One of the inevitable results of an Anglo-American war between 1776 and about 1930 is the establishment of some form of blockade of the USA. This does happen in Burnished Rows of Steel, but - as expected - the author is terribly unclear about what is going on, and when he is not simply ignoring the Royal Navy he is misrepresenting them.
How many ships do the British want?
At various times TFSmith presents the number of ships the British want to use in different ways.
Chapter 4 (first half):
So, in order to lift the U.S. blockade of the rebel states and impose a British blockade on the north, Milne requested a force of some 65 modern steam warships, including at least 54 frigates, corvettes, and sloops, along with at least 30 smaller craft and several ships of the line. The steam battleships would serve as flagships for no less nine separate squadrons, operating from the Gulf of Maine to the Gulf of Mexico. Captain Washington’s plan was for the same number of squadrons, but a total of some 40 ships; the number eventually deployed in American waters in the spring actually exceeded the total of the two plans, but were organized vastly differently – in large part because of the press of events and the British understanding that Upper and Lower Canada, cut off by the frozen Saint Lawrence until the April thaw, was vulnerable to an American winter campaign.
In itself this causes problems. Milne's original request was in the context of Washington's plan, where Washington's plan was for forty ships against major Atlantic ports; Milne raised it to sixty-five vessels. (Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America). There is no indication that this was "65 modern warships plus thirty smaller craft" as TFSmith puts it; it was 65 vessels.
Since Milne was a logistician as much as a combat commander, his request did not specify the exact types of ship - or where they would be stationed (which Washington had done) - it is quite possible that the 65-ship figure included the ability to detach ships from stations for cruising, escort and prize work.
In addition to all this, Milne's description of the six squadrons he assigned was that each should include "two to three frigates of force (i.e. liners or heavy frigates), two corvettes of Cadmus class, three sloops of Rinaldo class, a gun-vessel and two to three paddle-steamers". This includes in it gun-vessels, and with six squadrons suggests an average of 11 ships per station (of which 2-3 screw frigates or screw liners, two screw corvettes, three screw sloops, one gun-vessel and 2-3 paddle steamers).
Chapter 5 (second half)
For his part, Milne asked for as many as 106 ships, almost all of them smaller types, including as many as 24 frigates, 16 corvettes, 24 sloops, and 32 smaller gunboats and the like. Worth noting is that the Navy List for 1861, including ships in reserve, named 35 frigates and 57 corvettes and sloops, as well as some 75 smaller ocean-going ships, not including the various ironclads (whether ocean-going or for coastal and harbor defense), sailing ships, or the tiny steam gunboats built for operations in the Baltic and Black seas during the war with Russia.
Milne's request has now been upgraded to 106 ships. Remember that the original request from Milne was 65.
It appears that to get the 106 figure, TFSmith has taken the number of 65 - which he stated in chapter 4 as consisting of 54 frigates/corvettes/sloops and "several" (11) ships of the line in chapter 4 - and then added the ships of the line again, to get 76, before adding 30 gunboats (as in chapter 4). That or he has taken 24 frigates, 16 corvettes, 24 sloops (running total 64), added 32 gunboats (running total 96) and added 10 ships of the line - none of this is anything like what Milne is known to have asked for.
The mention of 24 frigates, 16 corvettes and 24 sloops also hints at the truth of the matter - TFSmith has taken Milne's requirements for six squadrons and expanded them to eight squadrons. (He has also conflated paddle-steamers and gunboats, oddly enough.)
One has to suspect that TFSmith is attempting to revise the numbers upwards considerably, in the hope of finding a number which seems too large for the British to provide. In so doing he has stepped so far past the bounds of his source that it is comical.
The size of the blockading fleet he has Milne request, 106 combat ships, is about one steam warship for every twelve miles of Union coastline; the Union blockade of January 1862 consisted of 125 combat ships, which included a large portion of sailing vessels (34) and was about one steam or sail ship for every 28 miles of Confederate coastline. Many of the steam ships were very small - smaller than the Crimean gunboats TFSmith often derides - and even counting such very small ships the blockade was 27% sail (with one steam ship for every 38 miles of coastline). The British blockade of the Union he describes should be about three times as effective as the Union blockade of the Confederacy - it has more steam ships and is compressed into a third of the area.
Rather incredibly, it is later stated that even this is not enough, and that the blockade has sucked up "more than forty" gunboats - while still being unable to close the Union's ports.
So much for the Incredible Expanding Blockade Requirements. Now let's look at what TFSmith actually deploys.
