks outside the fort (p.70). How exactly 1,300 men are supposed to live within the narrow confines of the fort is unclear.

In BROS, the Presidio is similarly over-capacity. After a considerable amount of construction (pp.81-2), its maximum garrison was 1,400 men in early 1865 (p.85). However, we are told that:

The American forces at the Presidio were well-placed to march against the British flank, and some 3,500 men, regulars and volunteers, infantry and cavalry, marched out and took Knox’s brigade from the east; the American troops were led by Col. Caleb C. Sibley... [and] included a battalion of the regular 9th Infantry, six companies strong, along with two regiments of volunteer infantry and a provisional battery (four 6-pounder guns)... and most of the 2nd California Cavalry... They were joined by increasing numbers of California militia forwarded from the city by Brigadier General John S. Ellis, who commanded the 2nd Militia District headquartered there.

If we interpret the 'regulars and volunteers' clause as excluding militia, and 'marched out' literally, we might expect there to be 3,500 men stationed at the Presidio. But this must just be sloppy writing: if there are only 5,000 defenders in the entire Bay, there cannot be 4,800 just at Fort Point and the Presidio. Yet it is bad enough: twenty-six companies of infantry, an artillery battery and most of a regiment of cavalry are stationed in a post that at this point historically housed fewer than 300 men.

The land assault

All the Union's plans for the defence of San Francisco, whether developed before the war or during it, had required the construction of permanent fortifications in the rear of Fort Point. These included the fortification of the Presidio, where the old Spanish redan had been removed in 1853, and the erection of a redoubt on Rob Hill overlooking Baker Beach. In the absence of these positions to slow the British advance, there was little to stop them moving on the fort, let alone establishing a beachhead.

TFSmith claims 'there was no easy road from the beach to the fort' for the British. This 1859 map shows that the situation is somewhat different:

As can be seen, there is a road which goes directly to the fort lying within 650 yards of the beach. By contrast, the Union troops in the Presido have three unenviable alternatives: march due east towards the beach, and attempt to take the landing head-on; take the long arching march northwest towards Fort Point; or march north-northwest across what we are told is 'the hilly country east of the beach... mostly sand dunes'. Unless they march across these sand dunes at some point, they cannot ambush or stop the British advance until the British have already reached Fort Point. Yet it is the British who struggle in 'Arabian' conditions, and the Union who are already present to ambush them. Once again, the author grants the Union the ability to move more quickly than their opponents.

Moreover, consider the distances. It is 1.2 miles, as the crow flies, from Baker Beach to Fort Point. By the same measure, it is 1.3 miles from the Presidio to Baker Beach, and 1.35 to Fort Point. Are we to believe that the Presidio garrison can get in front of the British troops with enough time to set up an ambush among the sand dunes? From Baker Beach to Telegraph Hill, at the north end of San Francisco, it is 4.25 miles. Are we really meant to believe that 'increasing numbers of California militia forwarded from the city' can be alerted, formed into their units, and despatched sufficiently quickly to affect the course of the battle, when they have to march three and a half times further to reach the battle than the British do to reach their objective?

There is a reason that TFSmith needs the British not to reach the Fort: its landward defences were nowhere near ready. Drawings of the coverface were not completed until August 1863, and construction was not started until November 1863. The only protection, then, are eleven 32pdr guns mounted on the landward side of the barbette tier, and 4 24pdrs mounted in the counterscarp gallery to sweep the fort's landward face. However, these 24pdrs would not come into play as the British can force the fort to surrender without assaulting the walls. The bluffs behind the fort overlook the fort itself, which gives those who hold it an advantage. From this elevated position, an attacking British force could snipe the 32pdr gunners and drop shells into the fort from the bluffs. When you consider this, the Royal Navy creating a breach through bombardment is advantageous, but not necessary.

Fortunately for TFSmith, the British are prevented from reaching the fort and pull back to the beach. Somehow, they are 'sniped at and shelled all the way'. However, the only guns with the attacking force is a provisional battery of 4 6pdrs, and the 6pdr carried only shot and spherical case not shells. Furthermore, the British would almost certainly have landed with larger guns than this. The older ships would have carried 12pdr and 24pdr howitzers for boat service, while newer ones would have had 12pdr and 20pdr Armstrongs instead. The British force should have had a considerable number of these guns, based on indicative numbers of boat guns issued to similar ships:

51-gun frigate: 2 20pdr RBL (Narcissus, February 1861); 2 12pdr RBL (Severn, December 1861); 1 20pdr RBL, 2 12pdr RBL (Shannon, December 1861)
26-gun frigate: 1 20pdr RBL (Galatea, December 1861)
21-gun corvette: 1 24pdr howitzer, 1 12pdr howitzer, 1 6pdr (Orestes, June 1861); 1 12pdr RBL (Rattlesnake, December 1861); 1 12pdr RBL, 1 12pdr howitzer (Barrosa, December 1861); 2 12pdr RBL, 1 9pdr RBL, 1 6pdr (Pylades, October 1862); 1 12pdr RBL, 1 12pdr howitzer (Cossack, January 1863)
17-gun sloop: 1 12pdr howitzer (Rattler, June 1862)
8-gun paddle sloop: 2 12pdr RBL, 1 12pdr howitzer (Salamander, January 1863)
6-gun paddle sloop: 2 24pdr howitzers, 1 12pdr howitzer, 1 6pdr (Dragon, June 1861); 2 20pdr RBL (Medea, October 1861)

The absence of these guns from the TL is startling. For some reason the guns of the transport HMS Vulcan 'were about all that held off the Americans from taking the last line of dunes before the shore'. However, the Royal Navy's amphibious warfare manual envisaged these boat guns being used actively in the event of a retreat:

'6. After landing, the boats should be hauled off into deep water to prevent a surprise, and those with guns might be employed on the flanks, to cover the advance or retreat when practicable.'
'8. The re-embarkation should be conducted on similar principles to the disembarkation... [when] the Main body have embarked... the Covering party then embark under cover of the boats' guns.'

Perhaps, like the road to Fort Point, the wind at the Golden Gate, and British gallantry, TFSmith simply doesn't realise that boat guns existed.