Naval Gazing (1)

In an unrelated discussion thread, TFSmith explained his methodology for researching ship locations:

‘Do a search for "The Navy List" for the appropriate years (1861, 1862, whatever) on Google Books. They have all been scanned in; aside from the occasional finger, they are pretty amazing images, and - depending on your version of Acrobat - are searchable. If not, the indexes are completely accurate.

 The Navy List was published annually, even quarterly; assignments of ships (whether active, in reserve/ordinary, building, etc.) and the officers of the ships in commission are included, along with flag officers and their staffs for all the various fleets, squadrons, and detachments.’

Like his explanation of his economic model for the war, this is very helpful: it allows us to explain exactly where he goes wrong.

A warning to readers: this particular post may itself be accused of navel-gazing, as it considers in detail why TFSmith's use of sources is so misguided. If that doesn't interest you, you can ignore this post and wait for the follow-up, which deals with some of the things he's actually got wrong.

Shubrick's 'Eyes Wide Shut'

Outside the TL, TFSmith has expressed his belief that 'the US has a gunboat there [on Puget Sound] that is the equal of Grappler'. We know what he intends this gunboat to be:

'the only American ship of any significance on the Sound was the Revenue Service sidewheel gunboat USRC Shubrick (2), which had helped evacuate the small Army contingent on San Juan Island and then fled south toward Olympia.'

Why is the equation between Shubrick and Grappler, when the British had two gunboats permanently stationed in Puget Sound? More importantly, why is it so wrong?

HMS Grappler:

• 1 68pdr (8in) smoothbore muzzle-loader
• 1 32pdr (6.4in) smoothbore muzzle-loader
• 2 24pdr (5.82in) smoothbore muzzle-loading howitzer

USRC Shubrick:

• 1 24pdr (5.82in) Dahlgren muzzle-loading howitzer
• 1 12pdr (4.62in) Dahlgren smoothbore muzzle-loading howitzer

Even if Grappler landed both her main guns, she would still outgun Shubrick and would also have the advantage of screw propulsion over paddle. So how is Shubrick ‘the equal of Grappler, at least’?

Bonus: The image of Shubrick which TFSmith posted here comes from the USCG page. Right click the image, select properties, and it informs you that the address is:

proxy.php?image=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscg.mil%2Fhistory%2Fimg%2FShubrick1857sm.jpg&hash=a97d7de9ad9a33fef89c85db7affed78

This persumably means that TFSmith has read the page, and knows that Shubrick carries only two howitzers. So why did he ever claim that it was the equal of Grappler?

Yankee Catholic

The author has long claimed that the Canadien population was a hotbed of anti-British sentiment merely waiting in the wings to rise up against the British rule. Of course, with the repeated failures to do so in 1775, 1812, or even 1866, one has cause to doubt the author's cocksure proclamations.

What the author repeatedly seems to fail to realize is that the populace of Canada East (modern Quebec) was predominantly, rural, traditional, and deeply Catholic. In fact here's a brief sketch the author paints of the region:

Although the country people were devout Catholics and deeply conservative, the prewar connections with the States made a difference when war broke out in April; very few of the sedentary militia had responded with enthusiasm to their call-ups, and the percentage of Canadiens in the volunteers – always low since the force’s organization in 1855 as an Anglophone-dominated service, with many traditions drawn from the units that had helped put down the 1837 and 1838 rebellions - had not risen significantly. The reality of how the war began, with the failed British attack at Rouse’s Point, had done even less to carry French Canada to the cause; unlike 50 years earlier, the Americans had not attacked first, and there were already thousands of men of Canadien extraction in the U.S. forces by the winter of 1861-62. 

The subsequent months of crisis and then war had split Francophone Canada, as it had split the Anglophone community in the Province; for every ultramontane like Étienne-Paschal Taché, who declared his loyalty to the crown publicly from the steps of Notre-Dame de Québec - with the archbishop in attendance - and tried to rally the militia where the British flag still flew, there was a patriote like Louis-Joseph Papineau, pursuing the age-old dream of “Canadien” nationalism and rallying his followers, in many cases under the green-white-red tricolor of the ’37 rising. As in any such situation, the vast majority of the French-speaking population of the Province, some 900,000 men, women, and children, living largely in the historically French territory of Lower Canada, also known as the Canada East District, wanted little more than to be left alone. The realities of war, however, forced increasing numbers of Canadiens – and, for that matter, Anglophones whose community showed similar divisions between English and Irish, town and country – to make a decision.

California Dreaming (5)

Welcome to the final section of this mammoth examination of the British assault on San Francisco. If you'd like, check out parts 1, 2, 3,or 4; alternatively, press on for the epic conclusion.

California Dreaming (4)

For reasons of length, what was intended to be the final part of this examination has been split into two halves. Apologies if this seems like dragging it out! I didn't originally think the whole thing would take more than two posts. However, not only did there prove to be more wrong with the TL than I'd anticipated, but showing what was wrong needed more words and sources than I'd anticipated.

This first half (part 4) will deal with the remainder of the battle at sea, and the second (part 5) will deal with the landing. Although I don't think you need to review the previous sections to understand this one, you're more than welcome to do so: check out parts 1, 2 or 3, or the section dealing with the Pacific Northwest.

Cross-Country Rally

For the purposes of Burnished Rows of Steel, TFSmith has created what he terms 'ralliers': men who sat out the Civil War, but would be only too ready to join a war against the British. His usage of these 'ralliers' reveals the simplistic jingoism which underlies his entire treatment of the conflict. In many cases, it also shows the superficial nature of his research, and how he lacks either the drive or the intellectual curiosity to glean more than the most facile and basic understanding of the people he uses as pawns.

Greater Scott!

A while ago, we learned that TFSmith believed that General Winfield Scott was on some sort of secret espionage mission for the Union during his time convalescing in Paris. We also learned that this belief, like many others held by TFSmith, was complete nonsense.

Since the publication of that article, a significant fact has come to my attention. Not only did Scott fail to meet Napoleon III during his brief time in Paris, but when news of the Trent Affair arrived he scuttled back to the United States so hastily that it threw out all the US minister's arrangements:

'General Scott will have arrived in the United States doubtless before this despatch; will you say to him that I last evening received a note from Mr Thouvenel, naming two o'clock to-day to receive him; at which hour I attended at the foreign office and returned his thanks, &c. Mr Thouvenel was quite disappointed at not seeing him, and said that the Emperor had promptly assented to give him a private interview. I explained at the same time that his departure for his own country had been sudden and unexpected.' (William L. Dayton, US Minister to France, to William H. Seward, Secretary of State, 11 December 1861)

Can we detect a hint of thinly-veiled anger in Dayton's message? It would be entirely understandable if we did. After all, he had taken the trouble to arrange a meeting for Scott with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, only for Scott to high-tail it back to the States at the first threat of war. This was not just a personal insult to Thouvenel, at a time when the Union needed all the friends it could find. It also made the Union's representative to Paris look like a buffoon, and the Union's most prominent military figure of the past half century look like a coward.

Either Scott had no mission in Paris, or he lost his head and threw away his only chance to complete it. Which is the more likely?