Sunday, 26 February 2017

The Maine Event

In chapter 4 part 2, TFSmith speaks glowingly about the ability of Maine to face  the British attack on Portland:
The militia had more than 3,000 assorted long-arms in the hands of companies on active duty in the various harbor defenses (forts McClarey, Scammel, and Sullivan), or in the state’s armories and arsenal, meaning the existing organized militia units could be mustered and equipped without relying on service militia with civilian weapons.
Unfortunately, this is not true.

In December, 1861, the weapons 'in the hands of companies on active duty in the various harbour defences' consisted of 255 M1842 muskets, and the weapons “in the state armouries and arsenals” consisted of:

161 musketoons
15 brown percussion rifles
6 rifles
145 common muskets
54 old English tower muskets

To which we might choose to add the 22 'muskets and rifles of different patterns at Headquarters' which were listed.

This leaves us with 255 weapons in the harbour defences, 381 in the arsenals, and 22 at headquarters. Rather than 'more than 3,000', therefore, our total is 658 weapons. How Maine managed to obtain another 2,343 weapons, increasing their stores by 356%, is rather a mystery- and one not revealed in the text. TFSmith has talked previously about there being 'about 700 [weapons] in with organized militia companies not on active duty, and about 1700 in the hands of USV units being organized'. These figures are not supported by detailed analysis of the reports, which list 1,547 weapons as having been lost and the 700 weapons with companies as being 'in constant use for drill and instruction' in a way that quickly made them 'almost worthless'.

Sadly, his treatment of the weapon situation still makes more sense than his treatment of the Maine militia:

another 44,000 men were enrolled in the militia. Of those, about ten percent were drilling regularly in the militia’s four organized units, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of militia infantry and the 1st Artillery Battalion

This is what the December 1861 Maine AG report has to say about the state of the militia:

'The absorption of nineteen of the most efficient of the thirty-four companies, which constituted the active militia of this State prior to April last, (Table 1, Appendix H,) with all their arms, equipments and camp equipage and the withdrawal of the material of five of the remaining fifteen for the same service, left so little of the militia force which ordinarily occupies the attention of this department and the major generals and other officers of the volunteer militia under chapter ten of the Revised Statutes, that with the exception of remarking the fact shown in Table 3 (Appendix H) of the returns of eight of the fifteen remaining companies, my report upon this branch of military organizations might with propriety be here brought to a close'

Table 3, appendix H of the report puts the number of active militia at 398. This alone would suggest a 1,006% increase in the size of the force. However, the 398 doesn’t reflect the actual number of men who were drilling:

‘Returns of May inspections from the commanding officers of this class of companies have been received from seven only, and of these but two have held company drills under section eleven above quoted, entitling them to compensation therefor.’

If two drills a year counts as ‘drilling regularly' - although TFSmith was extremely scornful of the six drills a year which the Canadian volunteers received - and only a quarter of the active militia are managing that standard, then getting 4,400 to do it would represent an increase of 4,322%,

The only other troops which Maine has are specified as unorganised, not organised, nor are they 'drilling regularly':

'The parading as regiments of numerous unorganized military associations, familiarly termed “Home Guards," during the summer and autumn, for drill and exercise in military discipline and for informal review by the major generals present, has been presented more fully in detail in the public prints of the day, than I am enabled to do in this report. The following have incidentally come to my knowledge: —

In the First Division:
At South Newburgh, August twenty-ninth,
At Hampden, October ninth,
At North Newburgh, October fifteenth.
At Bangor.

At the three first mentioned places Colonel Amasa Walker was in command and F. G. Flagg, Esq., of Hampden, Acting Adjutant ; at Bangor Colonel William H. Mills commanded. These three gentlemen are all well known and of large military experience. Major General James H. Butler and staff reviewed the troops at Hampden and Bangor, and I am informed that the patriotic zeal and military enthusiasm which actuate the great mass of the people in the present emergency, were demonstrated in a most gratifying manner.

In the Second Division but one similar demonstration is within my knowledge, and that occurred at Monroe on the twenty-fifth of September. I am informed that a successful one was made at Benton during the fall. Major General Titcomb was not present at either, and I am without detailed information in relation to them, yet have an impression that the Benton occasion was a most successful one. A similar demonstration is understood to have been made at Bowdoinham sometime in October; but of its success, as well as the exact date and name of the commanding officer, I have no information.

In the Third Division, a two days' encampment of those temporary organizations took place at Bethel, in October, commanded by Colonel Moses Houghton and reviewed by Major General William W. Virgin and staff. At Turner, under Colonel Philo S. Clark, and at Gray, (commanding officer unknown,) parades of a day each are informally reported as having taken place, all of which were eminently satisfactory.
In TFSmith's view, the Canadians cannot raise more troops than they had in peacetime, and cannot arm them properly despite having more than enough modern weapons to do so. However, in a case of textbook American exceptionalism, Maine manages raise vastly more militia than it had weapons available- and those troops also escape the scorn which TFSmith has for improvised units. Once again, logistics is something that only happens to the British.

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