'If the Yankees are worth their salt, they will at once make peace with the South and pour 100,000 men in to Canada where they can easily compensate themselves for their losses of the Confederate states, and England be perfectly unable to prevent it. Unless the British government at once make up their minds to fitting out an expedition which can start (as soon as war is declared) to seize Portland, and open up the railway communication from there to Quebec, I cannot see how we are to maintain our position in Canada this winter... Do not be surprised if you hear of us all being made prisoners of war before the end of February.'
In Chapter 2, part 1, TFSmith puts this quotation into Wolseley's mouth. Critically, TFSmith has specifically said that 'The quote from Wolseley is historical; it from [sic] a letter he wrote in December, before he sailed.' This is a lie, as a comparison of the original with the version that TFSmith provides makes clear:
'if the Yankees are worth their salt, they’ll at once make peace with the south – or at least stand on the defensive down there where they can – and pour 100,000 men into Canada, where they can compensate themselves with whatever they lose in the South, and England be perfectly unable to prevent it'
TFSmith said that he took the quote from Amanda Foreman's A World on Fire: however, this also features the correct version of the quote, without TFSmith's addition.
Why did TFSmith say that the quote was historical, when he had added to it? Moreover, if the Union could invade Canada without making peace in the South, why did Wolseley choose such a convoluted way of expressing himself? Why did he not simply say 'if the Yankees are worth their salt, they will pour 100,000 men in to Canada'?
The answer is simple. Wolseley knew that without making peace with the South, the Union had no prospect of launching the quick attack that he feared. His belief that the Union intended such a quick assault was predicated on the assumption (shared by many of his contemporaries) that the Trent was a deliberate insult designed to give the Union an excuse for breaking off the war against the Confederacy, in which it had so far signally failed to make progress. To appease the wounded pride of the populace, the Union had prepared a sucker-punch for the British and ordered Wilkes to give them the pretext to deliver it.
Wolseley expected the Union to reject the British ultimatum almost instantaneously, and to send units into Canada shortly afterwards. This attack would require the British to move quickly in order to seize Portland, which would allow them to send reinforcements via rail into the heartland of Canada instead of moving them slowly by road or waiting for the spring thaw on the St Lawrence. Even so, the likelihood would be that the British would be unable to respond quickly enough to the Union's surprise attack- and that, by February, the campaign would be over and Wolseley and his colleagues would be prisoners.
Wolseley's assumption was false. There would be no quick attack; the British would have time to prepare. Indeed, they have time to prepare in Burnished Rows of Steel (though, naturally, they choose to squander it). And yet TFSmith dresses Wolseley's words up to justify his interpretation, and lies about having done so. This is truly shameful.
As with the Fergusson letter, do readers of this timeline feel proud that they have been taken for fools? That TFSmith assumes either that they are incapable of Googling, or too lazy or credulous to do so?
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