This three part series of posts on Berthierville is not the whole of the analysis of that battle; there is a lot that is wrong with just the opening engagements.
Willich, 51 at the time of Berthierville, spoke English with a strong Prussian accent and was one of the premier disciplinarians in Grant’s army. He expected his men would perform the evolution of drill to bugle calls, and, unsurprisingly, trained them to do just that, not just on the parade ground but also on the battlefield, where Willich was invariably found in the front line. Kirk, 34, and Miller, 30, both attorneys in private life, were amateur soldiers, but each had more than a year of active duty under their belts by September of 1862, and had benefitted from the examples and attention of McCook, Wood, and Willich, as had many of the men in their brigades. Their camps were fortified, trenches had been dug behind the Chaloupe River, and outposts were set north of the river. Willich’s company of engineers gave the division an advantage they had put to good use in the lull before the battle began, felling trees to create abbatis, adding packed earth to the trenches, and building redoubts for Terrill’s artillery.
Just after dawn, sentries along the northern bank of the Chaloupe saw skirmishers moving forward through the open ground to the north, with masses of redcoated infantry behind; the British artillery opened fire, and the American regiments on the south side of the stream beat the long roll. Kirk’s and Miller’s brigades were to the southeast, Miller’s closest to the Chenal du Nord on the right; Willich’s was on the left flank. Wood’s headquarters and the artillery and divisional trains were to the south. Willich’s brigade anchored the northwestern end of the line, and was refused to the southwest to provide an entrenched flank. Each brigade had a battery attached, and the fourth, plus the Pioneers, were held as a divisional reserve.
The action grew hot along the northwestern part of the division’s line, as battalions from what was Maj. Gen. Randal Rumley’s 2nd Division, Army of Canada, skirmished and sniped from north of the Chaloupe, driving the American pickets into their outposts. The British 18-pounders fired into the tree stumps and obstructions around the outposts across the river, and the American videttes began falling back. The disengagement was fairly simple, however, and the British did not press their attacks; Kirk actually reported the action appeared only to have been a raid, and had requested Wood allow his brigade to cross the Chaloupe and counter-attack when the reason for Rumley’s movement became obvious.
Paulet’s crack 1st Division, trained at Aldershot and the only field formation maintained at full strength in Britain before the war began, had moved up quietly on the Americans’ left flank, avoiding detection even by Willich’s well-trained scouts; the British artillery began firing for effect from front and flank, and some 9,000 British infantry in three brigades attacked Willich’s single American brigade.
Paulet’s division, with Brown’s 2nd Brigade and the 3rd Brigade, led by the Hon. Percy K. Herbert, CB, a former aide-de-camp to Her Royal Highness, came on from the north, each with a battalion in open order as skirmishers followed by two battalions with fixed bayonets; Brown’s brigade was led by the 78th Regiment (Highlanders/Ross-shire Buffs), with pipes a-skirling, while Herbert’s had the 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment (King’s Royal Rifle Corps) in front; Enfields and Springfields blazed as the British came in on a run, and Terrill’s artillery blasted away; the battle rapidly turned into an all-out effort, with Paulet’s troops attacking with all the professionalism imaginable from a British Army and Wood’s men standing and fighting on the defensive, giving back blow for blow.
Although the terrain and tactical circumstances on the Chaloupe did not permit much maneuvering, some regiments performed notable feats of arms: at one point in the battle, the 49th Ohio swung back like a gate, changing its front ninety degrees to meet a threat to its flank, and then returned to its original position. The 32nd Indiana, Willich’s old regiment, used his Prussian tactics with success, executing a bayonet charge into a tightly packed British column. Terrill’s reserve battery, even under fire from the left, unlimbered and fired in support of Willich’s brigade. As Wood later wrote:
“Terrill’s battalion was a host in itself; The fire was terrific, and the guns were handled superbly. Wherever the guns were turned, silence prevailed.”
Wood, splendidly mounted like the cavalryman he was, was riding toward Willich’s position to see how the German was doing against what was obviously the main assault when Paulet committed his reserve, Taylor’s 1st Brigade, in an oblique attack from the southeast. At this point, with three brigades of British infantry, supported by a full battalion of field artillery, almost enveloping Willich’s brigade, Wood realized the battle was on a knife’s edge; his division’s line looked like an almost closed jackknife, and Terrill, a Virginian who had remained loyal, was down: he had been struck in the side by a shell fragment from one of the long-ranged British guns.
