Manoeuvering into difficulty

We have seen how TFSmith's description of an argument between the Princes Consort and of Wales at the Curragh manoeuvres makes no sense. However, there are further problems with this section which do not appear at first glance.

The Calixa Files

Burnished Rows of Steel sees a series of strange disappearances, none of which is stranger than the disappearance of nuance and context from the back story of one Calixa Lavallée.

An Errant Canadian?

In Chapter 2 Part 1 we have a rather curious meeting taking place in Toronto at University College in the office of Professor John McCaul. This is a curious meeting for two reasons. The first is for the venue of the meeting. From the text it is implied John McCaul has invited his two guests to discuss issues pertaining to Canada's future in his office, This is something out of character for McCaul who was an academic first and foremost, and in his long career offers no notable political commentary, so his desire to see two men who by all rights should have no reason to see him, is rather confusing off the cuff.

However, let us address the guest list:

Melbourne to Run

To understand how hideously unprepared for war the British are, we are given a vignette aboard the Melbourne on its way to Canada. Needless to say, there are many confusing mistakes in this.

It's not just the action...

From chapter 9, part 2:

Wolseley snorted. “The Duke of 'every change to be made at the right time, and the right time is when you cannot help it'? … he actually said that to me once

From The Spectator, 21 March 1925 (emphasis added):

The Duke of Cambridge opposed to Wolseley's ardour what may be called the philosophy of retarded action. At the end of his Commandership-in-Chief he said: 'Gentlemen, there have been changes—great changes. But I can say this. Every change has been made at the right time and the right time is when you cannot help it.'

Ze Germans are coming...

From chapter 1:

'I saw how we came to be at war with the Russians, and as much of a mess that was, but there was a reason for it: the Russian threat to the Mediterranean. It was a mess, and we had to try and recruit Germans and Italians and Swiss to keep the Army at strength'

From elsewhere on the boards:

'They struggled, in fact, to the extent the British were recruiting German, Swiss, and Italian mercenaries in 1855-56 (not that any of them actually made it to the Crimea)' (link)
'The issues brought out by the mercenary "legions" of 1854-56 are that is [sic] shows how brittle the regular army was' (link)

From Henry S. Sanford, US consul at Belgium, to William H. Seward, Secretary of State, 25 May 1861: 

‘I observe that the President is about to increase very largely the number of men in the standing or Regular Army. It has occurred to me that in view of the preference likely to be given to the volunteer service, and the consequent difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of army recruits through the ordinary channels at home, it might be advisable to seek them elsewhere. The German Legion of 10,000 men for the Crimean war was recruited by England in Hamburg, and were excellent soldiers. I have no doubt the same number of able-bodied men who have been in the army could be obtained there now in a few weeks for the bounty of steerage passage to the United States.'

The Colonel Baker Particulars

One of the rumors used to explain why the Patriote Canadians turn so rapidly to the American side is as follows;

The "Battle" of Limestone Ridge

In Burnished Rows of Steel we are treated in Chapter 5 Part 1 to the only real “Canadian” contribution to the war effort in full. That would be the so called “battle” at Limestone Ridge. In a poorly disguised effort to conceal the sheer historical parallelism the battle is called Limestone Ridge instead of Ridgeway with the serial numbers filed off.

The author is condescendingly dismissive of the Canadians who would serve the crown, variously calling them dupes or colonel blimps, blithely assuming that not a single man or musket more could be mustered versus his own sloppily collected 25,000.

In fact the author has spent a great deal of time dismissing the Canadians as losers and insists (to the point of absurdity) that the single battle of Ridgeway in 1866 is the be all to end all of Canadian fighting prowess. One might think to question the logic of such a comparison if it were made regarding the United States Army in terms of appealing to Red Cloud’s War in 1866 in order to say the United States Army lacks skill or smarts, but the author evidently finds such logic completely reasonable so we must go on.

The specifics of this early campaign into Canada West are not entirely clear. We have a crossing of 30,000 men in the Detroit Frontier, and then the only real action being a brief siege of London (Canada West). The big piece of the chapter comes when we get to “not Ridgeway”.

We have an American force of roughly 2 Divisions crossing the Niagara frontier laid out as such:

II Corps, Department of the Lakes

Commanding General: Brigadier General A.M. McCook

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Isaac F. Quinby

Corps troops - 3rd Ohio Cavalry Regiment (Col. Lewis Zahm); 4th Ohio Cavalry Regiment (Col. John Kennett); Battery H, 5th US Artillery – Capt. William R. Terrill; Lt. Howard M. Burnham

2nd Division - Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood;

1st Brigade – Col. Edward N. Kirk: 29th Indiana, 30th Indiana, 34th Illinois, 77th Pennsylvania;

2nd Brigade – Col. August Willich: 15th Ohio, 49th Ohio; 32nd Indiana, 39th Indiana;

3rd Brigade – Col. John F. Miller: 1st Wisconsin, 38th Indiana, 78th Pennsylvania, 79th Pennsylvania;

Division Artillery – Capt. William R. Terrill; Battery A, 1st Ohio Artillery; Battery D, 1st Ohio Artillery; Independent Pennsylvania Battery B;

3rd Division – Brig. Gen. Ormsby M. Mitchel;

1st Brigade – Col. John B. Turchin: 10th Illinois, 19th Illinois, 24th Illinois, 37th Indiana;

2nd Brigade – Col. Joshua W. Sill: 2nd Ohio, 21st Ohio, 33rd Ohio; 10th Wisconsin;

3rd Brigade – Col. Jacob Ammen: 6th Ohio, 18th Ohio, 24th Ohio; 36th Indiana;

Division Artillery – Capt. Cyrus O. Loomis; Battery A, 1st Michigan Artillery; Battery E, 1st Ohio Artillery; 5th Indiana Battery;

This we are told amounts to about 16,000 men. In response the Canadians have:

To the east, along the Niagara, the British forces were slightly stronger; although almost all the regulars had been withdrawn to Montreal and the Richelieu, initially for the fruitless attack on Rouse’s Point and then for the defense of Fort Lennox and Montreal itself. Other than a single company of Royal Canadian Rifles and some service personnel, the forces on the Niagara frontier were almost entirely local troops, a mix of volunteers and service militia. The subsequent fighting was noteworthy as being the first and only such action fought entirely under “Canadian” leadership.
The defending forces amounted to a mixed garrison of regulars, mostly Royal Canadian Rifles, and service militia in the fortified posts of Fort Mississauga; Fort Drummond; and Fort George. They were commanded by Major Kenneth M. Moffat, of the RCR, and were concentrated at the north end of the river, on or near the old Queenstown Heights battlefield.

And:

When the long-anticipated alarm was sounded, orders went out to Canadian militia and volunteer units across the region, from as far away as Toronto. As the Americans crossed and began forming up, the Canadians were moving east from Port Colborne and south from Saint Catherine’s via Stevensville; the goal was for all the available troops to rendezvous on Limestone Ridge, forcing the Americans to deploy for battle and delaying their movement to the west; then the combined force would fall back to the west and north, eventually moving back to Hamilton. The Canadian forces amounted to a mixed brigade of some 3,000 men drawn from the 6th Militia District, headquartered in Hamilton, and with one battalion of volunteers, the 2nd Battalion, a Toronto unit that had been formed in 1856. The men of the volunteer battalion were in dark-green “rifle” uniforms, while some of the 6th Brigade’s militiamen were in the traditional red coats; others were in a mix of uniforms and civilian overcoats. The two volunteer batteries and the provisional battery of naval militia each had six muzzle-loading 9 pounders; the volunteer infantry had Pattern 1853 Enfields, while the service militia were equipped with a mix of Enfield rifles and older rifles and smoothbore muskets. The cavalrymen, mounted for the most part on their own horses, had a mix of carbines, revolvers, and sabers. Their commander, Colonel Alfred Booker, 37, was a wealthy English-born merchant from Hamilton; he been commissioned in the militia in 1851, helped organize the Hamilton battery in 1856, and was named district commander in 1861.

The Canadian Order of Battle is laid out (such as it is):
6th Militia Brigade (Hamilton District) – Lt. Col. Alfred Booker
Adjutant and chief of the staff – Maj. H. V. Villiers
2nd Volunteer Rifle Battalion - Maj. Alex T. Fulton
Hamilton Service Militia Battalion - Lt. Col. R. A. Clarke
Cavalry: Maj. H.B. Bull (St. Catherine’s Troop, Grimsby Troop);
Artillery: Hamilton Field Battery, Port Colborne Field Battery,
Hamilton Naval Company (organized as artillery and pioneers)

Now strangely there is no mention made of the Royal Canadian Rifles here but we can assume the author just forgot.

