Battles by Appointment

It is regular in the few occasions where TFSmith portrays the British and the Union manoeuvring against one another, rather than staring at one another over trench lines, that the two sides end up in a head-on military clash (usually with the British ramming themselves obligingly against Union defensive fortifications, even when there should not be any). When the Union is on the attack, meanwhile, the British melt away to avoid conflict where they absolutely cannot find any trenches to attack.
But one of the odd features of these manoeuvres is that they appear to be scheduled beforehand, by both parties, to lead to this outcome.





Rouses Point


The American force at Rouses Point is almost entirely to the west of Lake Champlain, and the lake is still hard frozen; with this in mind, an easy British victory could be achieved by attacking east of the Richelieu river and defeating the sparse Vermont militia acting as rail-line guards (thus cutting one of two rail lines feeding the entire American army). This would allow the British to prevent the Americans bringing up sufficient force for an assault on Montreal.
Instead, the British go for a direct attack on a fortified position which can be quickly reinforced.


Montreal

TFSmith mentions at one point that the Union force took Montreal without opposition, because of British troops evacuating it. There is no motive given for this.



Berthierville

Almost the entire American army at Berthierville is north of the St Lawrence, defying normal military logic by advancing on the far side of the river from their base of support. Oddly, the British consider this not only all well and good, but oblige them by deploying their own army north of the St Lawrence as well - resulting in the complicated field battle of Berthierville.
Instead, a potentially-useful operational movement might have been to leave a division to hold the Americans along the Saint-Maurice river (at trois-rivieres) and attack south of the St Lawrence - with the Grand Trunk railroad as a route of supply, the British could have attacked south of Montreal and cut the entire American army off from their supply base in the US.
While this would not necessarily have defeated Grant's army, it would at least have caused some major inconvenience and might have prompted a full retreat - or the threat of it might have significantly reduced the forces present on the north bank of the St Lawrence. TFSmith, however, assumes that battles just sort of happen when two armies are close together - logistics exists as a reason to weaken the British.



Yarmouth

In one operation that takes place as part of the siege of Portland, the British land at Yarmouth and advance south. They reach the line of the Presumpscot river north of Portland, and stop overnight (which allows reinforcements to arrive at midnight, just as happened in the first Portland attack). They are thus stymied in their attempt to take Portland.

But in describing their actions, TFSmith has actually had the British achieve all their remaining objectives for the whole campaign - he just does not notice and nor do the British. Yarmouth is a station of the Grand Trunk railroad, and one which the British now possess - thus cutting the rail line north into Canada from Union influence, and theoretically allowing the British to control it instead.

Instead, the British attempt to take Portland, fail, and get stuck for the next several months.

As per Bourne:

A combined operation, mounted from Nova Scotia, to capture Portland and occupy the greater part of Maine might, it was thought, draw off large numbers of American soldiers who would otherwise be available for an attack on Canada and cut the most likely line of attack via Lake Champlain. Still more important it would also solve the problem of Canada's exterior communications for it would both cover the vulnerable roads through New Brunswick and in the Grand Trunk Railway provide a direct communication with Quebec and Montreal.

This means there were three possible objectives for the British:

 1) Divert American attention from a potential attack on Canada: Failed, as the Union have already invaded Canada by the time of the expedition.
 2) Hamper the American warfighting capacity in Canada by cutting the GTR: Succeeded, but nobody notices anyway.
 3) Provide direct communication with Canada: Failed, but because the war doesn't start until April it doesn't matter.



Quebec


Much is made during the march to Quebec by the Union of the way the Grand Trunk is an "all weather road", allowing the Union to sustain a force on the advance to Quebec even in the depths of winter, and that the Union must win by spring or else the British will pour another 40,000 troops down the St Lawrence to relieve Quebec, in a rather odd attempt to suddenly raise dramatic tension after the British have been incompetent idiots all year.
But the British still possess Yarmouth, and there is nothing in particular stopping them from advancing up the "all weather road" by landing their 40,000 troops at Yarmouth - not, that is, if railroads automatically grant their possessors the ability to ignore winter.