Blockade (II): Refit and Repair

At various points both in the text and marginalia of Burnished Rows of Steel, TFSmith asserts that the Royal Navy does not have enough ships to sustain a long-term blockade of the Union. In one case he makes it explicit, saying that:

The RN's strength is such that they can assemble the blockading force Milne wanted, but that takes a majority of the RN's steam frigates, corvettes, and sloops - and they cannot relieve those ships 1 for 1, for example, after however many months of sea duty on blockade (much less maintain those on the "peacetime" stations). There aren't enough ships in the RN to do so, period, end of story, even recomissioning ships in reserve.

This is quite a major claim, not least because TFSmith's blockade requirement figures are very inflated. (Milne requested about sixty-five ships, not the 106 TFSmith claims are required, and one reading of his 65 ship request is that it allows for ships to be off-station.) But the more interesting analysis is the question of relieving ships on station.


It should be fairly obvious that one does not have to replace an entire blockade at once; it is quite possible to move ships in and out of the blockade on a per-ship basis. To do as TFSmith implies would mean that fewer than half the Royal Navy's ships would be able to be on station at any one time - in reality the number was often considerably higher.

To determine the actual requirements above and beyond the ships actively on station, we will examine a few possible avenues.


The Napoleonic Wars
Over the course of the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy successfully blockaded much of Europe. While their ships of the line were on station much as the rest of their fleet was (thus earning them important sea time) we will look at the lighter and more heavily worked frigates.
During the period between Trafalgar and Waterloo, which was well into the wars themselves, the proportion of frigates in commission for each year was:
1805- 81%
1806- 85%
1807- 84%
1808- 86%
1809- 84%
1810- 87%
1811- 89%
1812- 79%
1813- 88%
1814- 97%

An availability rate of 80% (exceeded in all but one of the shown years) represents a situation where four out of five frigates are on station; the average availability achieved over this period was 86%. While quite respectable, this also shows the effect of the long war and aging ships on availability rates – in the period 1794-1802, an average of 93% of frigates were available.

The Royal Navy had a total of 47 frigates on the December 1861 Navy List. Even with TFSmith's inflated 24-frigate blockade requirements, it would take the addition of only three more frigates (to 50) to allow 24 frigates on blockade duty, 16 in peacetime service, and 10 refitting; since the peacetime stations appear to have been only thirteen frigates outside the North America and West Indies station, then even this "TFSmith" requirement for the blockade is met quite neatly.


Known Refit Times
We have some (albeit incomplete) information about the time taken to refit Royal Navy ships. It happens that the Royal Navy had so many ships that they tended to rotate them in and out of service (i.e. a ship would complete a cruise, decommission and then spend several years in reserve – the crews had a fast turnaround, but the ships did not.)
Fortunately, there were the Flying Squadrons. These squadrons cruised the globe, which meant they sustained a considerable amount of wear and tear which would be comparable to blockade service. However, rather than rotating vessels in and out of the squadron, they kept a core of ships from year to year. As such, these squadrons indicate how quickly Royal Navy dockyards were able to restore vessels to full working condition after a period of hard usage.



Examining these should allow us to determine the scope of refits required.


* Three frigates (Immortalite, Inconstant and Volage) entered refit on the 12th October 1871 and left on the 30th November 1871 - this is 79 days for the longest of the three (Inconstant) with the other two leaving for Spithead on the 10th November (59 days).
* The Immortalite paid off for refit on the 2nd October 1872 and left under sail on the 9th December (68 days).
* The Immortalite arrived at Spithead on the 7th January 1873 in order to repair a leak, and left the British Isles on the 16th-17th February (41 days).
* The Endymion took from 10th May to 12th June 1869 to refit; this is 33 days.
* The Barrosa (corvette) was ordered to fit out for sea on the 7th June 1869; despite an accident during preparations requiring a refit, she left on the 23rd June (16 days).
* The Narcisssus and Cadmus (corvette) took from the 14th October 1871 to the 13th November 1871 to be repaired; this is 30 days.
* Narcissus and Topaze took from th 30th September 1872 to the 12th December 1872 to be repaired and refitted; this is 73 days.

The arithmetic mean of the samples relating to frigates is 57 days; we will use this figure, on the assumption that minor damage can be repaired in Halifax or Bermuda (or Norfolk?) for some ships.

With about a ten day travel time one-way, this means that to achieve an 80% availability figure for those ships assigned to the blockade the average time on station should be about one year. (This means that over a 15 month period five frigates cycle through refit, with four of them on station at any one time.)

