Silas is Golden

TFSmith is fond of having British officers deliver canned speeches about how terrible their strategic position is, even if these speeches have to be taken out of context, misleadingly quoted, or plagiarised from secondary historians. It's a shame that in the quarter of a million words of BROS, he didn't find room to quote Colonel Silas W. Burt, former Assistant Inspector General of the New York National Guard. In his Memoirs of the Military History of the State of New York during the War for the Union, 1861-65, he gives a detailed explanation of New York's position during the Trent Affair.

In our then excited condition there was general exultation over Captain Wilkes' violent capture of the rebel emissaries. We had no idea of international law, and we viewed this violation of it as a proper exercise of our right to suppress the rebellion. Almost without exception the public expression was jubilant and laudatory. But soon came the menacing echoes from England, the outcry against the violation of neutral rights, the rapid military and naval preparations and the prospect of a foreign war superadded to our domestic troubles. There was some foolish ebullition of defiance, but to the thoughtful the prospect was very threatening and almost fatal. In case of war with Great Britain the brunt would have to be borne by New York. Its long sea coast, its great vulnerable metropolis, its long boundary at the north, coterminous with Canada, and its important ports on the great lakes, were all points of probable attack or invasion. So soon as the intelligence of hostile preparations in England reached this country, we who were engaged at the Governor's headquarters recognized the gravity of the situation, and that under existing conditions our State would have to provide largely for its own defense. Indeed there were many official and semi-official intimations from Washington that the threatened safety of that city would require the retention there of all the troops then near it, and that few could be spared from other quarters should there occur a declaration of war by England, as then seemed imminent — in other words, that we would have to take care of ourselves. This was a very serious consideration. Our organized militia, very feeble at the best except in New York city, had everywhere been weakened by the volunteering of a large part of its best element, since a considerable share of the officers in the new regiments had been drawn from the militia. There were several regiments within the State not yet completed, but they were comparatively few and at the best were raw and undrilled, and would count for little in a sudden contest with the disciplined soldiers of the regular British army. So far as the approach from Canada was concerned there was some relief in the imminence of winter, which would lock up the St. Lawrence in ice and make an invasion by land very difficult. We were more particularly concerned about New York city, which, as the largest and most important of our commercial cities, would be the principal objective point of a hostile navy, and England was then the best equipped naval power in the world...

the conditions of defence of the city were very faulty, and though the United States engineers had plans for completing the works and armaments so as to bring them fully up to the times, these would require years, and the dangers we were confronting were imminent...

Some attention was also given to the defences on the lakes and northern frontier, though nothing practical was attempted...the construction of canals around the several rapids of the St. Lawrence river and of the Welland canal, connecting Lakes Ontario and Erie, would enable the British Government to place upon the great lakes a fleet of war vessels at the very outbreak of hostilities... Our Erie canal locks would not admit boats with more than 98 feet of length, 17 3/4 feet width and 6 feet draught, or of less than 100 tons. We would therefore have to depend upon fitting out the mercantile lake craft for naval purposes, and though I do not doubt that had the pressing occasion required such a recourse, we would have rapidly improvised an excellent navy on the lakes, we would still have been at a great disadvantage with our antagonist, who could have brought upon those waters its sea-going naval vessels of small tonnage...

The terrible emergency never came, and the threatening war cloud that had so suddenly gathered from over the sea as suddenly passed away, but none of those who participated in the anxieties and discussions and bore a part of the responsibilities in those portentous days can forget them. Had the conflict ensued we should have been in a terribly unprepared condition, our harbor and frontier forts in bad condition, with very inadequate armament for them or for our improvised navies, and with only a raw, hastily gathered militia to encounter the British regulars seasoned in the Crimea and India. With little aid from the forces of the General Government, the menaced States would have had to depend upon such resources as each could gather within its borders

You should always read a source with caution, as they can only ever present one inaccurate part of the picture. But isn't this one a refreshing change? We spend so much time discussing how the British would have responded to an American invasion, and whether they could have held on the Lakes. And yet here we have a New York officer worrying about the British invading them, and talking about how they have the advantage on the Lakes!