Centreville Cannot Hold

In Chapter 7 Part 1 we come to the great dust up between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. Now one would expect an author who self-professes to know much about American history and military history could deliver an exciting battle with an interesting twist on historic events.

Sadly, in this case we can expect the exact opposite.

Duelling Bull-joes

In Burnished Rows of Steel, we are clearly intended to understand that Britain, and by extension its Canadian colony, is an archaic, class-ridden society. This is encapsulated in the way in which the aristocrats solve their problems: through single combat. The Prince of Wales's decision to call out his father is inspired by 'Generations of breeding,' and when Wolseley rebukes Colonel McNab for the state of the Canadian militia 'The Canadian looked ready to challenge the British officer to a duel then and there'.

This is completely ahistorical: whereas duelling had died out in Britain, it was still common in America. The last fatal Canadian duels were in the 1830s; the last fatal duel in England was fought between two Frenchmen in 1852. In 1859, meanwhile, a sitting US Senator was shot and killed by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. Senator Broderick clearly saw nothing wrong with accepting a challenge; three years later, when an Irish MP challenged Sir Robert Peel to a duel, Peel referred him to the Prime Minster who brought it before the House as a breach of Peel's privilege to speak freely.

Nor was Broderick's murder an isolated occurrence in American high life. TFSmith mentions Daniel Sickles' 'scandalous personal life': what he neglects to mention is that in 1859, while a Congressman, Sickles shot and killed a Washington DC district attorney who was cuckolding him - and that a jury of his peers acquitted him of the crime.

Which of these societies was the backward, violent one?

USCT: Untrue, Spurious, Concocted Twaddle

One of the consistent themes of Burnished Rows of Steel is TFSmith's insistence on denying the level of racism in the contemporary North. In turn, this leads to the litany of errors, lies and misjudgements which characterise his treatment of the US Coloured Troops.

Pakenham It In

As we have seen, TFSmith is more than happy to steal from authors. Unfortunately, when he does give them at least partial credit, he misrepresents their ideas. Witness the following quote, assigned to a 'distinguished historian':

An Errant Canadian?

In Chapter 2 Part 1 we have a rather curious meeting taking place in Toronto at University College in the office of Professor John McCaul. This is a curious meeting for two reasons. The first is for the venue of the meeting. From the text it is implied John McCaul has invited his two guests to discuss issues pertaining to Canada's future in his office, This is something out of character for McCaul who was an academic first and foremost, and in his long career offers no notable political commentary, so his desire to see two men who by all rights should have no reason to see him, is rather confusing off the cuff.

However, let us address the guest list:

Silas is Golden

TFSmith is fond of having British officers deliver canned speeches about how terrible their strategic position is, even if these speeches have to be taken out of context, misleadingly quoted, or plagiarised from secondary historians. It's a shame that in the quarter of a million words of BROS, he didn't find room to quote Colonel Silas W. Burt, former Assistant Inspector General of the New York National Guard. In his Memoirs of the Military History of the State of New York during the War for the Union, 1861-65, he gives a detailed explanation of New York's position during the Trent Affair.

Russells my jimmies

TFSmith describes a parade of the Army of the Potomac in glowing terms:

The troops included six divisions of infantry, with some 72 regiments between their 18 brigades; 24 light batteries that amounted to 120 guns; and six regiments of cavalry, a total of well more than 60,000 men... well-dressed, well-armed, and marching regularly, as the assembled bands played everything from “Hail, Columbia” to “Yankee Doodle.” 

William Howard Russell, the Times correspondent who had followed the British army to the Crimea, saw the parade at first hand. According to him, TFSmith is exaggerating the numbers present:

'November 20th. To-day a grand review, the most remarkable feature of which was the able disposition made by General McDowell to march seventy infantry regiments, seventeen batteries, and seven cavalry regiments, into a very contracted space, from the adjoining camps. Of the display itself I wrote a long account, which is not worth repeating here. Among the 55,000 men present there were at least 20,000 Germans and 12,000 Irish.'

