The Siege of Quebec Part I

In Chapter 15 Part 2, we come to what is evidently supposed to be the penultimate moment of triumph of the Union against Britain in the war in Canada. That is of course, the capture of the citadel of Quebec in Quebec City by Grant's Army of the Saint Lawrence.

There is of course some preamble to discuss in the campaign leading up to it.

The first section comes from Chapter 12 Part 2:

When Grant decided to march on Quebec after Berthierville, he chose to move south from the Saint Maurice upon Arthabaska, junction of the Grand Trunk and Arthabaska railroads; this was the key point south of the Saint Lawrence, and the railway offered the only all-weather road in the region. It ran from Arthabaska both northeast to River-du-Loup and north to the Saint Lawrence, and from Arthabaska south to Vermont, thus providing his forces with two separate lines of approach. 

After Negley’s attempt at Three Rivers, where my regiment, the 9th Indiana, formed part of the reserve, I was detached to serve as a topographical engineer with General Sheridan’s 1st Division, XV Corps, which was to lead the advance from the north upon Arthabaska; in this role I found myself in frequent movement between Sheridan’s headquarters and that of General Van Rensselaer’s to the south. I saw the movement upon Rumley’s division from both fronts, and was favorably impressed by the spirit both of Sheridan’s division of veterans and Van Rennselaer’s so-called “Mountain Division,” which had spent the fall organizing and training in the rocky green hills of Vermont. Van Rennselaer, a New Yorker, knew well how to move in the winter, and had trained his troops well; 

The two divisions moved forward with great care, both not to alarm the British troops at Arthabaska and to avoid losing men, animals, and equipment in the weather; the railroad, which was re-opened as we marched, was of course, of great assistance in this, providing a reliable line of supply and even mobile kitchens and hospitals for the troops as we approached the junction. By the time we closed on Arthabaska, supported by the patriotes, the Canadiens and our own patrols had cut the railroad south from Quebec to the town; Rumley’s division, much diminished by the fighting at Berthierville, was driven into the town. We laid on a proper siege, and Ruff’s cavalry brigade, operating as light infantry, moved past the town and north to guard against any effort by Paulet’s army to march south to Rumley’s relief. 

On December 23, the campaign culminated with Rumley’s surrender and Sherman’s entry into Arthabaska. He sent the following dispatch to President Lincoln, which was received Christmas Eve: “I beg to present to you, as a Christmas gift, the town of Arthabaska, with 25 heavy guns, plenty of ammunition, several thousand British and Canadian troops, and a direct route to the City of Quebec.”

The difficulty of a winter campaign past November nonwithstanding, the biggest question here is why is the never specified "General Van Rennselaer" in charge of a division? Going by the TL and history, there can be only one choice for who this man is. Henry Bell Van Rennselaer, son of Stephen Van Rensselaer. His sudden jump in competence and promotion is interesting, considering that only two months ago according to the TL, he was only a colonel serving as an inspector general for prisoners. Van Rennselaer never showed any aptitude for command historically, and never moved beyond staff positions behind the lines. Though maybe here his promotion is driven by his connections with Secretary of State Seward. That he is suddenly thrust into command here really only can have one explanation, the author desires to banish the stain of the American loss at Queenston Heights from history by having the son of that disgraced commander win a signal victory over the British despite the son never showing any more military sense than his father.

Truly a marvel of historic revisionism.

The greatest problem is that neither has the man commanded as much as a brigade in combat before, but as per the TL, he can only have at maximum, 2 months training time with such a specialized division. That such a force can be expected to preform well in extreme conditions under a commander who has never before demonstrated military aptitude is absolute folly.

The other issue of course, is the difficulty of a winter campaign, in an area which should be at best apathetic to the Union, and at worst swarming with partisans. But more on that in a moment.

We finally get to the meat of the issue when Grant's forces have their march north described in brief:

The crossing of troops after Berthierville commenced November 30th. By Christmas, the British garrison at Arthabaska had fallen thanks to Sheridan’s division from W.T. Sherman’s XV Corps and Van Rensselaer’s “Mountaineers” from Ord’s VIII Corps, and we drove north, cutting the railroad at Mont-Carmel with Wood’s cavalry corps early in the New Year. This closed the railroad to the British south of Riviere du Loup, and so cut Quebec off from the overland trail from New Brunswick. 

On the 18th of January the main army was in front of Levis, just across the St. Lawrence from the city. On the 19th, some seven weeks after we had crossed the river and headed northeast on the southern side of the St. Lawrence, we had marched more than 70 miles through the dead of winter, with skirmishing most of the way. By the middle of the month, Quebec City was completely invested and an assault by the British had been repulsed; more one thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded.