Now it’s curious how the alarm is “long anticipated” but evidently the Canadians have done nothing to prepare, such as raising more men, organizing defences, or drilling their militia. This despite having 6 months from the first alarm in October to when the Confederates raided the border, to the outbreak of hostilities in April, but I guess the Canadians are just lazy?

There are a few problems with this order of battle however, the first and not the least being we have no idea how the Canadians are apparently being organized. What it seems that the author has tried to do is organize the militias as ad-hoc brigades by district. This is an admirable guess, but the research falls flat on the face of it.

For starters, the Hamilton District should be labelled as the 7^th Militia Brigade, as Hamilton is the 7^th Militia District according to the organization drawn up in that time period by the militia. So properly, this should be the 7^th Militia Brigade (Hamilton District).

Booker is also slightly problematic. He was slated to serve as a staff officer to the British commander on the Niagara Frontier, local Major General George T. C. Napier (appointed December 1861, page 471), and would most likely have been promoted to a colonelcy as he was historically. Though that aside his position is roughly correct, but one would assume command of a brigade would be given to any one of the dozen British officers assigned to Canada to organize the militia.

Moving on let’s address the order of battle. For some reason the 2^nd Battalion “The Queen’s Own Volunteer Rifles of Toronto” has been sent to the Niagara Frontier. One assumes this is because they were present at Ridgeway in 1866, but let us ignore that for a moment. They are confusingly commanded by a “Maj. Alex T. Fulton” despite the fact that Fulton, in 1863 no less, is only acaptain commanding the 10th “Highland” company of the Queen’s Own. In truth in 1862 the battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. William Smith Durie, and under him were Majors George Brooke, and Alexander M. Smith under him, all appointed in April 1860.

Then we have the nebulous “Hamilton Service Militia Battalion” under Lt. Col. R. A. Clarke. Problematically there is no Lt. Col. R. A. Clarke on the lists in 1862-63. We do have a Lt. Col. George K. Chisholm and a Lt. Col. Isaac Buchanan however. Buchanan actually held his first command in 1837 against the rebels in Upper Canada, and served on the Niagara frontier! There was also a battalion formed in December 1862, the 13^th Battalion Volunteer Infantry, which Buchanan was placed in command of. One assumes, since it had more than twocompanies established before 1862 that it would fall in the authors stated requirements for being established in a war time call up, but this might be too fair to the Canadians so evidently not. Either way, the 13^th really ought to be on that list.

Chisholm most likely ought to be leading his own battalion as well but I digress.

The remaining problems with the order of battle come from the supporting troops. There are actually four companies of cavalry in Military District 7, the 1^st and 2^nd Wentworth Troops (Maj. Thomas Roberston, senior officer) the Grimsby Troop (Maj. Conrad Teeter) and the St. Catherine’s Troop (Maj. Thomas Bate). Of these the St. Catherine’s Troop and the Grimsby Troop are mentioned, but the Wentworth troops are completely ignored, and confusingly Bull (who is the most junior officer of them all) is placed in command. One might expect an ad hoc regiment might be formed here under command of Bate who was commissioned in 1855, making him the senior officer.

Next is the artillery (not given an officer) which consists of the Hamilton Field Battery, and the non existent Port Colborne Field Battery. In 1862 you actually had the Hamilton Field Battery and the Welland Canal Field Battery, as well as the Dundas and St. Catherine’s companies of foot artillery. Now since Maj. Villiers was detached as brigade major historically (and chief of the staff here) command of any ad hoc artillery brigade would fall to Lt. Col. William Notman(1856) of the Dundas Foot company.

Finally is the Hamilton Naval Company, bizarrely armed as pioneers rather than serving aboard the Passport on the Great Lakes. One might think this could make sense for the Marine company at Oakville, but the Hamilton Naval Company would have much work to do on Lake Ontario rather than be tramping around with the grunts at Ridgeway.

So in summation there are more questions than answers in this order of battle, but let’s do a brief correction for the author shall we?

7th Militia Brigade (Hamilton District)

Col. Alfred Booker Commanding

Chief of the Staff: Maj. H. V. Villiers

2nd Battalion “The Queens Own” Volunteer Rifles (Lt. Col. William S. Durie)

13th Battalion Volunteer Rifles (Lt. Col. Isaac Buchanan) 10cos

7th District Provisional Battalion (Lt. Col. George K. Chisholm) 10cos

Oakville Marine Company (Capt. Duncan Chisholm)(attached as pioneers)

Cavalry: (Major Thomas Bate) 4cos (1 and 2 Wentworth Troops, Grimsby Troop, St. Catherine’s Troop)

Artillery: (Lt. Col. William Notman) (Hamilton Field Battery, Dundas Foot Artillery, St. Catherine’s Foot Artillery)*

*We shall assume the Welland Battery is on duty along the canal.

Now this assumes all the various battalions and companies are at full strength, the infantry at 840 men, the cavalry at 55 men, the artillery at roughly 75, and this force comes to a total strength of 3049 men (absent staff) and assuming the Royal Canadian Rifles got attached then 3150. Not a bad guess by the author.

Let’s just discuss why even absent all this, the whole battle as portrayed is farcical, first the framing:

Booker’s troops, although generally young and utterly inexperienced, were willing to fight and moved quickly toward the ridge, some on foot, others on horseback, and still more by rail; Bull’s cavalry, serving as the advance guard, met the 3rd and 4th Ohio cavalry regiments about mid-day between Stevensville and Ridgeway, and became heavily engaged. Infantry and artillery from both sides arrived, led by Mitchel’s 3rd Brigade, and the engagement became general; the Canadians began taking up hasty positions on the ridge itself. As more American troops came up, however, as Fulton wrote later, “the situation of the Volunteers and militia was thereby rendered most critical, as it seemed improbable we could hold our position.” The American forces in the field eventually numbered some 16,000, including both Wood’s and Mitchel’s divisions, with seven batteries. The American infantry outnumbered the men from Upper Canada by more than five to one; the artillery by more than two to one; despite the rain and mud, the guns got forward.

Now the battle:

After a half day of skirmishing by the cavalry and Ammen’s brigade, the American artillery – including Terrill’s regular battery H, assigned to reinforce Loomis’ battalion - was in position and began a heavy bombardment of the Canadian militia’s position on the ridge. Terrill, a Virginian and regular (USMA, ‘53) whose father and brother served the Confederacy, had something to prove, and he promptly did so, opening “such a fire upon the British (sic) as they had never seen,” as Loomis wrote. Turchin’s brigade moved forward on the right (northern) flank, and Sill’s on the left (southern) flank; under that much pressure, and after an hour or so of constant fighting, the result was pre-ordained. 

“A scene of confusion ensued,” as Fulton wrote, and Booker’s force was routed, with only the Volunteer Rifles maintaining much cohesion. Among the casualties and prisoners were the student soldiers of the University Rifle Company of Volunteers from Toronto, which had marched out with the 2nd Battalion; they included two professors and more than a score of young men who had fought - and died - on the ridge. 

Booker was unable to regroup his men at Ridgeway, and retired with his mounted staff and battered cavalry to Port Colborne; the mass of militia infantry and artillery – some 2,000 men - surrendered on the muddy field shortly before dusk. Fulton, wounded, was among the last to surrender, offering his sword to Terrill; the Virginian returned it, reportedly saying “Major, you are as true to your oath and country as I have been to mine; keep your sword.”

Valiant little, but ultimately doomed, stand right? Just as the poor deluded Canadians must stand aside in the face of the mighty Americans.

Well aside from that the whole set up is a farce. For starters the limestone ridge in question would make a terrible defensive position attempting to stop anyone coming from the south, or Buffalo if they landed at Fort Erie.

The ridge itself rises some 30 feet facing west and running along the appropriately named Ridge Road, with roadways connecting it to Port Erie and Port Colborne at the extreme south end of the ridge. North and south the ground is lower at the edges, but this offers no advantage when facing east. The ground is perfect to deflect an attack coming from the north or the west, but completely useless to defend against an attack coming from the east. This would be a singularly poor choice of ground for the Canadian militia to offer battle if engaging an American force coming from Fort Erie. It would be far superior for an American force to occupy.

Even ignoring that point however, we get little understanding of the battle. And with the above geography in mind it should have been child’s play for the Union forces to cut off the Canadians and surround them. Yet evidently by a failure of understanding in the geography the author chooses to have the Canadian command staff and cavalry quit the field in a rout, if only to once again stick it to the Canadians by saying they would run or surrender.