His 'long account' shows that the infantry were anything other than 'well-dressed, well-armed, and marching regularly':

'it was a display of military power which could not have been satisfactory to a military critic adopting the standard of European criticism... light dragoons, long-haired, open-collared, strapless, with trousers well up the calves of their legs, displaying great variety of booting and hosiery, with ungroomed horses and dirty accoutrements... it became a moot question whether he was going to commit unintentional suicide by falling on his sword, or whether he would cut off his horse's head or your own, as he flourished about on his steed, quite out of hand... the field-batteries on the hill fired a very irregular and ill-timed salute... the cavalry were bad, slovenly, ill set-up; in person, accoutrements, and horses, showing a want of care... inferior in appearance and regularity to the Cossacks of the Black Sea... The artillery was the best part of the display... The infantry was varied in character and air... There is still a diversity of armament in the artillery, and of small-arms and uniforms in the other branches of the service... Some regiments came by carrying arms, some with arms sloped, some with fixed bayonets, others without; some had excellent bands, others rendered day hideous by their discord... Taking the regiments of infantry at 600 strong, which, considering camp guards, reserves, etc., is rather a high average, there may have been 46,000 or 48,000 men on the field, with 3,000 cavalry... and 100 guns.' (Times, 9 December 1861)

Russell's other observations from around the same time are little more complimentary to the Army of the Potomac:

'October 8th. A review of the artillery at this side of the river took place to-day, which has been described in very inflated language by the American papers, the writers on which never having seen a decently-equipped force of the kind pronounce the sight to have been of unequalled splendor; whereas the appearance of horses and men was very far from respectable in all matters relating to grooming, cleanliness, and neatness. General Barry has done wonders in simplifying the force and reducing the number of calibres, which varied according to the fancy of each State, or men of each officer who raised a battery ; but there are still field-guns of three inches and of three inches and a half, Napoleon guns, rifled ten-pound Parrotts, ordinary nine-pounders, a variety of howitzers, twenty-pound Parrott rifled guns, and a variety of different projectiles in the caissons. As the men rode past, the eye was distressed by discrepancies in dress. Many wore red or white worsted comforters round their necks, few had straps to their trousers; some had new coats, others old; some wore boots, others shoes; not one had clean spurs, bits, curb-chains, or buttons. The officers cannot get the men to do what the latter regard as works of supererogation.'

October 26th: 'spurring home pretty fast along an unfrequented road, leading from the ferry at Georgetown into the city, I was nearly spitted by a "dragoon," who rode at me from under cover of a house, and shouted "stop," just as his sabre was within a foot of my head. Fortunately his horse, being aware that if it ran against mine it might be injured, shied, and over went dragoon, sabre and all, and off went his horse, but as the trooper was able to run after it, I presume he was not the worse ; and I went on my way rejoicing.

'October 27th. After church, I took a long walk round by the commissariat wagons, where there is, I think, as much dirt, bad language, cruelty to animals, and waste of public money, as can be conceived.'

'December 4th. To Arlington, where Senator Ira Harris presented flags that is, standards to a cavalry regiment called after his name... The regiment then went through some evolutions, which were brought to an untimely end by a feu du joie from the infantry in the rear, which instantly broke up the squadrons, and sent them kicking, plunging, and falling over the field, to the great amusement of the crowd.'

No doubt many Union supporters will imply that Russell was mistaken, or call him a liar or prejudiced. Russell, who faced social ostracism and threats of violence from telling the truth about the Union's humiliation at Bull Run, and who was subsquently forced to leave America because he was denied permission to travel with the Union Army for fear of what he might say about it, would no doubt be amused by this.

Lies, Damned Lies, and Quotations

While leaving Britain for service in Canada, Wolseley wrote to a friend that:

'If the Yankees are worth their salt, they will at once make peace with the South and pour 100,000 men in to Canada where they can easily compensate themselves for their losses of the Confederate states, and England be perfectly unable to prevent it. Unless the British government at once make up their minds to fitting out an expedition which can start (as soon as war is declared) to seize Portland, and open up the railway communication from there to Quebec, I cannot see how we are to maintain our position in Canada this winter...  Do not be surprised if you hear of us all being made prisoners of war before the end of February.'