For corvettes the samples we have are for 16 and 33 days. One month to 40 days seems to be an appropriate rough value; with travel time this would mean 60 days.




Time On Station
It is harder to determine the time a ship would be able to stay on blockade station. The Union Navy can be used as a sample:

Frigates The Colorado spent from 3 June 1861-28 June 1862 on her first blockade cruise; about one year.
The Wabash appears to have spent from 29 October 1861 to 1 October 1864 at Port Royal. (about three years)
The Roanoke entered commission on 20 June 1861 and decommissioned on 25 March 1862 for reconstruction as a monitor.
The Minnesota spent much of the Civil War as the flagship of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, appearing to serve this duty for 2-3 years at a stretch.
The Niagara's first cruise on blockade had her on station from 10 May 1861 to 5 June 1862.

These suggest that a year on station is not unreasonable, and that longer is possible.

Sloops
The Dacotah cruised on blockade and anti-raider work from 9 March 1862 to 11 June 1863 (15 months).
The Seminole was ordered out on 16 July 1861 and back for repairs in June 1862; her second cruise was from July 1863 to late August 1864. (11 and 13 months)
The Narragansett spent effectively the whole war cruising in the Pacific (but was not on blockade duty)
The Brooklyn took heavy damage in a battle and so her first cruise was from December 1861 to August 1862 (8 months); her second cruise was from October to the next August (10 months).
The Richmond spent from 5 March 1862 to 30 July 1863 engaged in blockade duty and battles up the Mississippi river (17 months).
The Pensacola departed for blockade duty in early 1862, and did not return for refit until 1864 (27 months)

These all also suggest a year on station as a first approximation.


With this data, we can suggest that - if one year on station is the average - then (given the above refit times, and a travel time of 10-15 days one way) it would take five frigates to have four on station (80% availability) and seven corvettes to have six on station (86% availability). With 37 RN frigates available and 24 in TFSmith's requirements, and with 96 corvettes/sloops available and 40 in TFSmith's requirements, both availabilities are at least as high as would be required.
This shows that - contra to TFSmith's assertions - even his inflated blockade figures are entirely achievable with the Royal Navy of the period.







It is possible that those who argue the Royal Navy would take inordinately long times to refit their ships are basing their estimates on Union practice. The brand new screw sloop USS Brooklyn, for instance, was out of service between 25 August 1863 and 14 April 1864, while the similarly new screw sloop USS Seminole was decommissioned between June 1862 and June 1863. However, this overlooks one significant point: dry docks. Union advocates often state that the Union is the only power with dry docks on the west side of the Atlantic (after the convenient destruction of Norfolk Navy Yard), but they never seem to say how many. In fact, there were only four naval dry docks: two permanent docks at New York and Boston, and two floating docks at Philadelphia and Portsmouth (with a third floating dock at San Francisco). This was sufficient for the tiny pre-war navy, but wholly inadequate for wartime requirements, resulting in a bottle-neck of dock capacity.

The Royal Navy, by contrast, had built for a large pre-war fleet. As of March 1862 it had thirty-one permanent naval dry docks: some individual British dockyards had more dry docks than the Union had in total.

Deptford: 2
Woolwich: 3
Chatham: 4
Sheerness: 5
Portsmouth: 10
Devonport: 3
Keyham: 3
Pembroke: 1

The effect of this capacity is hard to overstate. The Royal Navy could refit, repair and recommission many more ships at a single time than could the Union navy. Its shore establishments could be working up reserve ships while another ship was returning from the blockade, allowing the officers and crew to transfer directly from one to another and minimizing turnaround time. Lest it be thought that this is pure Britwank, it should be noted that this is what was already happening at the time of the Trent Affair. The captain of the 14-gun sloop HMS Wasp, which paid off at Portsmouth on 10 December 1861 after service at the Cape of Good Hope, immediately transferred his pennant to the 17-gun sloop HMS Chanticleer. Though the officers and crew were given a week's leave, the ship was otherwise ready to proceed to sea.

The emphasis on the length of time it would take the Royal Navy to refit its ships would be less exceptionable if TFSmith were consistent in applying it to both sides. Instead, the Franklin is completely rebuilt into an ironclad by the end of April and the Niagara's armament is completely upgraded with forty extra guns so fast it is not worth noting. Once again, logistics are something that happen only to the British.