The idea that Booker would abandon his men also flies in the face of his performance at Ridgeway, where even after he bungled the historic fight by mistakenly ordering the square formation, he attempted to rally his men the whole way. However, here we have historical parallelism gone mad and somehow Booker fails to rally his men at the village of Ridgeway, yet the Canadians also surrender on the muddy field at Limestone Ridge

What's odder is that the battle at Ridgeway only took place historically because the Canadians were moving to attack the Fenians who were blocking the path north, and tellingly much of the fighting took place below the ridge proper.

All this of course can be attributed to simple research failure. Though with the authors previous comments, one has to wonder whether this was malicious intent, or just lazy.

The Maine Event

In chapter 4 part 2, TFSmith speaks glowingly about the ability of Maine to face  the British attack on Portland:

The militia had more than 3,000 assorted long-arms in the hands of companies on active duty in the various harbor defenses (forts McClarey, Scammel, and Sullivan), or in the state’s armories and arsenal, meaning the existing organized militia units could be mustered and equipped without relying on service militia with civilian weapons.

Unfortunately, this is not true.

A two-horse open sleigh

As we are frequently (and correctly) told by TFSmith, during the winter there is no sea route to the Province of Canada.
However, there was a land route, one set up decades before, which travelled by icy road along the eastern border of Maine to reach one of the termini of the Grand Trunk Railroad (Riviere du Loup). Three hundred kilometres long, it used horsedrawn sleighs to transport roughly 160-200 men plus baggage each day – the limiting factor being the accommodation at the end of each day's route.

TFSmith is aware of this, in principle. However, it does not actually get used in the timeline to any extent.

Divergent Reality

In any alternate history, the question is – what event causes the timeline to skip to one side and take on a new course?

A thousand ways to talk, and only one correct

One of the peculiarities of the way Burnished Rows of Steel is written is that it is distinctly not easy to understand. Beyond the way that many posts are labelled by month rather than by day, there are also numerous cases where what is presumably supposed to be important scene-setting data is rendered in dialogue between characters.
But by far the most annoying is the phonetic accents. Presented below are some examples of the accents used.

Robbing saltpetre to pay Paul

It is a truth universally acknowledged that the Union of 1861 was in possession of a great number of men, but was in need of a large quantity of war materials. Specifically, steel, gun-iron, and saltpetre- all of which it could only obtain from Britain. Needless to say, these material constraints play no part in Burnished Rows of Steel. But perhaps the most egregious treatment is that of saltpetre, the integral component of gunpowder.

Silas is Golden

TFSmith is fond of having British officers deliver canned speeches about how terrible their strategic position is, even if these speeches have to be taken out of context, misleadingly quoted, or plagiarised from secondary historians. It's a shame that in the quarter of a million words of BROS, he didn't find room to quote Colonel Silas W. Burt, former Assistant Inspector General of the New York National Guard. In his Memoirs of the Military History of the State of New York during the War for the Union, 1861-65, he gives a detailed explanation of New York's position during the Trent Affair.

A Pain in the Skagerrak

TFSmith is very interested in Britain's involvement with the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864. Indeed, it forms the basis of much of his planning for BROS- from the supposed British inability to act against the Union to his plan to have Palmerston defeated in a vote of confidence in the Commons. In fact, we already know what speech he intends to plagiarise eventually:

Russells my jimmies

TFSmith describes a parade of the Army of the Potomac in glowing terms:

The troops included six divisions of infantry, with some 72 regiments between their 18 brigades; 24 light batteries that amounted to 120 guns; and six regiments of cavalry, a total of well more than 60,000 men... well-dressed, well-armed, and marching regularly, as the assembled bands played everything from “Hail, Columbia” to “Yankee Doodle.” 

William Howard Russell, the Times correspondent who had followed the British army to the Crimea, saw the parade at first hand. According to him, TFSmith is exaggerating the numbers present:

'November 20th. To-day a grand review, the most remarkable feature of which was the able disposition made by General McDowell to march seventy infantry regiments, seventeen batteries, and seven cavalry regiments, into a very contracted space, from the adjoining camps. Of the display itself I wrote a long account, which is not worth repeating here. Among the 55,000 men present there were at least 20,000 Germans and 12,000 Irish.'

His 'long account' shows that the infantry were anything other than 'well-dressed, well-armed, and marching regularly':

'it was a display of military power which could not have been satisfactory to a military critic adopting the standard of European criticism... light dragoons, long-haired, open-collared, strapless, with trousers well up the calves of their legs, displaying great variety of booting and hosiery, with ungroomed horses and dirty accoutrements... it became a moot question whether he was going to commit unintentional suicide by falling on his sword, or whether he would cut off his horse's head or your own, as he flourished about on his steed, quite out of hand... the field-batteries on the hill fired a very irregular and ill-timed salute... the cavalry were bad, slovenly, ill set-up; in person, accoutrements, and horses, showing a want of care... inferior in appearance and regularity to the Cossacks of the Black Sea... The artillery was the best part of the display... The infantry was varied in character and air... There is still a diversity of armament in the artillery, and of small-arms and uniforms in the other branches of the service... Some regiments came by carrying arms, some with arms sloped, some with fixed bayonets, others without; some had excellent bands, others rendered day hideous by their discord... Taking the regiments of infantry at 600 strong, which, considering camp guards, reserves, etc., is rather a high average, there may have been 46,000 or 48,000 men on the field, with 3,000 cavalry... and 100 guns.' (Times, 9 December 1861)

Russell's other observations from around the same time are little more complimentary to the Army of the Potomac:

'October 8th. A review of the artillery at this side of the river took place to-day, which has been described in very inflated language by the American papers, the writers on which never having seen a decently-equipped force of the kind pronounce the sight to have been of unequalled splendor; whereas the appearance of horses and men was very far from respectable in all matters relating to grooming, cleanliness, and neatness. General Barry has done wonders in simplifying the force and reducing the number of calibres, which varied according to the fancy of each State, or men of each officer who raised a battery ; but there are still field-guns of three inches and of three inches and a half, Napoleon guns, rifled ten-pound Parrotts, ordinary nine-pounders, a variety of howitzers, twenty-pound Parrott rifled guns, and a variety of different projectiles in the caissons. As the men rode past, the eye was distressed by discrepancies in dress. Many wore red or white worsted comforters round their necks, few had straps to their trousers; some had new coats, others old; some wore boots, others shoes; not one had clean spurs, bits, curb-chains, or buttons. The officers cannot get the men to do what the latter regard as works of supererogation.'

October 26th: 'spurring home pretty fast along an unfrequented road, leading from the ferry at Georgetown into the city, I was nearly spitted by a "dragoon," who rode at me from under cover of a house, and shouted "stop," just as his sabre was within a foot of my head. Fortunately his horse, being aware that if it ran against mine it might be injured, shied, and over went dragoon, sabre and all, and off went his horse, but as the trooper was able to run after it, I presume he was not the worse ; and I went on my way rejoicing.

'October 27th. After church, I took a long walk round by the commissariat wagons, where there is, I think, as much dirt, bad language, cruelty to animals, and waste of public money, as can be conceived.'

'December 4th. To Arlington, where Senator Ira Harris presented flags that is, standards to a cavalry regiment called after his name... The regiment then went through some evolutions, which were brought to an untimely end by a feu du joie from the infantry in the rear, which instantly broke up the squadrons, and sent them kicking, plunging, and falling over the field, to the great amusement of the crowd.'

No doubt many Union supporters will imply that Russell was mistaken, or call him a liar or prejudiced. Russell, who faced social ostracism and threats of violence from telling the truth about the Union's humiliation at Bull Run, and who was subsquently forced to leave America because he was denied permission to travel with the Union Army for fear of what he might say about it, would no doubt be amused by this.

Use the Thaws

One of the major features of the lake and river terrain of North America is, of course, that much of it freezes in winter.

TFSmith is aware of this much; however, he does not appear to be aware of when this took place.

1) Lake Champlain.

During the Battle at Rouses Point, it is a key feature of the battle that the Americans can rush reinforcements to the threatened area by ship over Lake Champlain - very significant reinforcements, as it happens - as well as move firepower by gunboat,
Unfortunately, the battle is fought in the last few days of March.

Historically, navigation opened at Burlington on 29th April, and in a normal year Plattsburgh followed three days later - so the Union gunboats would be icebound.


2) The St Lawrence freezes.

In the OTL, some of the transport ships which raced for Canada managed to put off some troops at the St Lawrence before it froze in mid- December.


3) The St Lawrence thaws.