At that point, Willich’s brigade was curling in on itself, coming under fire from front, left, and rear; Wood pulled Col. Frederick S. Stumbaugh’s 77th Pennsylvania and Col. John C. Starkweather’s 1st Wisconsin from the reserve positions of Kirk’s and Miller’s brigades to try and cover the trains, which were coming under fire from Taylor’s brigade. As the Pennsylvanians formed a line, they suffered heavily from fire from the 61st Regiment (South Gloucestershire), Taylor’s right flank battalion. There was a lull in the fighting, and then Rumley’s division, with brigades led by William S.R. Norcott, CB; Edward R. Wetherall, CB; and Henry A. Lake, CB, all pitched in from the north, striking Woods’ weakened 1st and 3rd brigades. Starkweather’s regiment was turned around again, and thrown back into the Chaloupe River line; the American, British, and Canadian provincial troops (one of the units in Norcott’s 1st Brigade was the Stadacona Rifle Battalion, under Lt. Col. D.C. Thomson) slammed into each other again and again, in a firefight that came down to a few yards at times.
Taylor’s brigade forced Stumbaugh’s Pennsylvanians back, and the whole position was endangered; Wood learned that Kirk was shot and mortally wounded, and Miller was wounded as well; with Terrill gone, only Willich was left on his feet. Reluctantly, Wood ordered the Prussian to cover the retreat, and the battered 1st and 3rd brigades, along with what was left of the artillery and trains, slipped away from the Chaloupe and withdrew south along the road to Lanoraie. Willich, with his battery shot to pieces and his four regiments reduced to battalion strength, held off the lunging British long enough for what was left of Wood’s division to withdraw, and then tried to march off the field as well. At one point, as the movement turned into a pell mell retreat, Willich actually halted the 32nd Indiana under fire and drilled them in the manual of arms until they steadied and could be marched off toward the river. Willich’s pioneer company, turned into infantry, covered the retreat.
In the end, however, Paulet’s and Rumley’s numbers and discipline overwhelmed even that example; Willich’s horse was shot out from under him, and the gallant old German was captured, along with most of what was left of his brigade. But for every American dead or wounded, there were as many British regulars or Canadian volunteers; even with 2-1 odds and the surprise of Paulet’s flank attack, the strength of the defensive over the offensive, especially when the defending force was dug in, even behind simple field defenses, was undeniable.
Just after dawn, sentries along the northern bank of the Chaloupe saw skirmishers moving forward through the open ground to the north, with masses of redcoated infantry behind; the British artillery opened fire, and the American regiments on the south side of the stream beat the long roll. Kirk’s and Miller’s brigades were to the southeast, Miller’s closest to the Chenal du Nord on the right; Willich’s was on the left flank. Wood’s headquarters and the artillery and divisional trains were to the south. Willich’s brigade anchored the northwestern end of the line, and was refused to the southwest to provide an entrenched flank. Each brigade had a battery attached, and the fourth, plus the Pioneers, were held as a divisional reserve.
The action grew hot along the northwestern part of the division’s line, as battalions from what was Maj. Gen. Randal Rumley’s 2nd Division, Army of Canada, skirmished and sniped from north of the Chaloupe, driving the American pickets into their outposts. The British 18-pounders fired into the tree stumps and obstructions around the outposts across the river, and the American videttes began falling back. The disengagement was fairly simple, however, and the British did not press their attacks; Kirk actually reported the action appeared only to have been a raid, and had requested Wood allow his brigade to cross the Chaloupe and counter-attack when the reason for Rumley’s movement became obvious.
Paulet’s crack 1st Division, trained at Aldershot and the only field formation maintained at full strength in Britain before the war began, had moved up quietly on the Americans’ left flank, avoiding detection even by Willich’s well-trained scouts; the British artillery began firing for effect from front and flank, and some 9,000 British infantry in three brigades attacked Willich’s single American brigade.
Paulet’s division, with Brown’s 2nd Brigade and the 3rd Brigade, led by the Hon. Percy K. Herbert, CB, a former aide-de-camp to Her Royal Highness, came on from the north, each with a battalion in open order as skirmishers followed by two battalions with fixed bayonets; Brown’s brigade was led by the 78th Regiment (Highlanders/Ross-shire Buffs), with pipes a-skirling, while Herbert’s had the 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment (King’s Royal Rifle Corps) in front; Enfields and Springfields blazed as the British came in on a run, and Terrill’s artillery blasted away; the battle rapidly turned into an all-out effort, with Paulet’s troops attacking with all the professionalism imaginable from a British Army and Wood’s men standing and fighting on the defensive, giving back blow for blow.
