History: Use and Abuse

TFSmith has said that

I have tried to research it [the TL] and write as somewhere close to what could have been reality, neither an Operation IMPERIAL STORM nor a "Third time's the charm" version of events. Everything in BROS is based on a) what the situation was in the winter of 1861-62, filtered by b) historical precedent, primarily from the period 1841-81, i..e, the length of a professional career (more or less). 

What this means in practice is that:

1. Everything bad that happened to the British between 1841 and 1881 gets to happen here, with the serial numbers filed off.
2. Everything good that the British managed to do between 1841 and 1881 gets discounted because it's against the Americans.

Think I'm joking?

The Coaticook River shambles

 

There is a lot wrong with the Vermont militia's engagement with the British on the Coaticook River in chapter 1. What is perhaps most wrong, however, is that it's lifted wholesale from an event twenty years later: the battle of Bronkhorstspruit. Let this sink in for a moment:

• In reality, Boer commandos armed with the Westley Richards falling-block breech-loading rifle caused 156 British casualties in fifteen minutes
• In TFSmith's story, Vermont militia armed with muzzle-loading percussion rifles cause 156 British casualties in fifteen minutes

One wonders why the Boers wasted their money on new rifles.

The battle at Rouse's Point 

In chapter 3, part 2, the British attempt a night attack on Fort Montgomery. A drunken Canadian laughs; this alerts the Union forces, and the British slump to one of many defeats. TFSmith has admitted that the battle is based wholesale on the later battle of Tel-el-Kebir, where the British defeated the Egyptians:

The British night march is taken directly from Wolsley's strategy at Tel el-Kebir, which was the first division+ operation he ever commanded, and in a similar tactical situation; seemed he would have struck on the same idea here...

The "drunken soldier" is taken from the same source; it really happened (albeit in 1882, but still... it is within my self-imposed 1841-42 to 1881-82 timeframe for historically analogous practice, albeit barely). The Egyptians, however, were unable to take advantage of it, namely because they only had a single defensive line. The US (I think, given the depth of experience and engineering/artillery specialists available) would have had more, which is why things did not work out so well for the British in BROS. Winter helps as well, of course.

What he neglects to mention is that the drunken soldier at Tel-el-Kebir did not alert the Egyptians (as a cursory reading of secondary literature will tell you). Thus, we already have the author changing historical events to make the situation worse for the British.

Although Tel-el-Kebir was outside TFSmith's frame of reference, he could have used an alternative battle: Roberts' march on the Peiwar Kotal in 1878. This battle, of which TFSmith is presumably unaware, saw Roberts launch a long overnight flank march to bypass an Afghan position. What is most striking about the battle is that the Pathans marching with the force actually started shooting as the force was still moving into position - whether accidentally, or in a deliberate attempt to alert their kinsmen on the other side, is unclear. Despite this, Roberts still managed to storm the position successfully. So far, we have two historical examples of night assaults which the British conducted without alerting the defenders, and one fictional one where the defenders were alerted.

Had TFSmith done more research, he would also have found that night marches and assaults at dawn were a frequent phenomenon of the suppression of the Indian Rebellion, where marching during the middle of the day was impossible. For instance, the 83rd (County of Dublin) Regiment marched fifty-two miles in thirty hours to attack a rebel force at 4 A.M., achieving total surprise. Trench warfare at Sebastopol had also given the British considerable experience in both repelling and launching night attacks- for instance, the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade won two VCs for this exploit:

Marching down to the trenches they lay down till dark. They then advanced stealthily, creeping along the broken ground which led first down a slight incline, and then up towards the enemy, who were completely surprised by the attack. Fifty men under Tryon formed the storming column; 50 the supports under Bourchier and 100 the reserve under Cuninghame. Eventually these parties, became practically one. They quickly drove the Russian riflemen from their cover, though supported by a heavy column of Russian infantry... 

Repeatedly during that long night did the Russians attempt to retake the pits; sometimes by sending forward strong columns, sometimes by creeping up a few at a time, and when they got near making signals for their companions to come on. But this handful of Riflemen, under the command of these two young officers, bravely withstood them, and held the position until relieved next day by another party of the Battalion.

The pages of history are littered with examples of the British conducting successful night attacks- and yet, when an American author portrays them fighting against the Union, they are unable to do so. It is this fundamental bias, twisting and perverting real events to suit the author's pretence at impartiality, which makes the timeline such an incredibly frustrating read to anybody with a commitment to the truth.