We are repeatedly told that the St Lawrence is icebound, and indeed it was for much of the early months of the year. However, this icebound state continues to be used as an excuse for why Canada cannot be reinforced at least into May, when historically the opening took place as follows:

Navigation at Quebec opens 11th April
First steamers at Quebec 16th April

Navigation at Montreal opens 23rd April
First steamers at Montreal 28th April

Rideau Canal opens at Kingston 1st May
St Lawrence opens at Kingston 5th May

So by early May there would definitely be RN gunboats on Lake Ontario, through one route or another. Instead, in late May (the 24th), Montreal is still so cut off from the outside world that it has no riverine gunboats or corvettes (or ironclads) present, and the garrison is less than 10,000 troops:

Fewer than 10,000 British and Canadian troops, including a mix of volunteer and sedentary militia, constituted Russell’s garrison in Montreal; although the city had some fixed defenses - Fort de l'Île Sainte-Hélène was formidable, and the destruction of the two-year-old Great Victoria Bridge certainly made a siege much more difficult – Montreal was not a citadel in the sense that Quebec was; which Heintzelman, reinforced by the leading units of Grant’s army, quickly made clear.

As Heintzelman’s 30,000 troops began to dig in around Montreal, Bishop Ignace Bourget’s pastoral letter was read in Montreal on 24 May, echoing Bishop Lartigue’s in 1837, and urging the Quebecois “not to be seduced by those who want to entice you into rebellion against the established government, especially to the benefit of these foreign puppets and American Protestants.”

It is at no point stated in the timeline how Heintzelman gets across the rivers. By this point the British would have sent forty gunboats and six new-build ironclads upriver to reach Lake Erie and Lake Ontario; though the Union in this TL have secured control of Lake Erie, this just means there are an extra twenty gunboats and three ironclads to add to the defences of Montreal.


In fact, since the whole offensive into Upper Canada begins on the first of May, it should be clear (first steamers at Quebec) that there should have been at least two weeks' worth of time for reinforcements to be sent to Upper Canada by train before the offensive begins. (Given the train travel oddities elsewhere in the TL for the Union, if the British had the same capacity there'd be time to move 20,000 men each to the Niagara frontier and to face Detroit - though this might be excessive in a world where the militia had actually been mobilized.)


TFSmith is distinctly confused about the whole issue of the thaw. He has in the past repeatedly stated that the thaw "comes from the south", whereas as we've seen - at least on the St Lawrence - it comes in from the sea.

Crimea river: Landings in the Crimea and in BROS

There are two major landing operations that take place in Burnished Rows of Steel, and one from the Crimea which is referenced.


The Union Landing at Norfolk

In the setup of the TL, either in late December or early January, it is mentioned as an aside that:

In late December, there had been a rumor they were going to be attached to the expeditionary division being gathered at Annapolis under Rhode Island’s own Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside; instead, they remained with Sumner’s newly-formed division, while Burnside’s had moved down the Chesapeake to Hampton Roads, in the Department of Virginia, gone ashore, stormed Norfolk, and then destroyed the navy yard.

This is of course outrageous for more than one reason.


The first reason is that this was never done historically – despite there being a very good reason to do it, which is that the Virginia was being constructed at Norfolk. This ironclad led to all kinds of massive expenditures of effort to prevent her entering action, but for some reason the Union never just thought of attacking the port directly.

The second reason is why the Union never attacked Norfolk directly, historically – it's because it was defended. Very heavily defended, in fact, with 13,451 troops present for duty in the November returns and about 192 heavy guns in several batteries and forts. In short, to land in the way described Burnside would have to land troops in the face of superior numbers of defenders equipped with heavy artillery.

And the third reason is why it was done – it's possible to work backwards, thus:

• If the Virginia was launched in this timeline, then it might mean the Union suffers serious defeats, while the Norfolk Navy Yard would offer the British a useful safe harbour for repairs and logistics support. (It has coal, water, food and even a graving dock).
• In addition, without the Monitor available (penned in by the blockade or sunk on transit) it would be possible for the Virginia to have a completely free hand to aid in the blockade and capture of Fort Monroe - and, for that matter, to sail to and up the Potomac. (The limiting water depth of the Potomac is essentially that of the draft of the Virginia, and with a good high tide it would be theoretically possible for the ironclad to make her way up to Washington.)
• Therefore, Norfolk Navy Yard must be attacked and destroyed before the Virginia is launched.

There is no realistic driver for it; instead, it is something that has to happen for the Union to win. So it happens.


Later on we are told, instead, that Norfolk was abandoned before Burnside attacked (the troops are sent to the Peninsula, and the troops at the Peninsula are sent to the main field army). This is at odds with the description of “stormed”, and makes even less sense for the Confederacy – it is pure ahistorical decision making, and completely pointless.

Not even wrong
There are two reasons to hold the Peninsula - to stop the Union attacking Richmond, and to protect Norfolk. But by abandoning Norfolk to hold the Peninsula the Confederates here make one task impossible and the other much more difficult, since it is now possible to move troops up the James river and bypass the Yorktown line.
In the OTL, Norfolk was only abandoned after McClellan had forced the abandonment of the Yorktown line itself - here it is backwards.


The Allied landing at the Crimea


In reality, on the 13th September 1854 transports arrived off Eupatoria. The Allies began landing on the 14th, and within an hour several French regiments had landed, with a division ashore by noon; The British (due to a major muddle) did not begin landing until 9am, on a mile-wide front some way south of the intended landing position.

The landing was fraught with logistical problems, being distinctly a new experience in recent memory for the British at least, and by the end of the first day the full infantry complement and some of the artillery had been landed but the tents had not, and the soldiers spent an uncomfortable night exposed in the rain (these including many of the commanders who would later on be described as pampered or otherwise unused to the realities of war in Burnished Rows of Steel)

Despite a storm overnight and into the next morning, the main difficulty was in landing the cavalry horses on the 15th (mainly due to the rough weather) and the stores were got ashore but unorganized. This is hardly a great and notable achievement, but the salient point is that the entire British (and French) infantry complement got ashore on the first day, along with some of the guns.

Once properly organized, the British-French allied force marched south on the 19th, and fought the Battle of the Alma on the 20th September.


The British Landing in Maine


The British landing in Crescent Beach is far worse than Calamita Bay. Quite apart from one of the transports striking a rock well into the morning and sinking (it is described as sinking at dawn, but dawn at this time is 5AM and the grounding is also described as taking place at 8AM), it takes until noon for the landing to commence - seven hours after dawn, instead of 2 hours 40 minutes as at Calamita Bay, despite the lack of some of the mistakes which did take place in the Crimea. (Certainly the French are not described as showing up and blagging the entire original landing spot).

the remaining transports, with Kingcome’s frigates in support, made their turn to the south and began putting troops ashore on Crescent Beach by noon

We are later told the following details:

Now, even as the sun dropped to the west over the mainland and dusk fell across the water, the bays, beaches, and shore were filled with ships and boats, marching troops, and guns and horses being manhandled ashore…

however, it was – at least in comparison with the landings at Kalamita Bay in 1854 - a triumph.

Since troops are still being landed at dusk (8pm) despite 1/3 the number of troops being landed by the British, this is clearly not a triumph compared to Calamita Bay. At Calamita Bay all the infantry were landed from 9am to 7pm (10 hours to land 30,000 troops and some guns), so after eight hours here as many as 24,000 infantry could have been landed at the same scale of time.

“I daresay, colonel, your concerns are appreciated, but are misplaced,” Lane Fox replied, a bit sharply. “In ’54, at Eupatoria, the Allies put 67,000 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and one hundred forty pieces of artillery ashore in five days; today, we have landed some 10,000 men and two dozen guns, including the naval brigade, which will service as siege artillery against Fort Preble

As we have seen, the Eupatoria (Calamita) landing described is incorrect. Even if the Eupatoria landing had indeed taken five days (rather than being mostly complete for infantry and partially complete for artillery on the first day) then a single day should have seen 12,000 men and 28 guns landed pro rata – if not more, due to the lack of the cavalry.


At best, the British are doing worse than they did at the original Calamita Bay, despite better experience. At worst they are doing several times as badly.    

Our great want to speedily crush this invasion is men; we have an abundance of guns.

(title paraphrased from Simon Cameron, secretary of war, to Hon. William L. Dayton, US minister in Paris, 12 November 1861; United States War Department, The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies, Series 3 Vol. 1 (1899), p.630)


Rifles and muskets

In Burnished Rows of Steel, during the engagements on the road to London and around the Niagara in May we are told that there are only a few thousand armed militia in Upper Canada and that the quality of their weapons is often substandard.