In Chapter 2, part 1, TFSmith puts this quotation into Wolseley's mouth. Critically, TFSmith has specifically said that 'The quote from Wolseley is historical; it from [sic] a letter he wrote in December, before he sailed.' This is a lie, as a comparison of the original with the version that TFSmith provides makes clear:

'if the Yankees are worth their salt, they’ll at once make peace with the south – or at least stand on the defensive down there where they can – and pour 100,000 men into Canada, where they can compensate themselves with whatever they lose in the South, and England be perfectly unable to prevent it'

TFSmith said that he took the quote from Amanda Foreman's A World on Fire: however, this also features the correct version of the quote, without TFSmith's addition.

Why did TFSmith say that the quote was historical, when he had added to it? Moreover, if the Union could invade Canada without making peace in the South, why did Wolseley choose such a convoluted way of expressing himself? Why did he not simply say 'if the Yankees are worth their salt, they will pour 100,000 men in to Canada'?

The answer is simple. Wolseley knew that without making peace with the South, the Union had no prospect of launching the quick attack that he feared. His belief that the Union intended such a quick assault was predicated on the assumption (shared by many of his contemporaries) that the Trent was a deliberate insult designed to give the Union an excuse for breaking off the war against the Confederacy, in which it had so far signally failed to make progress. To appease the wounded pride of the populace, the Union had prepared a sucker-punch for the British and ordered Wilkes to give them the pretext to deliver it.

Wolseley expected the Union to reject the British ultimatum almost instantaneously, and to send units into Canada shortly afterwards. This attack would require the British to move quickly in order to seize Portland, which would allow them to send reinforcements via rail into the heartland of Canada instead of moving them slowly by road or waiting for the spring thaw on the St Lawrence. Even so,  the likelihood would be that the British would be unable to respond quickly enough to the Union's surprise attack- and that, by February, the campaign would be over and Wolseley and his colleagues would be prisoners.

Wolseley's assumption was false. There would be no quick attack; the British would have time to prepare. Indeed, they have time to prepare in Burnished Rows of Steel (though, naturally, they choose to squander it). And yet TFSmith dresses Wolseley's words up to justify his interpretation, and lies about having done so. This is truly shameful.

As with the Fergusson letter, do readers of this timeline feel proud that they have been taken for fools? That TFSmith assumes either that they are incapable of Googling, or too lazy or credulous to do so?

Wolseley vs Fergusson

Chapter 3, part 1 features a British war council at which Wolseley reads part of a letter from the British Conservative MP Sir James Fergusson. Fergusson had been to America and seen both Union and Confederate armies, and on his return his observations were passed from Lord Derby to Lord Palmerston and, in this timeline, to Wolseley. Fergusson's observations, as read by Wolseley, make chilling reading:

"… with regard to the Northern army, there can be no doubt that for its size it is one of the best equipped which any nation has set on foot. Its transport is superb, its artillery numerous, well-appointed, and of the best description; and the physique of its men unsurpassed..." Wolseley stopped, letting it all sink in.

"And that, gentlemen, is the opinion of a member of parliament who is an avowed Southern sympathizer…" the colonel said 

 On the other hand, had Wolsely continued to read the letter he would have made his audience feel considerably better:

But which in their sanguine anticipations Americans forget, in England we must note that of the rank and file of the army the Chief Part is little more experienced than it was at the time of the Battle of Manassas — that its officers are taken from the same class & elected in the same manner as then, and that of all the causes to which the rout of Manassas has been attributed none is better proved than the general incapacity of the regimental officers—that of the general officer is a necessity...  A liberal bounty, eighteen pence a day and rations have filled the ranks so far. But as to the military character of the army my impressions and belief is that it lacks as greatly all the qualities of worth and strength which distinguishes the army that England sent to the Crimea as it is rich in those equipments in which that army was deficient.

It is evident too that it does not possess the confidence of its commanders. Each mile that the Confederates permit it to advance its outposts unopposed is carefully fortified & every road covered by field works of the strongest construction. Such is not the plan of a general at the lead of an "imposing" eager and patriotic army. 

