Ultimatum ain't what it used to be

By no means the first error in the timeline, but one of the most entertaining, comes when TFSmith has the Union accidentally reject the British ultimatum.

Of course, he does not notice this.




Delivery

Lord Lyons (British ambassador to the Union) received the text of the ultimatum, along with his covering letter, on the 18th December in reality. He did not present it officially for another five days (until the 23rd), though he did inform Seward of the contents, thus skirting around the letter of his instructions in order to allow the Union government sufficient time to consider the note.
In Burnished Rows of Steel, he presents the ultimatum on the 19th December - this is told to us by the narration. In itself this is a realistic bit of divergence, if deliberately included - the relations between the two nations are more tense than they were historically.


Text

The text of the real ultimatum, and Lyons' covering letter, are reproduced below.


Ultimatum

Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1861.

My Lord — Intelligence of a very grave nature has reached her majesty's government.

This intelligence was conveyed officially to the knowledge of the admiralty by Commander Williams, agent for mails on board the contract steamer Trent.

It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, dated 'Royal Mail Contract Packet Trent, at sea, November 9,' that the Trent left Havana on the 7th instant, with her majesty's mails for England, having on board numerous passengers. Commander Williams states that shortly after noon, on the 8th, a steamer having the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colors, was observed ahead. On nearing her, at 1:15 p. m., she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across the bows of the Trent and showed American colors. While the Trent was approaching her slowly, the American vessel discharged a shell across the bows of the Trent exploding half a cable's length ahead of her. The Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers, and, compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the Trent. While some parley was going on upon this matter, Mr. Slidell stepped forward and told the American officer that the four persons he had named were then standing before him. The commander of the Trent and Commander Williams protested against the act of taking by force out of the Trent these four passengers, then under the protection of the British flag. But the San Jacinto was at that time only two hundred yards from the Trent, her ship's company at quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance was therefore out of the question and the four gentlemen before named were forcibly taken out of the ship. A further demand was made that the commander of the Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he said he would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, and this demand was not insisted upon.

It thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage — an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law.

Her majesty's government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the government of the United States must be fully aware that the British government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her majesty's government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.

Her majesty's government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the government of the United States that government will, of its own accord, offer to the British government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.

Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.

You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the secretary of state, and, if he shall desire it, you will give him a copy of it.
I am, etc., Russell.

Lyons' letter

In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you by command of her majesty, to make certain demands of the government of the United States.

Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her majesty's government, your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation and repair immediately to London. If, however, you should be of the opinion that the requirements of her majesty's government are substantially complied with, you may report the facts to her majesty's government for their consideration and remain at your post until you receive further orders.

You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon receiving the answer of the American government, and you will send him a copy of that answer, together with such observations as you may think fit to make.

You will also give all the information in your power to the governors of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda and such other of her majesty's possessions as may be within your reach.

The key phrases here are "Not exceeding seven days" and "or if any other answer is given". What these mean are that Lyons is to treat anything short of compliance (effectively, release of the Confederate commissioners) as a rejection, and that no more than seven days are to be permitted for the Union to deliberate. In reality that gave them from the 23rd (official presentation) to the 30th to reply.



Changes in BROS


We are not shown the covering letter, though there is little reason to believe it would not exist - Lyons has very similar instructions - and we are told that the demands of the British are harsher:


From Chapter 1, on the 27th December 1861:

“Mr. President, to review: the British note arrived at Lord Lyons’ at midnight Dec. 18; it was presented the next day. This note was predicated on the incident in the Bahama Channel, involving USS San Jacinto, HMS Rinaldo, and the merchant steamer Trent. It does not address the Coaticook Bridge incident, or the incident at St. Albans. Since its arrival, we have been considering how to respond, and our options. Essentially, the British have asked for the following:
First, the release of Mason, Slidell, and their staff;
Two, an apology and compensation for the seizure of the Trent;
Three, an apology and compensation for the damage to the British warship Rinaldo;
Four, the dismissal of Captain Wilkes from the naval service;
Fifth, agreement to British naval operations on the Gulf and South Atlantic coasts designed to prevent the recurrence of incidents such as that in the Bahama Channel; essentially, to oversee the declared blockade by the United States Navy of the ports currently occupied by the rebels. Any disputes to be handled by the nearest British Admiralty court, presumably in Bermuda for the South Atlantic ports and Kingston for the Gulf ports….”
“And?” Lincoln asked.
“Lord Lyons stressed to me this is not a declaration of war, but added that he has been instructed to depart from Washington for Quebec, by way of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Albany, and Montreal, by the end of the day today, if he has not received word of our government’s acceptance of these terms. He also stressed to me that he does not believe word has reached London regarding the incident on the Coaticook River, and that as much as he appreciates the release of the Canadian militia, he expects the British soldiers to be returned north immediately. His exact words were, “it is superfluous for me to point out that this means war.”

As we can see, the demands are harsher. It is also noted that Lord Lyons has been instructed to depart on the 27th if he has not had word of acceptance - however, this appears to be a misreading based on when the OTL climb-down took place. With the note presented on the 19th, it would expire on the 26th; to whit, yesterday.
Lyons should already be on his way home.
The description of Lyons' route is also wrong, although this may be disinformation on Lyons' part - though there should be no need for it, detaining him would be contra to any diplomatic standard.



Union response

In reality, the Union backed down in private on the 27th and in public on the 29th - thus meeting the time criteria in the note on both counts. They agreed to release the Confederate commissioners, thus substantively complying with the demands.


In Burnished Rows of Steel, they do not.
From Chapter 2 part iv, set in early February:

After the Administration’s refusal of the British terms after Christmas, Lincoln, determined to have the decision for war or peace fall on Palmerston’s shoulders, had Seward offer to submit each nation’s cascading pile of disputes with the other to international arbitration. Arbitration, presumably by one or more of the neutral nations, was a slim chance for a settlement; but the offer had been enough to keep Lyons in Washington for another month, awaiting an answer from London.

This is wrong on so many levels.

1. Russell's note was clear. Anything other than acceptance was rejection.
2. The note expired the day before the Administration made a decision anyway.
3. The British had given the short deadline historically precisely to prevent the Union from making too many preparations of just the sort they go on to actually make (though the Union gilds the lily by making far too many preparations!)
4. If Lyons sent off to London for instructions, then he would have a reply by now - indeed, he would have had a reply perhaps two weeks previously.

By any reasonable measure, given the Union's described actions in this timeline, the Union and the British should already be at war by the time of chapter 2 part iv. That TFSmith insists it would take all kinds of contrivances to force the two nations into war indicates he does not understand the history - or the seriousness of the British ultimatum.

Even in the possibility that the British would be satisfied with a mediation demand (unlikely in OTL, nigh impossible TTL with their stronger demands) then Lyons should have left Washington before the end of December; since the British clearly are not satisfied with mediation in this timeline then the declaration of war should have arrived on or before the 20th January (along with, most likely, Milne's fleet to blockade the Chesapeake).