Sherman crossed the frontier under rainy skies and across the still icy Detroit River and Lake Saint Clair. His troops moved east into Upper Canada, sweeping aside company-sized units of the Royal Canadian Rifles and mixed lots of volunteer and service militia at Point Edward and Sarnia, Fighting Island, Old Fort Malden, Amherstberg, and Windsor.
His corps marched east to London, where a provisional battalion of the RCR under Maj. FitzWilliam Walker, along with the 7th Militia Brigade (London District) under Lt. Col. James Shanly, and some pensioners and storekeepers, surrendered after a short siege. When the Stars and Stripes replaced the Union Jack over Victoria Barracks, part of the London Garrison, however, the surrender was the first of a British post in North America since the 1812-1815 war.

Note here scattered companies and troops barely worth mentioning. There are only a few thousand troops mentioned.

The Canadian forces amounted to a mixed brigade of some 3,000 men drawn from the 6th Militia District, headquartered in Hamilton, and with one battalion of volunteers, the 2nd Battalion, a Toronto unit that had been formed in 1856.

The men of the volunteer battalion were in dark-green “rifle” uniforms, while some of the 6th Brigade’s militiamen were in the traditional red coats; others were in a mix of uniforms and civilian overcoats. The two volunteer batteries and the provisional battery of naval militia each had six muzzle-loading 9 pounders; the volunteer infantry had Pattern 1853 Enfields, while the service militia were equipped with a mix of Enfields and older rifles and muskets.

Again, here, only a few thousand troops are mentioned.

Fewer than 10,000 British and Canadian troops, including a mix of volunteer and sedentary militia, constituted Russell’s garrison in Montreal

And here the scale of the garrison is below 10,000 men. Of these about 5,000 are probably regulars (considering the scale of the casualties at Rouse's Point) so there's perhaps 5,000 militia and volunteers present.


The total number of militia and RCR that can be enumerated here, defending everywhere further inland than Quebec, is 11,000. This agrees with TFSmith's suggestion that the largest force that the British could raise in Canada is 25,000 men.


What's hard to understand is why any of them have muskets at all.

As of December 1861 there were, according to reports, 15,000 rifles in store in Canada. At this time there were already a few thousand troops embodied and with rifles (at minimum the RCR and those active units of the Active Miltia) so the 15,000 total can be considered de minimis and a more appropriate total would be more like 20,000.

The Melbourne carried 30,000 stand of Enfield rifles, and many of these were sent down the sledge route in OTL. Certainly they were all in store in Quebec in 10 June 1862, but we don't know how they got there.

Other ships sent OTL also carried rifles: The Persia had 5,000, the Australasian had 5,000, and we can assume that more would have been sent with no climbdown.

Thus, assuming that merely 500 Enfields went down the sled route for each of the 73 days of activity of the sled route in the real world Trent affair, the total number of Enfields in Canada should be well over 40,000 by the time of the thaw.

Finally, navigation to Quebec opened historically in mid-April and so there has been two more weeks for rifles to travel.

Therefore, in a situation where the British are having to hand out muskets, either there are more than 30,000 rifle-armed Canadians in Quebec and only 11,000 in the rest of the Province of Canada – or the main question asked of new Canadian recruits is “would you like two Enfields or three?”

Bigger guns


Further colouring the situation is the issue of Canadian artillery. The only artillery which makes an appearance is brass 9-pounder muzzle loaders, and yet the Canadian arsenals were full of weapons to use – in the field, in gunboats, in forts, none of which appears to have happened.


As it happens, in the OTL in stores – exclusive of those guns already mounted in forts or the 38 field guns with the active militia – there were:

Brass field guns

13x 12 pdrs
6x 9 pdrs
5x 3 pdrs (saluting guns)
7x 24 pdr howitzers
7x 12 pdr howitzers
9x 5.5" howitzers
17x 5.5" mortars
23x 4.4" mortars

Iron fort guns

9x 68 pdr 95 cwt
625x 24 pdrs
64x 18 pdrs
73x 12 pdrs
22x 9 pdrs
6x 6 pdrs
4x 10" howitzers
2x 24 pdr howitzers
70x 68 pdr carronades
5x 42 pdr carronades
245x 32 pdr carronades
41x 24 pdr carronades
13x 18 pdr carronades
26x 12 pdr carronades
12x 10" mortars
28x 8" mortars


18 brass 18 pdrs, 12 Armstrong 20 pdrs and 10 12 pdr howitzers were sent from Halifax in January over the sled route.

Of the field guns already with the militia, by the 1863 report the batteries had the following guns:

Kingston Field Battery 2 9pdrs, 1 24pdr H
Hamilton Field Battery 3 6pdrs, 1 12pdr H
Port Colborne Field Battery 3 9pdrs
London Field Battery 2 9pdrs, 1 24pdr H
Toronto Field Battery 3 6pdrs, 1 12pdr H

Quebec Field Battery 3 6pdr, 1 12pdr H
Montreal Field Battery 3 6pdr, 1 12pdr H
Ottawa Field Battery 3 6pdr, 1 12pdr H
Brockville Gun Detachment 1 6pdr

With over a thousand fort guns of 18 pdr size or greater, one might perhaps expect there to be a few Canadian batteries forming some kind of resistance to the armies of Grant and Heintzelman - in fact, there is roughly one gun for every ten Canadian militia appearing in the story - but no such batteries seem to exist.

With such an unusual dearth of rifles, it would perhaps be simpler for the British and Canadians to repel the Union invaders by digging a very deep hole, waiting for the Union to fall into it, and pushing spare cannon over the edge to crush them.    

The cure is worse than the disease

Owing to the banning of TFSmith from AH Dot Com, there are two versions of the TL floating around. One of them is the AH.com one, the other is more recent.


One example of a change between the TLs is the events of the Battle of Rouses Point.




During this battle, the British take the first defensive line, but are then stymied by further defences and defeated by large numbers of Union reinforcements flowing into the battle area.
This much is the same between both versions.

However (and sensibly) most of the Union force at the battle is encamped at Plattsburgh, about twenty miles away from Rouses Point in a straight line. This is quite a long way to expect divisions complete with artillery to march, especially since (again quite correctly) the Union does not confirm a major attack is going on for a few hours.

First Version

In the first version, the US troops reach the battlefield by taking the train. They have a "special train" which embarks "most of a Brigade" (in the event it is the entire Excelsior brigade, four regiments strong) and a battery of artillery, then moves up to Rouses Point at 25 miles an hour before spending the rest of the battle bouncing back and forth between the remaining Union force and the battlefield.

There are two problems with this. The first is that the train would have to have nearly ninety rail cars to move this much firepower - batteries have about forty men and several horses per gun so each gun requires three cars, and there's 40 men per car otherwise - and hence would not be able to move at top speed.
The second is that there is no train track between Plattsburg and Rouses Point. There is a railroad from Plattsburg northwards, but it passes twelve miles from Rouses Point (which is itself a days march, especially starting at midday).


Evidently after this problem was pointed out by 67th Tigers, TFSmith revised it, because...

Second version

In this version, posted after TFSmith's banning, the US troops reach the battlefield by ship. They board transports in Plattsburg and steam the twenty or so miles up to Rouses Point, then disembark, and TFSmith gilds the lily by having the ships also fire on the British troops to boot. Thus the same result is achieved,  though presumably not at 25 miles per hour as no ship in the world could achieve that speed at this time.

Unfortunately, there is a simpler problem with this one. It's just plain impossible, as Lake Champlain did not thaw for another month.

Don't blame it on the moonlight

This is a very minor thing, but still amusing.

During the battles around Portland in the first two days of June, the Irish Brigade gets off their train at midnight of 1-2 June 1862 and make a moonlight march to get into position.:

As they approached the brook, Steele’s British infantry came under fire from Meagher’s troops, notably Col. John Burke’s 63rd New York Volunteers and Col. Robert Nugent’s 69th New York; they were supported by Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly’s 88th New York and Capt. John D. Frank’s Battery G, 1st New York Light Artillery. The brigade had arrived in Portland at midnight by train, and marched out to the battlefield by moonlight, led by some of the stalwart men of the 3rd Maine Militia and Saunders’ sharpshooters, who had held the British off the previous day.

This should not have been nearly so easy as it is presented, for one simple reason - the moon was four days past new. As such, not only should it have been very dim, but it set an hour and a half before midnight.
This should not, by itself, be the kind of detail that cripples a timeline. But it is not as though this kind of thing is impossible to find out.

Shot through the leg, but who's to blame?

Lieutenant-Colonel George John Peacocke has the dubious distinction of having been shot by a man who doesn't exist.

Let me explain.

Let's play a game!

I'm going to give you two officers, and your job is to guess which assignment TFSmith gave them in his timeline. Ready? Off you go.

'tis no matter what you do, if you were not in Mexicoo

Or Canada. Either way, not having experience on the North American continent is the most heinous crime that can be committed and immediately disqualifies you from any form of competency. Let's see a few cases.

