Lakes a-Mercy! (2)

The purpose of this post was to deal with the human factors of the Lakes war. Unfortunately, in researching it I detected another issue with the material factors which I felt I should pick up on. Rest assured, we'll get to the people in just a moment.


We are informed that the Union's gunboat force on the Lakes is armed with, among other sources, 'an increasing number of new guns cast at West Point, Cold Springs, and Rome'. Despite appearances, 'West Point, Cold Springs' in fact refers to a single location- Robert P. Parrott's West Point foundry at Cold Springs. As we have already seen, Parrott is doing double-service in the field and running his own arsenal. However, the production of weapons at Cold Springs also appears to have taken a quantum leap: it is sufficient to arm land forces, coastal fortifications, border defences like Fort Montgomery, the blue water navy, and ships on the Lakes.

The reference to Rome is rather a mystery. In February 1862, the only sites manufacturing heavy artillery were those at Pittsburgh, Boston, and Cold Spring, with a combined capacity of 33 pieces per week. By the end of 1863, there were now seven foundries making heavy artillery- however, none were in Rome. However, chapter 3, part 2 makes TFSmith's intention clear when it states that Fort 'Montgomery bristled with guns, from both Cold Springs and the state arsenal at Rome'. This shows that TFSmith has done almost no research, and relies on the gullibility of his audience not to check his research. This arsenal did not manufacture material, but stored it:

The arsenals at Vergennes, Vermont, and Rome, New York, which had been under the supervision of the commanding officer of the Watervliet Arsenal since its founding, had not been used for any purpose for many years before the war. The government had made efforts to sell them for ten years, but had received such low offers that nothing had been accomplished. With the advent of the Civil War, they again became useful, were repaired and staffed and used to store thousands of pounds of material

Either TFSmith believes that the US could simply start making cannon at Rome with the snap of their fingers, or he is hoping that the relatively small quantity of digitised evidence about the arsenal will enable him to bluff his readers.

TFSmith's overall approach to the material situation may be summed up in the two following posts:

given the general British attitude toward Canada West/Upper Canada, it seems pretty clear the sort of half-assed "Provincial Marine" effort I've sketched here would come pretty far down the list. It's pretty clear from Bourne the Admiralty was not going to bother... Likewise, given that the ice was in place from November to mid-April, why would Bouchier or anyone else even see a reason to give the "navy" anything? It's not like whatever vessels they scrape up is going to be able to get out of Kingston before the spring, at which point it's moot.

I'm sure there would be plenty of willingness to die gallantly (seems there almost always was, with the British in the Nineteenth Century) but given the results of Taku Forts and Petropavlovsk, I don't see the seagoing equivalent of Dad's Army being able to do much more than that in 1862, at least before the Saint Lawrence is clear all the way to the Atlantic. (1)

Somerset basically had said "don't bother because its too late" back in the first week of December...(see the discussion in Bourne)...a truly ambitious effort in Kingston - which is, of course, pretty much doomed to failure, given the time, distance, and weather. The ice didn't break up at Ogdensburgh (i.e. Prescott) until April 17, 1862...

The British did drop the ball; as stated several times, Somerset told Lewis in December, 1861 that the RN had better things to do. Period, end of story. MY take is that Monck et al would try to slap something together, so take a look at who and what is available in BNA - it's not the men who were last in Upper Canada ten years earlier, obviously. I found my quartet with one search of the DCB; it certainly was not difficult. (2)

TFSmith's belief that the British did not understand the importance of holding the Lakes is entirely his own fabrication. Not only did the 1862 commission take great care to consider sites for naval dockyards, but Sir James Shaw Kennedy wrote in February 1862 that 'Obtaining and maintaining the command of the lakes and rivers of Canada is a matter of paramount importance as regards the defence of that country.' It is true that the British had abandoned hopes of pushing ships up the St Lawrence in December. However, TFSmith seems to have forgotten that he has the British start the war by launching a surprise attack against the Union in April 1862, just before the river unfreezes. Why do the British not prepare for a war they are launching?

The reality is that this is the perfect set of circumstances for the Union. On the one hand, it gives them the maximum amount of time to build warships; on the other, it prevents the British from passing ships down the St Lawrence. If the British had waited a month, they could have contested the Lakes using gunboats constructed in Quebec and Montreal or dispatched from Britain. The fact that TFSmith must tip the scales so outrageously strongly once again shows the relative strength of the British position.

Whether this is a conscious decision on his part is debateable. However, there is a suggestion that he does, in fact, realise that the British could easily contest control of the Lakes if not irredeemably hamstrung by authorial fiat. Notice his paean to Montreal's industrial strength following its occupation by the Union:

Augustin Cantin’s Montreal Marine Works, an integrated yard of 14 acres in extent that had built more than 70 vessels since 1846. These included river, lake, and coastal steamers of up to 300 tons displacement. Cantin’s yard was supported by the foundries and engine works of the city

How fortunate for the Union that the British decide to build vessels only in Quebec, that the Canadians lack the entrepreneurial ability to build their own gunships, and that the British start a war while the river is still iced up!