Although the terrain and tactical circumstances on the Chaloupe did not permit much maneuvering, some regiments performed notable feats of arms: at one point in the battle, the 49th Ohio swung back like a gate, changing its front ninety degrees to meet a threat to its flank, and then returned to its original position. The 32nd Indiana, Willich’s old regiment, used his Prussian tactics with success, executing a bayonet charge into a tightly packed British column. Terrill’s reserve battery, even under fire from the left, unlimbered and fired in support of Willich’s brigade. As Wood later wrote:
“Terrill’s battalion was a host in itself; The fire was terrific, and the guns were handled superbly. Wherever the guns were turned, silence prevailed.”
Wood, splendidly mounted like the cavalryman he was, was riding toward Willich’s position to see how the German was doing against what was obviously the main assault when Paulet committed his reserve, Taylor’s 1st Brigade, in an oblique attack from the southeast. At this point, with three brigades of British infantry, supported by a full battalion of field artillery, almost enveloping Willich’s brigade, Wood realized the battle was on a knife’s edge; his division’s line looked like an almost closed jackknife, and Terrill, a Virginian who had remained loyal, was down: he had been struck in the side by a shell fragment from one of the long-ranged British guns.
At that point, Willich’s brigade was curling in on itself, coming under fire from front, left, and rear; Wood pulled Col. Frederick S. Stumbaugh’s 77th Pennsylvania and Col. John C. Starkweather’s 1st Wisconsin from the reserve positions of Kirk’s and Miller’s brigades to try and cover the trains, which were coming under fire from Taylor’s brigade. As the Pennsylvanians formed a line, they suffered heavily from fire from the 61st Regiment (South Gloucestershire), Taylor’s right flank battalion. There was a lull in the fighting, and then Rumley’s division, with brigades led by William S.R. Norcott, CB; Edward R. Wetherall, CB; and Henry A. Lake, CB, all pitched in from the north, striking Woods’ weakened 1st and 3rd brigades. Starkweather’s regiment was turned around again, and thrown back into the Chaloupe River line; the American, British, and Canadian provincial troops (one of the units in Norcott’s 1st Brigade was the Stadacona Rifle Battalion, under Lt. Col. D.C. Thomson) slammed into each other again and again, in a firefight that came down to a few yards at times.
Taylor’s brigade forced Stumbaugh’s Pennsylvanians back, and the whole position was endangered; Wood learned that Kirk was shot and mortally wounded, and Miller was wounded as well; with Terrill gone, only Willich was left on his feet. Reluctantly, Wood ordered the Prussian to cover the retreat, and the battered 1st and 3rd brigades, along with what was left of the artillery and trains, slipped away from the Chaloupe and withdrew south along the road to Lanoraie. Willich, with his battery shot to pieces and his four regiments reduced to battalion strength, held off the lunging British long enough for what was left of Wood’s division to withdraw, and then tried to march off the field as well. At one point, as the movement turned into a pell mell retreat, Willich actually halted the 32nd Indiana under fire and drilled them in the manual of arms until they steadied and could be marched off toward the river. Willich’s pioneer company, turned into infantry, covered the retreat.
In the end, however, Paulet’s and Rumley’s numbers and discipline overwhelmed even that example; Willich’s horse was shot out from under him, and the gallant old German was captured, along with most of what was left of his brigade. But for every American dead or wounded, there were as many British regulars or Canadian volunteers; even with 2-1 odds and the surprise of Paulet’s flank attack, the strength of the defensive over the offensive, especially when the defending force was dug in, even behind simple field defenses, was undeniable.
There are several problems with this passage.
Firstly, there is that the Union troops are digging trenches during what is essentially a field battle. This is not common at this point – Spotsylvania Court House, in 1864, was the first Civil War field battle where troops dug in rather than forming embrasures (built up wooden obstacles) - and the generals in question are generals who didn't even fortify their positions as a matter of course at this time. (It was Shiloh which taught them otherwise, and Shiloh did not happen TTL.)