Remind us what Doyle did again...

TFSmith thinks it is very important that you know that Major-General Charles Hastings Doyle had no command experience:

more than four decades in uniform, the attack at Lanoraie was the first time Doyle had seen action against a Western enemy... he returned to England without seeing any service in the Crimea. Doyle served as inspector-general of the militia in Ireland until his promotion to the rank of major-general on 15 Sept. 1860... Doyle – who had never commanded so much as a battalion in action before...

He also wants you to know that 'Overall, their general officers have little experience with large formations, brigades, divisions, or corps, in action or otherwise'. This is the actual experience of the British general officers in North America as of the Trent Affair:

• Lieutenant-General Sir Fenwick Williams: Siege of Kars, 1855; Woolwich District, 1856-9
• Major-General George T.C. Napier: Commanded the Cavalry Brigade at the action of the Berea, 1852
• Major-General David Russell: 5th Brigade, second relief of Lucknow (wounded, mentioned in dispatches, CB); 1st Brigade, Alambagh under Outram; 2nd brigade, fall of Lucknow (captured the Kaiserbagh), commanding a brigade at Aldershot 1861.
• Major-General Randal Rumley: Brigadier General at Malta, 26 January 1855; On the staff at Gibraltar (unattached) 1857; Commanding 2nd Brigade, Gibraltar, 1858; VP of Council of Military Education, 9 March 1860; IG of Infantry, April 1861
• Major-General Lord William Paulet: Light Division, Crimea; 1st Brigade, Aldershot, 1856-60; South-Western District, 1860-5
• Major-General Charles Hastings Doyle: No experience

And this is how TFSmith describes Union officers who have 'never commanded so much as a battalion in action before':

Brigadier General Joseph Hooker, 47, the divisional commander and the only West Pointer (class of 1837) of the trio… hard living and intensely ambitious, certainly, but he was no fool, and he knew soldiering and war. As a young officer in Mexico, he had been brevetted for gallantry for every grade from captain to lieutenant colonel - a record unsurpassed by any other first lieutenant in the Army. That undeniable ability was why he was a general officer today, despite having left the service almost a decade earlier.

West Pointer (1843) Brigadier General Charles S. Hamilton... who earned a brevet for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco and was severely wounded at Molino del Rey, had returned to the colors in 1861 as colonel of the 3rd Wisconsin Volunteers; he had been promoted to brigade and then division commander after service on the Upper Potomac and in the Shenandoah Valley

[Darius N.] Couch, also an artillery specialist, had graduated with McClellan in the class of 1846, commanded a Massachusetts regiment in 1861, and been promoted to brigade and then divisional command in 1862

[Silas] Casey, (USMA, 1826) was an infantry specialist who had won two brevets in Mexico and commanded the Army of the Potomac’s “training division” in the winter of 1861-62

Once again, command inexperience matters only when it's the British. This phenomenon has accurately been described as 'competency capping': in any Trent War scenario, the British are limited to abilities they have already shown to possess, whereas the Union's untrained and unprepared militiary personnel only ever excel in new roles.

History: Use and Abuse

TFSmith has said that

I have tried to research it [the TL] and write as somewhere close to what could have been reality, neither an Operation IMPERIAL STORM nor a "Third time's the charm" version of events. Everything in BROS is based on a) what the situation was in the winter of 1861-62, filtered by b) historical precedent, primarily from the period 1841-81, i..e, the length of a professional career (more or less). 

What this means in practice is that:

1. Everything bad that happened to the British between 1841 and 1881 gets to happen here, with the serial numbers filed off.
2. Everything good that the British managed to do between 1841 and 1881 gets discounted because it's against the Americans.

Think I'm joking?

His truth is wiki'ing on

The first post of BROS includes two verses and two choruses of the Battle Hymn of the Republic, which you are encouraged to read. Unfortunately, the lyrics still include the hyperlinks showing that they were copied and pasted amateurishly from Wikipedia.

(hover over 'gospel', 'the serpent', and 'Christ' to reveal their origin).

New here?

Welcome! This is a collaborative site dedicated to critiquing the alternate history timeline Burnished Rows of Steel. It deals with a conflict betwen Britain and the United States over the boarding of the RMS Trent, also known as 'oh God, are you losers discussing that again?' We intend to update pretty regularly: however, if you have something you'd like to contribute to the site, we welcome both guest posts and guest authors. With almost a quarter of a million words in the timeline, and with errors ranging from simple anachronisms from fundamental errors in plotting, we're going to need all the help we can get...

If you're looking for somewhere to start, you might want to see how badly messed up the start of the story is. Alternatively, have a look at how 70% of the Canadian army was 'mislaid' somewhere along the line. Or, if you're looking for probabaly the most serious offense the timeline commits, see how it quotes sections from other books without crediting the authors.

Or, you know, check out whatever takes your fancy.

Lies, Damned Lies, and Quotations

While leaving Britain for service in Canada, Wolseley wrote to a friend that:

'If the Yankees are worth their salt, they will at once make peace with the South and pour 100,000 men in to Canada where they can easily compensate themselves for their losses of the Confederate states, and England be perfectly unable to prevent it. Unless the British government at once make up their minds to fitting out an expedition which can start (as soon as war is declared) to seize Portland, and open up the railway communication from there to Quebec, I cannot see how we are to maintain our position in Canada this winter...  Do not be surprised if you hear of us all being made prisoners of war before the end of February.'

In Chapter 2, part 1, TFSmith puts this quotation into Wolseley's mouth. Critically, TFSmith has specifically said that 'The quote from Wolseley is historical; it from [sic] a letter he wrote in December, before he sailed.' This is a lie, as a comparison of the original with the version that TFSmith provides makes clear:

'if the Yankees are worth their salt, they’ll at once make peace with the south – or at least stand on the defensive down there where they can – and pour 100,000 men into Canada, where they can compensate themselves with whatever they lose in the South, and England be perfectly unable to prevent it'

TFSmith said that he took the quote from Amanda Foreman's A World on Fire: however, this also features the correct version of the quote, without TFSmith's addition.

Why did TFSmith say that the quote was historical, when he had added to it? Moreover, if the Union could invade Canada without making peace in the South, why did Wolseley choose such a convoluted way of expressing himself? Why did he not simply say 'if the Yankees are worth their salt, they will pour 100,000 men in to Canada'?

The answer is simple. Wolseley knew that without making peace with the South, the Union had no prospect of launching the quick attack that he feared. His belief that the Union intended such a quick assault was predicated on the assumption (shared by many of his contemporaries) that the Trent was a deliberate insult designed to give the Union an excuse for breaking off the war against the Confederacy, in which it had so far signally failed to make progress. To appease the wounded pride of the populace, the Union had prepared a sucker-punch for the British and ordered Wilkes to give them the pretext to deliver it.

Wolseley expected the Union to reject the British ultimatum almost instantaneously, and to send units into Canada shortly afterwards. This attack would require the British to move quickly in order to seize Portland, which would allow them to send reinforcements via rail into the heartland of Canada instead of moving them slowly by road or waiting for the spring thaw on the St Lawrence. Even so,  the likelihood would be that the British would be unable to respond quickly enough to the Union's surprise attack- and that, by February, the campaign would be over and Wolseley and his colleagues would be prisoners.

Wolseley's assumption was false. There would be no quick attack; the British would have time to prepare. Indeed, they have time to prepare in Burnished Rows of Steel (though, naturally, they choose to squander it). And yet TFSmith dresses Wolseley's words up to justify his interpretation, and lies about having done so. This is truly shameful.

As with the Fergusson letter, do readers of this timeline feel proud that they have been taken for fools? That TFSmith assumes either that they are incapable of Googling, or too lazy or credulous to do so?

Wolseley vs Fergusson

Chapter 3, part 1 features a British war council at which Wolseley reads part of a letter from the British Conservative MP Sir James Fergusson. Fergusson had been to America and seen both Union and Confederate armies, and on his return his observations were passed from Lord Derby to Lord Palmerston and, in this timeline, to Wolseley. Fergusson's observations, as read by Wolseley, make chilling reading:

"… with regard to the Northern army, there can be no doubt that for its size it is one of the best equipped which any nation has set on foot. Its transport is superb, its artillery numerous, well-appointed, and of the best description; and the physique of its men unsurpassed..." Wolseley stopped, letting it all sink in.