He states that:
Washington, drawing on information provided by Confederate agents in Britain, had laid out a plan to blockade the largest American ports by patrolling the approaches; notably, this included the Chesapeake, Delaware, and Lower New York bays, and Long Island Sound, as well as three points within the Gulf of Maine, off Boston, Portsmouth, and Portland. Washington had also laid out the recommended strengths for each detachment, as follows:
Chesapeake 1 liner, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 7 total
Delaware 1 liner, 1 frigate, 2 gunboats; 4 total
New York 2 liners, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 8 total
L.I. Sound 1 liner, 1 frigate, 1 corvette/sloop, 2 gunboats; 5 total
Boston 1 liner, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 7 total
Portsmouth 2 corvettes/sloops; 2 total
Portland 1 frigate, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 5 total
Total 6 liners. 9 frigates, 11 corvettes/sloops, 12 gunboats; 38 total
The specific blockade squadrons (except for the Chesapeake squadron, which is undescribed) are:
At the same time Smart’s fleet was underway, detachments would take up station to blockade Boston, Portsmouth, and Portland, as follows:
Portland – Diadem (32), Capt. George D. Randolph; Rattlesnake (21, flag), Com. Arthur PE Wilmot; Barrosa (21), Capt. William M. Dowell; Swallow (9), Master Edward Wilds, Sparrow (5), Master Frederic Seaton;
Portsmouth – Galatea (26, flag), Capt. Henry Maguire, Pylades (21), Capt. Arthur W. A. Hood;
Massachusetts Bay – St. George (86) Capt. Hon. Francis Egerton; Severn (51, flag), Rear Admiral Augustus L. Kuper, CB; Cdr. Richard Bradshaw; Euryalus (51), Capt. John Josling; Rattler (17), Cdr. Edward Howard; Zebra (17), Cdr. Anthony Hoskins; Pandora (5), Cdr. William Ruxton; Rifleman (5), Master John W. Reed.
The Delaware blockaders are listed as:
Along with Conqueror, Sotheby’s command included the big steam frigate Orlando (50), Capt. Francis Scott, CB, commissioned in 1861, 335 feet long, and with the displacement of a battleship; and two gunboats, Coquette (4), Cdr. John Alexander, and Comorant (4), Cdr. Charles M. Buckle.
In a later chapter, the New York blockades are given as:
Lower New York Bay - Commodore Sherard Osborn, CB; Donegal (99F) Capt. Osborn, Cdr. William H. Jones; Agamemnon (89) Capt. Thomas Hope; Melpomene (51) Capt. Charles J.F Ewart, Phaeton (51) Capt. Edward Tatham; Chanticleer (17) Cdr. Charles Stirling, Perseus (17) Cdr. Augustus Kingston; Lee (5) Lt. Charles E. Foot, Mullet (5) Cdr. C.H. Simpson; Thunder (14) Lt. Frederick V. Lewis; Hyena (4) Lt. John W. James, (coastal gun boat); Julia (4) Lt. Count Eugene Visconti (coastal gun boat);
Long Island Sound - Commodore Alfred P. Ryder; Hero (89F) Capt. Ryder, Cdr. William H. Edye; Mersey (40) Capt. Henry Caldwell, CB; Ariadne (26) Capt. E.W. Vanistart; Lily (4) Cdr. Henry Harvey, Osprey (4) Cdr. Arthur Innes; Meteor (14) Captain John Bythesea, VC; Lt. Henry Rogers); Raven (4) Lt. Cavendish Hardy (coastal gun boat) Rainbow (4) Lt. Edgar H. Blake (coastal gun boat).
Look again at all the blockade stations we are actually given in these chapters, compared to the Washington allocations.
Chesapeake 1 liner, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 7 total. (TFSmith allocation not given)
Delaware 1 liner, 1 frigate, 2 gunboats; 4 total (TFSmith allocation 1 liner, 1 frigate, 2 gunboats)
New York 2 liners, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 8 total (TFSmith allocation 2 liners, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 4 gunboats, 1 ironclad)
L.I. Sound 1 liner, 1 frigate, 1 corvette/sloop, 2 gunboats; 5 total (TFSmith allocation 1 liner, 1 frigate, 1 corvette/sloop, 4 gunboats, 1 ironclad)
Boston 1 liner, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 7 total (TFSmith allocation 1 liner, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats)
Portsmouth 2 corvettes/sloops; 2 total (TFSmith allocation 2 corvettes/sloops)
Portland 1 frigate, 2 corvettes/sloops, 2 gunboats; 5 total (TFSmith allocation 1 frigate, 3 corvettes/sloops, 1 gunboat)
Total 6 liners. 9 frigates, 11 corvettes/sloops, 12 gunboats; 38 total (TFSmith allocation 5 liners, 7 frigates, 10 corvettes/sloops, 13 gunboats, 2 ironclads; 37 plus Chesapeake squadron)
By all appearances, TFSmith is using the "Washington" sized blockade with a few upgrades, perhaps 45 ships, and then using this as an excuse for the blockade stations to be easily defeated.
This needs repeating - TFSmith is giving the British the problems associated with sustaining over a hundred ships on blockade, then giving them the effective results of having less than forty on station (and cheating even then - the Delaware blockading squadron is destroyed by a submersible attack with spar torpedoes, two technologies not yet invented in 1862.)
Do you feel that the author has accurately presented the scale of potential British commitment to the blockade, reader? For a timeline so supposedly committed to accuracy, to describe Milne as asking for 65, 90 and 106 ships and then to portray him deploying 38 ships is a real problem - especially since, as we have already seen, TFSmith is quite happy to create entirely new Union fleets out of nothing in the span of three months.
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