But these must also be large deductions made from the members of which the Federal Army is popularly supposed to consist. The most recent detailed estimate of a N.Y. Paper not likely to understate such matters gives only 360,000 as the number of soldiers raised and in the ranks of the various loyal States. Another has lately stated 450,000 and called it 1/2 million—but it was evident that it included the "3 months men" enrolled but since disbanded. Recruiting in N.Y. & other Eastern States is said to have almost ceased. Many of the 360,000 are as yet undrilled—few more than of 3 months service and there is a considerable daily diminution by casualties.

When I was at St Louis about 20th Sept., the newspapers were decrying Gen. [John Charles] Fremont's inaction and his supineness in suffering Lexington (Missouri) to fall, but I found that many of his regiments were only then receiving their arms — which bye the bye were indifferent smooth-bore muskets—he was without any organized transport.  

The army of the Potomac in advance of and around Washington is said to consist of 200,000 men but when I was with Gen. Beauregard on 12th Oct. he received from a friend in Washington with access to the best official information an exact account of the arrival of troops from the date of the Battle of Manassas. Their numbers did not exceed 60,000 & it was stated that giving an ample allowance, the force of "the Potomac" did not exceed 140,000 & was probably much less. Hence if the Federal General has such a force, if he has actually 150 pieces of Artillery, a large force of cavalry (those I saw on the Northern side w[oul]d have been very bad yeomanry) any estimate of his power of attacking a wary & resolute enemy—holding a difficult country & that his own, w[oul]d lead to [a] grave mistake, if founded on an experience of European or any regular troops.

Can anybody defend the small section which TFSmith put in Wolsely's mouth as a fair representation of the whole? As a reader, do you enjoy being misled in this way about what people at the time said and thought?


For those who have now lost all trust in quotations, the full letter may be found in:
Michael F. Hughes, '"The Personal Observations of a Man of Intelligence": Sir James Fergusson's Visit to North America, 1861,' Civil War History, Volume 45, Number 3, September 1999, pp. 238-247
Elisabeth Joan Doyle, 'A Report On Civil War America: Sir James Fergusson's Five-Week Visit,' Civil War History, Volume 12, Number 4, December 1966, pp. 347-362

Roswellington That Ends Wellington

The climax of Chapter 1 Part 6, as the Washington Cabinet vote to reject the British demands, is Lincoln reading an excerpt from Wellington's letters. Given his background as a lawyer, it is perhaps not surprising that Lincoln cut out everything nice that Wellington said about the British:

“I confess that I think you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession of territory from America. Considering everything, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such as the want of the naval superiority on the Lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You cannot then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power. I put out of question the possession taken by Sir John Sherbrooke between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay. It is evidently only temporary, and till a larger force will drive away the few companies there; and an officer might as well claim the sovereignty of the ground on which his piquets stand, or over which his patrols pass. Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any; and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground which, I believe, their government are looking for, not to break off the negotiations, but to avoid to make peace. If you had territory, as I hope you soon will have New Orleans, I should prefer to insist upon the cession of that province as a separate article than upon the uti possidetis as a principle of negotiation.”

What is more surprising is that Lincoln is able to read the extract at all. It is supposedly provided to him by General Mansfield via Major-General Wool: however, the meeting takes place on 27 December 1861, and volume 9 of Wellington's Supplementary Despatches (which contains the quotation) wasn't published in London until June 1862. The Library of Congress did hold the 'Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh' in which the quotation appears, but it seems unlikely that Wool would have read it. Nor is it likely that Wool happened across the quotation in a newspaper: between 1840 and 1862 it appeared three times, all in 1853. In that year Wool was administering the Department of the East from Troy, New York, but the papers which printed the quotation were in Washington and Richmond. Unfortunately, this appears to be the author forcing his characters to act as a mouthpiece for his own prejudices, instead of attempting to let them speak for themselves.

Burnished Rows of Steal

Plagiarism, or the theft of the ideas of others and passing them off as one's own, is the worst offense that can be committed in the intellectual world of academia. TFSmith purports to be an academic, and claims copyright over the work at the start of each post which he makes. Yet he also paraphrases or outright quotes from other historians without crediting these historians for the work he claims as his own.