"And that, gentlemen, is the opinion of a member of parliament who is an avowed Southern sympathizer…" the colonel said 

 On the other hand, had Wolsely continued to read the letter he would have made his audience feel considerably better:

But which in their sanguine anticipations Americans forget, in England we must note that of the rank and file of the army the Chief Part is little more experienced than it was at the time of the Battle of Manassas — that its officers are taken from the same class & elected in the same manner as then, and that of all the causes to which the rout of Manassas has been attributed none is better proved than the general incapacity of the regimental officers—that of the general officer is a necessity...  A liberal bounty, eighteen pence a day and rations have filled the ranks so far. But as to the military character of the army my impressions and belief is that it lacks as greatly all the qualities of worth and strength which distinguishes the army that England sent to the Crimea as it is rich in those equipments in which that army was deficient.

It is evident too that it does not possess the confidence of its commanders. Each mile that the Confederates permit it to advance its outposts unopposed is carefully fortified & every road covered by field works of the strongest construction. Such is not the plan of a general at the lead of an "imposing" eager and patriotic army. 

But these must also be large deductions made from the members of which the Federal Army is popularly supposed to consist. The most recent detailed estimate of a N.Y. Paper not likely to understate such matters gives only 360,000 as the number of soldiers raised and in the ranks of the various loyal States. Another has lately stated 450,000 and called it 1/2 million—but it was evident that it included the "3 months men" enrolled but since disbanded. Recruiting in N.Y. & other Eastern States is said to have almost ceased. Many of the 360,000 are as yet undrilled—few more than of 3 months service and there is a considerable daily diminution by casualties.

When I was at St Louis about 20th Sept., the newspapers were decrying Gen. [John Charles] Fremont's inaction and his supineness in suffering Lexington (Missouri) to fall, but I found that many of his regiments were only then receiving their arms — which bye the bye were indifferent smooth-bore muskets—he was without any organized transport.  

The army of the Potomac in advance of and around Washington is said to consist of 200,000 men but when I was with Gen. Beauregard on 12th Oct. he received from a friend in Washington with access to the best official information an exact account of the arrival of troops from the date of the Battle of Manassas. Their numbers did not exceed 60,000 & it was stated that giving an ample allowance, the force of "the Potomac" did not exceed 140,000 & was probably much less. Hence if the Federal General has such a force, if he has actually 150 pieces of Artillery, a large force of cavalry (those I saw on the Northern side w[oul]d have been very bad yeomanry) any estimate of his power of attacking a wary & resolute enemy—holding a difficult country & that his own, w[oul]d lead to [a] grave mistake, if founded on an experience of European or any regular troops.

Can anybody defend the small section which TFSmith put in Wolsely's mouth as a fair representation of the whole? As a reader, do you enjoy being misled in this way about what people at the time said and thought?


For those who have now lost all trust in quotations, the full letter may be found in:
Michael F. Hughes, '"The Personal Observations of a Man of Intelligence": Sir James Fergusson's Visit to North America, 1861,' Civil War History, Volume 45, Number 3, September 1999, pp. 238-247
Elisabeth Joan Doyle, 'A Report On Civil War America: Sir James Fergusson's Five-Week Visit,' Civil War History, Volume 12, Number 4, December 1966, pp. 347-362

Roswellington That Ends Wellington

The climax of Chapter 1 Part 6, as the Washington Cabinet vote to reject the British demands, is Lincoln reading an excerpt from Wellington's letters. Given his background as a lawyer, it is perhaps not surprising that Lincoln cut out everything nice that Wellington said about the British:

“I confess that I think you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession of territory from America. Considering everything, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such as the want of the naval superiority on the Lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You cannot then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power. I put out of question the possession taken by Sir John Sherbrooke between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay. It is evidently only temporary, and till a larger force will drive away the few companies there; and an officer might as well claim the sovereignty of the ground on which his piquets stand, or over which his patrols pass. Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any; and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground which, I believe, their government are looking for, not to break off the negotiations, but to avoid to make peace. If you had territory, as I hope you soon will have New Orleans, I should prefer to insist upon the cession of that province as a separate article than upon the uti possidetis as a principle of negotiation.”

What is more surprising is that Lincoln is able to read the extract at all. It is supposedly provided to him by General Mansfield via Major-General Wool: however, the meeting takes place on 27 December 1861, and volume 9 of Wellington's Supplementary Despatches (which contains the quotation) wasn't published in London until June 1862. The Library of Congress did hold the 'Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh' in which the quotation appears, but it seems unlikely that Wool would have read it. Nor is it likely that Wool happened across the quotation in a newspaper: between 1840 and 1862 it appeared three times, all in 1853. In that year Wool was administering the Department of the East from Troy, New York, but the papers which printed the quotation were in Washington and Richmond. Unfortunately, this appears to be the author forcing his characters to act as a mouthpiece for his own prejudices, instead of attempting to let them speak for themselves.

A Tale of Two Units

In Chapter 2, Part 1, we see a newly-formed Canadian volunteer unit training. In short order, the timeline mocks the military pretensions of 'the middle-aged lieutenant drilling them – at 38, he was twice the age as most of his charges, and just as much of an amateur', noting that 'his father was a quartermaster in the Light Dragoons, so naturally Cherry thinks he is a natural-born soldier'. This suggestion is clearly belied by the lieutenant's effeminacy, as he runs across the field in 'little bounds' rebuking his men in a 'thin voice' with 'Gracious, what would Captain Croft say? Heavens, what would Colonel Denison say?' Clearly, the military life is only one for proper men, not those who study mathematics and natural philosophy. Even language professors are too effeminate for TFSmith's taste, as Joseph Chamberlain becomes 'a tall blonde' (presumably with the consent of his wife).

As the unit drills with antiquated P1842 muskets, we see the inadequacy of its training as it blunders through a basic left turn. Perhaps suggesting low academic standards at University College Toronto, one of the students turns right instead: this mistake actually fells two students and almost brings down four. The author takes the opportunity to remind us, in case we had not realised, that 'they were all tyros'. Later, in Chapter 3 part 1, we find that the rest of the volunteers are little better trained: an almost unhinged Wolseley screams at a Canadian officer about the fact that the volunteers have received 'a mere six or twelve days' annual training according to the arm of the service', a level which is clearly inadequate to prepare them for war. Moreover, we learn that 'muster rolls without men and organization are so much kindling'- only formed units with assigned men and officers, ready to take action rather than being hastily improvised, are useful in war.

In Chapter 3, part 2, we learn about the Union militia defending the border- the 8th Brigade of the 3rd New York State Militia Division. A more different picture could not be painted. They were 'the usual mix of boys and older married men, ranging from ardent amateurs spoiling for a fight to those reluctant about enlisting with the volunteers'. The brigade's commander, Henry A. Samson is a tannery owner - a suitably masculine profession,  reinforced by his being 'a mountain of a man' with 'a businessman’s common sense'. No effeminate professors here!

When the British attack, the 10th New York State Militia pour 'musket and rifle fire' onto the storming party- the rifle fire presumably coming primarily from Company A, the Albany Zouave Cadets, which we are told had 'loaded Springfields' and 'blood in their eyes'. The 'best shot in the company,' Orderly Sergeant Benton, snipes the commander of the Royal Canadian Rifles. Though the British assault force turns and runs, the Union force is eventually defeated- but not before derailing Wolseley's carefully thought-out scheme.

This tableau is an elaborate scheme of misdirection, based on a healthy combination of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi. We are led to mock the amateurish Canadian officer and directed to presume that Samson is an adequate leader, yet even the history of the 20th New York State Militia admitted that Samson 'was a plain, uncultured man, and really knew very little of military tactics or science, and did not pretend to'. Moreover, contrary to the suggestions of physical strength given by his profession and his descripton as 'a mountain of a man', Samson had already refused active service because of physical infirmity.

The claim that the 10th New York State Militia had '155 riflemen and 40 infantry with muskets' is false: page 70 of the New York State Adjutant General's 1861 report shows them to have had 375 percussion muskets. Moreover, the feat which earned Sergeant Benton his status as 'best shot in the company' consisted of three rounds fired from a musket at one hundred yards: a risibly short distance, when at the same time even amateur British units were training at 500-750 yards. Yet we are encouraged to consider this as a great achievement, by describing Benton as the 'best shot' rather than the 'least worst shot'.

We are encouraged to believe that improvised formations are ineffective in the field. However, we are not told that the 8th Brigade is, itself, an improvised formation. The 10th NYSM  was part of the 9th Brigade, not the 8th, which we were told had been relieved in January.  However, there was only one regiment left in the 8th Brigade, as the 20th NYSM had already volunteered for three years service. This required TFSmith to botch together a command for Samson to take up, although- needless to say- the slight of hand is not brought to the reader's attention.

