It's Always Sunny In Mexico II

In the story Mexico and the Southwest in general seem to be a land of convenience for the author. As we last saw, here the United States very ahistorically begins to devote significant resources to coaxing the French out of Mexico on a very unfavorable deal. Now though, as the story rolls into 1863, the author feels Mexico should get more credit than it did historically.

We open now, to what is apparently known as the "Rio Grande Campaign", let's watch as the author turns a sideshow into yet another advanced win for the Union:

With the French agreement to withdraw, Juarez’ Liberal government in Mexico City was free to reassign some of the 32,000-strong force under Comonfort that had been formed to defend Puebla against the second, never-attempted, French attack. Although some 3,000 Mexican Conservatives had been raised to augment the French expeditionary force over the winter of 1862-63, most were willing to accept the amnesty offered by the Central government, conditioned on the amnesty-seekers willingness to serve on Mexico’s new frontiers.
Among them were roughly 2,000 men of the so-called “Miramon Brigade” under perhaps the most able Mexican officer of the period, Colonel Miguel Miramon. The unit was dispatched to the northeastern frontier, placed under the watchful eye of the liberal caudillo of Tamaulipas, General José María Jesús Carbajal, and grouped with a 2,000-strong force raised by the regular army Colonel Emilio Langberg into a division, to be commanded by one of the most distinguished officers of the regular army, General Porfirio Diaz.

Carbajal had replaced the pro-Confederate José Santiago Vidaurri in 1863 when the settlement with France was reached, and rapidly organized his troops into a mixed force of infantry and cavalry; the later were under the long-time leader of the pro-Mexican forces in the border wars, General Juan Cortina. In total, Carbajal had some 6,000 Mexican troops, regulars and irregulars, and fitted out with equipment the French agreed to leave behind as they withdrew. Because of the unsettled condition of the frontier – Carbajal, although loyal to Juarez’ government, had told the Confederate authorities in Texas he intended to continue Vidaurri’s policies, even as the exiled Vidaurri said exactly the opposite to Beauregard and Hebert – the Texans began sending troops to the border.

The problems really leap out here.

Firstly, the French leave equipment behind, apparently to help outfit the Mexicans. Now this is a throwaway line, but a significant one. First, because this is actually a concession Washington couldn't hope to arm their Mexican allies, secondly because it is reality warping logic. No firm number is given on the amount of material left behind, but assuming it is even only rifles, say even only enough to arm the 6,000 men depicted, that would come up to a cost of about 360,000 francs (assuming each Minie Rifle costs 60 francs each), which digs severely into the amount of money France is supposed to be recouping from this venture. If they've left enough rifles behind to arm all 30,000 Mexican troops plus artillery, that cost would soar into the millions.

What was France getting out of this deal again?

Stupendously convenient military equipment aside, we then see that the long time warlord of the northeast in Mexico José Santiago Vidaurri is replaced by José María Jesús Carbajal. Vidaurri however, should have the influence and strength to buck such an attempt (either by calling on the CSA, or by sheer dint of probably being able to claim French equipment for himself) and he seems to be shunted off with exaggerated ease when in real life he was difficult to get rid of. In any event, Carbajal, who was little better than a warlord himself, manages to set himself up with 6,000 men on the border, its a wonder the Confederates don't fall for it.

However, we see a general "who's who" of Mexican leaders here. You have the fiery Conservative Miramon, and of course Porifio Diaz. To point out that all of these men hated each other on a very personal level is something of an understatement. How such a unit would be effective in the field is an open question, but I digress.

Next of course, we get some tidbits on Texans fighting Texans:

As it was, even with Walker’s Greyhound Division withdrawn from Louisiana and Roane’s cavalry from Arkansas to deal with the resurgent Comanche in West Texas, about the most that could be spared for the Rio Grande were state troops, militia, and Brigadier General Henry McCulloch’s strong brigade, detached from Walker’s division. These were deemed sufficient, however, and presumably would have been - absent Houston’s loyalists.
Houston, who had risen from private to lieutenant in the United States Army during the 1812-15 war with the British, had declared his neutrality upon secession. With the Confederacy allied with the old enemy, however, the man who - despite his age - remained the undisputed leader of Unionist feeling in the state, had headed south into Mexico in the spring of 1863 with a large number of his followers, following what became known as the Camino de Las Lágrimas.
With aid from Washington flowing by way of the long but secure trail from El Paso to Matamoros, Houston – at the age of 69 – could not take the field, but did (along with his fellow Unionist ex-governor, Elisha M. Pease) help organize what became known as Houston’s Brigade, some 3,000 Texans under the actual command of Brigadier General Alexander J. Hamilton, and regiments led by colonels Edmund Davis (1st Texas Cavalry), John Haynes (1st Texas Infantry), William Alexander (2nd Texas Infantry), and Adolph Zoeller (3rd Texas Infantry). Davis’ executive officer in the cavalry was the old Tejano, Lt. Col. Juan N. Seguín.

Now there's a few problems here. The first obviously is that the Union somehow rounds up over 1,000 extra Texans to fight for them than historically. Now maybe some of them really hate Britain, but why would they then turn their guns on fellow Texans? It's a little incredible to imagine Sam Houston of all people (at 69) both leaving the state for Mexico, which he detested, and then rallying 3,000 men to fight alongside Mexicans in the invasion of his home state.

In short, you have a military formation comprised of former enemies from two nations who have nothing in common with one another, varying degrees of experience and completely different training (not to mention a language barrier), and who are preparing to lead an invasion of part of their former home to attack their countrymen and burn their property. Somehow this circle doesn't square unless these are all hardcore Unionists who have no qualms (or racist quibbles) about helping foreigners loot their country.

This also apparently amends the number of rifles left by the French to nearly 10,000, bringing the cost up to over 500,000 francs to arm France's former enemies.

One wonders how this is supposed to make sense in context.

In any event it serves to tie down further resources from the Confederacy. Though we know from the author that the war doesn't end until 1866-67 and so can imagine that this isn't even an effective campaign, despite all the braggadocio.

It's always sunny in Mexico for the Union it seems though.