California Dreaming (2)

It's been a while since we last looked at California. If you want to remind yourself what was wrong with the land defences, check out the previous post. You may also want to check out the problems with the Pacific Northwest, as California is used to boost the numbers there.

Otherwise, let's press on.

The militia

As well as detailing the defences, Chapter 7, part 2 also lays out the troops assigned to San Francisco. We are told that 'Governor Stanford had called out some 3,000 men of the state’s organized militia'. Unfortunately, in December 1861, there weren’t 3,000 militia in California to call out:

‘Seven of the companies mentioned in the above table have been mustered into the service of the United States, while others have had their numbers considerably diminished by their members enlisting in the same service… The Stockton Blues, Sutter Rifles, Sierra Guard, Downey Guard, Sotoyome Guard, and the Humboldt Volunteers, have virtually though not formally disbanded. No arms have been issued to nineteen of the companies known to be organised, while a number of others are only partially armed and equipped. If two thousand five hundred muskets could be mustered out of the number of rank and file upon the rolls, we should be agreeably surprised.’ (Sacramento Daily Union, 21 March 1862)

Indeed, the description of any Californian militia as ‘organised’ is sketchy, given that their state in December 1862 was very reminiscent of the Maine militia in December 1861:

The enrolment of the militia has only been partly made. Up to this date, returns have only been received from the Second Brigade and a portion of the First and Sixth brigades, so that not even an approximate return can be made to the President of the United States, as required by the laws of the State of California and the laws of Congress.

TFSmith presumably allows for a sudden rush of enthusiastic volunteers to fill out the ranks of the militia, as he does in New York, Vermont and Maine (though not, for some reason, Canada). Unfortunately, even if these volunteers had come out, there weren’t 3,000 weapons to issue them with:

‘we should, therefore, have at least a hundred thousand stand of arms distributed among our Militia; instead of this there are not three thousand, and many of these are of antique style and character, of but little use for modern warfare.’ (report of the message of the Governor of California, Marysville Daily Appeal, 11 January 1862)

Looking at the December 1861 report suggests the militia had 2,967 muskets and rifles available. The 1862 report, however, suggests a lower number:
On hand in arsenal as at December 1861: 87 muskets.
Issued to military companies prior to 1st January 1862 and now in their possession: 1,354 muskets, 474 rifles
Received back from companies during 1862: 437 muskets, 110 rifles.
Total = 2,375 weapons, with 2,288 in the hands of militia.

Where these missing 592 weapons went is unclear, but it is likely that they were broken or lost by the militia organisations over the course of the year. This damage caused by careless or untrained soldiers to antique weapons should be a familiar theme in the TL, though in practice the Union consistently manages to mobilise more troops than its stores of weapon seem to indicate would be possible.

As for the prospect of expansion, per the 1862 report:

‘We have but a single battery of artillery, and but few muskets or small arms of any description, excepting those in the hands of the organised militia.’ (p.7) ‘the exposed and defenceless condition of our State’ (p.8) ‘California is sadly deficient in arms… We need artillery and cavalry arms, and improved arms for our infantry- of which there are none on this Coast.’ (p.15) ‘There are constant applications made to this department for arms, by citizens who desire to connect themselves with the military organisation for home duty. If this inclination could be encouraged it would lead to a large increase of our military force. It will be noticed that the number of arms in possession of the state is so small that the most prompt means should be taken to increase the supply, to arm new organisations, and complete the equipment of those already formed.’ (p.22)

Clearly, then, the militia did not have 3,000 organised troops and was unlikely to be able to equip new volunteers. Who else might have been able to help?

Federal arsenals


There were three armouries on the Union's Pacific coast from which troops might have been armed. The first of these, Fort Vancouver, we can dismiss from our calculations. They had 3,763 muskets and 126 rifles in November 1859, and 'two or three thousand stand of arms' in October 1864. We have already seen that TFSmith increases the number of troops in the Department of Oregon by c.2,000, so most of Fort Vancouver's weapons would have been used up.