Moreover, both the 10th and the 21st were as short of officers as many of the Canadian sedentary militia battalions which TFSmith insists were unready for the field. Per p.195 of the 1861 report, the 10th was missing all three of its field officers and ten of its 32 company officers: Ira Ainsworth, who we are told was a major, was in fact the senior captain. As for the 21st, it is surprising to see Colonel John R. Cooper present with the battalion when Samson's report on p.119 of the 1861 report makes it clear that he had resigned to act as surgeon of the 5th New York Cavalry. Assuming his is the only name erroneously included in the roster on pp. 220-3, the regiment lacked two of its three field officers and twelve of its 39 company officers.

We are told that six days training was insufficient for the Canadian volunteers, but the 8th Brigade had never received six days training in a year. In 1859, the inspector's report on pp.60-1 shows the 20th recieved three days battalion training and the 21st four. In 1860, pp.83-5 shows that the 20th Regiment had four days and the 21st a single day's parade- pp.64-5 includes Samson's protest that the payment to the 20th had required 'waiving all claims for the services of 1859' and the 21st had been prevented from encamping for lack of funds. In 1861, on pp.118-9, Samson was forced to announce that he had no idea whether his battalions had trained during the year as his commanders had failed to provide the proper reports. It is unclear what training the 10th NYSM had received, as the 9th Brigade did not report in any of the three years given.

The fundamental bias of the timeline is shown in its phrasing. Canadian volunteers are 'tyros'; Union ones are 'ardent amateurs'. Implicit praise is present in his suggestion that volunteers with the 10th NYSM 'carried what they had brought from home, a mix of hunting rifles and shotguns', yet elsewhere he compares calling out the Canadian sedentary militia 'calling out the posse, and hoping they showed'. And even those New Yorkers 'reluctant about enlisting with the volunteers' and facing other manly Americans on the field of combat are still prepared to face the idiotic British and their effete Canadian allies.

The Declaration of War

In any timeline about a war, or indeed any story about one, an important question is this:
When does the war begin?

Normally this is a simple question. But in Burnished Rows of Steel, it becomes oddly arcane as it follows no particular logic - especially compared to the original timeline.

Part 1: The OTL events of the Trent affair

1. In the OTL, the British learned about the Trent affair in late November. This was a shocking crisis, and one which came after several events which the British (largely wrongly) interpreted as the Union signalling that it planned to invade Canada at the first opportunity.
2. The British spent some days debating, and then sent their ultimatum – one which demanded the release of the prisoners (Mason and Slidell) and an apology, and directed their ambassador to treat anything other than substantive compliance as a rejection.
3. This ultimatum had a one week expiry date. This was deliberate, and was intended to not give the Union too long to prepare commerce raiding cruisers (seen as a major possible financial risk).
4. In the OTL, the British Ultimatum arrived in Washington on the 18^th December. Lyons allowed the Union another five days total to consider before the formal presentation of the demand; in the event, the Union backed down in private on the 27^th and in public on the 29^th.
5. This news led to the cancellation of General Militia Order number one, which called for Canadian militia mobilization to formally begin on or about the 30^th December.
6. The news reached Britain on the 9^th January.

So much is OTL. Now, there are a few additional details to note.

• The first is that the decision on whether to go to war was already made – it was why the ultimatum was sent. Much like in the Crimean War, the decision making had already taken place, and a declaration of war would follow within a day or two of the rejection of the ultimatum.
• The second is that, owing to the predominantly naval British strategy, any delay harms them. They have no reason to delay a declaration of war more than a few days, unless they decide to delay until summer when they can pre-position large chunks of the Royal Navy and British Army inside Canada to protect it (and can drill large numbers of Canadian militia).
• The third is that the British already had a large naval squadron off the American coasts in December 1861.

Part 2: Changes in the Timeline

The following changes take place to this course of events in Burnished Rows of Steel.

1.  The Trent affair is not the first provocation for which the news reaches Britain – instead there is the St Albans Raid, which takes place ahistorically early. This should have the effect of making the British more wary of any Union reaction. It should also have the effect of causing the British to form provisional battalions of volunteer militia for active service, as they did when the raid actually took place, or sending regular infantry battalions to reinforce the border.
2.  The Trent affair is far, far worse, with the San Jacinto (the US ship in the Trent affair) firing on the British corvette Rinaldo and crippling her; the San Jacinto escapes with no noted damage. It is stated that it is unclear which ship fired first, but the British should have little doubt that the more heavily armed Rinaldo would not have been crippled if she fired first. (she has to be towed back to a nearby port, San Jacinto sails under her own power to Boston.)
3.  There are additional border incidents, including one where (according to a strict reading of the facts given in the post as opposed to the statements of the characters) the Vermont militia invade Canada to ambush a company of British regular infantry.
4.  The British ultimatum is harsher, calling for several additional provisions, and is officially presented on the 19^th December.
5.  The Union calls for mediation on the 26^th December. (This would be taken by the British as a rejection, and Lyons would leave the country immediately; this he does not do.)
6.  The timescale of when the Union rejection reaches Britain is not known. What is known, however, is that the British response arrives in Washington on or about 22^nd February – a two-way message time of 58 days, which compares very poorly to the OTL one-way message time of 11 days.
7.  General Militia Order number one either does not exist or is cancelled TTL. No Canadian mobilization takes place, and some of the OTL regulars alerted to move to Canada are stood down – in short, the British are acting as though the Union has backed down.
8.  The contents of the British response are not known, but they do not include a declaration of war and nor do they include either an acceptance of mediation or a further ultimatum.
9.  There is a British attack in time of peace towards the end of March on the frontier around Lake Champlain.
10. The Union declares war on Britain on the 1^st of April.
11.  At about the same date, the British begin moving their battlefleets. The first naval action of the war takes place in late April.

This timeline makes no sense. It is the British doing absolutely everything wrong they possibly could, from not following up on their ultimatum, to not using the time to mobilize, to opening hostilities at literally the worst possible time (i.e. early enough that the St Lawrence is still just about frozen, late enough that the Union has had four months to prepare and that mud is closing the sled route to Riviere du Loup), to opening hostilities without a formal declaration of war.

Part 3: Examples from the real world

Incidentally, here's some examples to show that the massive British delay has to be vacillating, not the results of storms:


Europa, December 25 from Boston; arrives Queenstown, 6 January
Jura, December 28 from Portland; arrives Londonderry 8 January
City of Washington, December 28 from New York; arrives Queenstown 9 January
Teutonia, December 28 from New York; arrives Southampton 10 January
America, January 1 from New York: arrives Queenstown 13 January;
Nova Scotian, January 4 from Portland: arrives Londonderry 15 January
City of Edinburgh, January 4 from New York: arrives Queenstown 16 January
Niagara, January 8 from Boston; arrives Queenstown 20 January

With a 26 December reply, the latest that the news should arrive in the British Isles is 13 January. 8 January is more likely, on the Jura.

Ships from UK:
Europa, from Liverpool on the 11th, Queenstown on the 12th, arrived Halifax 26 January 1862; goes on to Boston.
Teutonia, from Southampton on 15 January for New York
City of Washington, from Liverpool on 15 January for New York; arrived 31 January
Anglo-Saxon from Liverpool on 16 January for Portland; arrived 30 January

Note that some of these are the same ships again.
The British reply should have arrived, at the latest, before the start of February. If the Jura took the message and there was an immediate declaration of war (first day after rejection of ultimatum, thus 9th or 10th Jan, as per the Crimea) then the declaration of war should have arrived on the Europa if not sooner.
Dispatch vessels should have reached Milne about the same time.


If Milne had instead had conditional war orders, as we have reason to believe he may (e.g. Dunlop commenting about how he'd had orders to come down on the Gulf Blockading Squadron) then it's possible that the first actions of the war could have taken place as early as the second week of January.

Thus, TFSmith's odd warping of space and time has served to buy the US three and a half months of preparation time. The amount of preparation the British do in the same time period is miniscule - certainly they don't ship over anything like the number of troops they could have. While the British twiddle their thumbs, the Union manages to increase their army by somewhere in the region of 75,000 men present for duty.

The explanation he uses is that the Crimean War course of events is one to be copied, where the incident to the declaration of war is a few months. This completely misses any kind of changed circumstances - one assumes he would delay the ultimatum until late March to fit the Crimean timeline, but unfortunately it actually happened - and conveniently happens to place the events to trigger the war at the best possible time for the Union, without placing the blame for the war on them. This is particularly unfortunate because the British had started to reinforce Canada in early December 1861, which is far too quick for TFSmith's model to account for. We therefore see the British hurry out reinforcements in the unseaworthy Melbourne because of the need for haste, and then lose interest in Canada for three months.

One of the side effects of this desire is that we never see what the late-Feb communication from the British was; this is because, whatever it is, it would be worse for TFSmith's timeline than if we never actually see it and are encouraged to forget it entirely.