Predictably of course, every British attempt to stop the American juggernaut (despite forces on the defence always having the advantage in this period) fails. The British can't even organize a counter attack properly apparently! In fact the British actions are simply glossed over as the author has already pre-ordained them to fail and so are barely worth mentioning.

Of course, two problems rear their heads almost immediately.

The first being, how on earth does a division sized force of infantry and cavalry march more than 160 miles in the dead of winter through enemy controlled territory? Much less sustain itself in rough country? This is simply a miracle of maneuver warfare, especially in light of the fact there is no working railroad, and all the riverine routes are frozen over. It should be noted that Grant declares his forces have moved 70 miles in winter, difficult, but we can grant this isn't completely outside the realm of possibility with copious forage (more on that in a bit) and stealing every sled, toboggan, mule and horse not tied down in the lower province.

However, Van Rensselaer’s and Wood’s forces are moving double that distance, with a primarily cavalry arm in support in the harshest winter months. I cannot think of a single action which would be comparable in military history. Almost two hundred miles in winter, through a hostile countryside, with limited forage and no real supply lines.

Unfortunately, we have a very real comparison to how that might look from history thanks to Napoleon and Moscow. Heck, the average low in Moscow (from recent weather patterns admittedly) is a balmy -9 in January, while the average low in Quebec City is -17 in the same period. That's overlooking such things as wind chill, which makes the weather far worse.

Of course, British planners in the period carried out studies on the defence of Canada, and came to the conclusion that carrying out a siege in the middle of winter would be all but impossible thanks to Generals January and February, with Colonel William Jervois writing in 1864:

“It should be borne in mind that a large force can only move and keep to the field for about five months of the year, vix, from about the middle of May to the middle of October, from the latter part of October to December, the communications would be more or less difficult, according to the amount of rain or snow which falls; between the middle of December and the end of March, the intense cold forbids an army encamping, and the deep snows prevent the movement of troops except on beaten tracks, on which they could show no front, and numbers would consequently be of no use; from the beginning of April to about the middle of May the state of the roads owing to the thaw of the winter snows, is such that many are impassable for an army. 

It is only then, for about half the year, that military operations on a large scale could be carried on, and it is submitted that by the aid of fortifications it is perfectly practicable to provide for the defence of the country during this period.”

Even better let's quote the New York Times writing on the matter from November 1861:

Another insurmountable obstacle to the investment of Quebec is the climate. For seven months of the year it would be impossible for a hostile army to find provisions or to encamp in the vicinity of Quebec. The thermometer falls as low as 40° below zero, and the inhabitants themselves have to lay in their provisions before the inclement season sets in.

 Of course, any such problems are hand waved for the Americans. As has been noted previously, logistics only count for the British.

As a secondary note, the capture of Mont Carmel doesn't even make much sense, as it doesn't cut the railroad, and it isn't even a strategic location, or useful staging point compared to say, Kamarouska, which is both closer, and actually sits on the railroad, whereas Mont Carmel does not.

Which  finds us confronting our second problem.

The Americans are advancing up the St. Lawrence River in winter. Even with the railroad, the American journey north with over 100,000 men, would not be easy. The author also likes to remind us the Grand Trunk is only single track. This is apparently an insurmountable disadvantage for the British in spring, but an easily surmounted challenge for the Union in the dead of winter.

Unfortunately, reality ought to have intervened. In winter the rail route was still not perfect. Trains were slowed up by snow, the tracks froze and cracked, and they would be susceptible to destruction by the British. That the British evidently do not do this can only be the author handing them the idiot ball and laughing maniacally as they make all the "mistakes" and the Union make none.

As to logistics however, we have Grant state:

As soon as the news of the arrival of the American army in front of Quebec reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry, and the gift was appreciated. We made every effort to avoid foraging on the French-Canadians, and were able to supply the troops without it, but the fare was limited; the intentions of our visitors were recognized and well-received.

Just how Grant is supplying his army in the coldest winter months without foraging from the French Canadians, boggles the mind. He foraged heavily in all his campaigns in the South, whether it be through Tennessee or Virginia. Indeed it was this total war policy which made his campaigns viable by not using overly long supply lines. Of course, the author decides he can't have the Union's reputation amongst the French marred, so he deceptively spares them the reality of war, and magically produces supplies and supply routes to feed a 100,000 man army on campaign in the winter in enemy territory that they don't forage.

I hope that poultry lasts.

In part two we shall examine the siege itself and some of the questionable leaps the author makes to justify it.