The two California arsenals are Benicia and Alcatraz. However, there is no solid evidence as to how many weapons might have been present in either of them. Some guesses may be made, but all we have is fragmentary suggestions of their total capacity. We do know, however, that as of December 1861 40,000 weapons had been ordered away from California in two transactions: one in early September, and a second in mid-September. Without knowing how many weapons were in store to start with, it is impossible to know how few weapons were left. Yet there are indications that these transactions left California begging for additional arms.

On 4 October 1862, Brigadier-General George Wright, commander of the Department of the Pacific informed the Adjutant-General in Washington DC:

I telegraphed to you a few days since asking that 20,000 stand of small-arms and equipments might be sent here by the first steamer. I hope they will be sent; occasion might arise rendering it necessary to use them.

In December 1862, he requested permission to issue weapons to California state militia; in January 1863 he chased this request; and in February 1863 he asked for 'at least 10,000 stand of small-arms and equipments'. His response came only in April 1863, however, when he was told that he could only loan weapons to the militia 'in cases of extraordinary exigency'. This is not the behaviour of a country with a surplus of arms.

The practice before the war, when the Federal government had lots of weapons, was to issue the oldest to the state militia and keep the newer weapons for themselves. It is therefore suggestive that in March 1863, the Governor of California's petition that 29,000 weapons be sent was met with an offer to send 30,000 'best Springfield muskets'. When troops at Gettysburg were armed with smoothbores, why were 30,000 Springfields being sent to a peaceful backwater like California? Was this because the Federal Arsenals in California simply did not have the weapons to give?

Furthermore, in February 1864 Benicia Arsenal was requisitioning 50,000 infantry weapons (plus 8,000 pistols and 9,000 sabres) to put an all-arms force of 75,000 into the field. This requisition also reported that 5,000 weapons had been issued to the militia. Therefore, around 25,000 weapons from the mid-1863 delivery should still have been in store. This strongly suggests that there was a minimal quantity of weapons in California in 1862: enough for Wright to consider giving some of them to the militia, but not enough for Halleck to allow him to do so, and not enough to feature in the calculations of 1864.

Without clear evidence, it is impossible to state categorically how many weapons were in California in 1862. However, the weight of evidence is that there were serious problems with the quantity of weapons available historically in the Department of the Pacific, even with the minimal threat that was present.

Total defenders

We have fairly comprehensive details of the number of soldiers that TFSmith believes could be stationed in San Francisco:

Governor Stanford had called out some 3,000 men of the state’s organized militia, and put the units in San Francisco – some 2,000 men organized into two regiments of heavy artillery - under Wright’s command; this increased the soldiers available for the defense of the Bay to more than 5,000, including regulars and volunteers

We also have fairly comprehensive details of the number of troops that were historically stationed in this region.We have discussed TFSmith's confusion over the various measures of Union strength previously. However, as he specifies that these were soldiers 'available for the defence of the Bay,' he can only be talking about Present for Duty. Aggregate Present includes men who could not be made available for the defence, including sick and wounded, and non-combatants.

As of 31 December 1861, the entire Department of the Pacific had 4,632 officers and men present for duty. Of this, there were 3,976 PFD in California and Nevada. By 30 June 1862, there were 5,066 troops present for duty, with 2,258 PFD in California and Nevada. Calling out 3,000 men of the state militia would leave just over 5,000 troops in the whole of California and Nevada. In theory, it would be possible to station 5,000 troops in San Francisco by using all the militia and regular units to defend the city, and abandoning all but token commitments in the rest of the two states.

However, this cannot be possible. For a start, we are told that only 2,000 of the militia are stationed in San Franciso: this immediately drops the available force to c.4,000. The only force available to compensate for this would be Colonel Carleton's California Column, numbering c.1,300 troops. However, Wright reports at the end of the chapter that 'some small parties have organized with a view to pass the frontier; but thus far Col. Carleton’s forces have defeated their attempts'. What we have here, then, is the invention of a thousand regular troops to defend San Franciso.

It is this defence to which we will next turn our attention.