There is mention of British “18 pounders” - this is a misnomer at best. As this is a regular British formation (two divisions, though each of them is a “TFSmith pattern” division consisting of three brigades) there should be six to eight batteries of 12 pounder Armstrongs present, though it is also possible there would be 20 pounder light position guns or 40 pounder heavy position guns. If the 18 pounders are supposed to be Canadian artillery, then this is little better – no 18 pounder field guns were present in Canada during the time of the Trent, though 18 brass 18-lbers were sent over the sleigh route in January.
In any case, as regular British formations there should be Armstrong guns firing here. If this is a single corps (of two divisions, as per British pattern) there should be six foot or position Armstrong batteries present; if we instead count by battalions, there should be nine or more. Compared to this, the brass 18-lber smoothbores would be a minor detail. (The estimated total number of guns is 40-50.)
In the preamble to the battle itself, it is noted as being intended to be like the Battle of the Alma. The actions shown above are not correct for the Battle of the Alma, however, as the Alma involved a diversionary flank attack by the French and a frontal British attack across the river; it also involved a climb of nearly 110 metres. Nevertheless, we will return to a comparison of the Alma later.
The way the British attack unfolds is odd. British troops of this time were trained to fire at several hundred yards (and did at the Alma) with notable success; American troops at this time were not. Suppressing the American base of fire should be relatively easy for such a large force (three British brigades attacking one American one).
In the event the British had launched a bayonet charge, however, they should have taken only one volley (or at most two) – they are described as coming on “at a run” and at such a speed they will cross from the open-fire range (around 100 yards) to bayonet point in about thirty seconds. This is not a situation in which they would take very many casualties, not in a surprise flank assault.
Instead, however, the way the attack is written “a firefight that came down to a few yards at times” the attack is a close-in firefight. This sacrifices every British advantage at once, forgoing their huge range advantage without gaining any benefit in return and fighting at the only range which an American formation can fight.
All the “great feats of arms” mentioned are by Union brigades rather than British regulars, indeed at one point a Union force charges into a “tightly packed British column”. This is very silly as the British way of making an attack was a line, not a column.
One of the other feats of arms has the Union troops wheeling out of line to hit an enemy on their flank. This is probably copied from Gettysburg, but illustrates the failure of simply taking one action and transposing it like this - the British, unlike the Confederates at Gettysburg, have well-drilled cavalry on hand to use. If the line of battle is broken like this, the result should be a cavalry charge, the breaking of the position, and the quick destruction of the Union force.
The British attack does not achieve anything in particular. A single brigade is captured, at a considerable cost to the British and Canadians, in spite of having launched a surprise attack that engulfed the enemy from three directions with more experienced regulars.
The comparison mentioned to the Alma is very unflattering. While the narration tells us that the advantage of field fortification has sufficed to overcome surprise, a flank attack, and a 2:1 advantage, at the Alma the advantage of permanent, well-built fortifications (on top of a very tall hill, as opposed to the flat ground around Berthierville) was insufficient to stop a British-French force of 60,000 defeating a Russian force of 30,000 in a frontal attack in broad daylight. During the Battle of the Alma the Allies inflicted roughly 2:1 casualties, with most of these being inflicted by the 28,000 British troops (and most of those inflicted by their infantry).
So the comparisons to the Alma here are that – compared to the Alma – the British are making a flank attack, not a frontal one; they have tactical surprise; their artillery is better; they are attacking on the flat instead of up a hill; their enemy is in field fortifications instead of permanent redoubts… and they suffer twice the relative casualties as at the Alma.
Of course, the amazing power of the defensive showcased here is not permitted to be used by the British (who did plan on using field fortifications to defend Montreal and Canada West), and the defending British in those battles are easily swept aside. Applying a similar factor to Inkerman as was applied here to the Alma, but in the opposite direction, it should have taken roughly one division of British troops to hold off the entire Army of the Lakes.
There is another battle this is similar to, however, and the clue is in the commanding officers – Willich and McCook. Willich's men at Stones River were the right flank of McCook's corps, and were attacked by the Confederates in the early morning. The attack at Stones River broke two Union divisions with minimal casualties, and only Sheridan's division stopped the whole Federal flank from being rolled up – Willich's Brigade in particular was captured almost to a man.
A further indication that Stones River was a source is that the Confederate attack there was in column – and the British here attack in column, instead of in either a line or (as per the Alma) a thick skirmish order.
What we have here is a major British victory from the Crimea, and a major Union defeat from the early phases of Stones River, being combined together into an engagement where the two sides obtain equal honours. This adds the Alma to the list of British achievements which TFSmith intends to recast in the Civil War and turn into a failure, simply because they are facing Americans.
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