Ahead By A Century

At numerous places in Burnished Rows of Steel the author displays a dizzying lack of understanding of the tactics or logistical constrains of 19th century warfare.

An excellent number of examples exist in the TL for how the author doesn't quite grasp how armies and battles were carried out. Most interestingly, the Battle of Berthierville, his supposed "realistic" example of what it would look like when a Union army confronted a British army in 1862.


We saw a while ago that there were things which didn't make sense in this battle, but one of the greatest problems is that the whole fight itself lacks any resemblance to a battle fought in the Civil War except in the little details, on the strategic level it resembles the maneuvering we would see if an army were trying to push to a battle, rather than concentrating to fight one.

The British plan is the one that most resembles a fight which might have taken place in 1862:

The initial target was to be McCook’s corps, split between a vanguard just to the southwest of Berthierville and his headquarters and main body 10 miles to the south – but still north of the river – at Lanoraie. At least one of McCook’s divisions was known to be at Sorel, on the south side of the Saint Lawrence, and so the British expected they could defeat at least a third of Grant’s army in detail, before taking on the elements south of the river or massed to the southeast, at Montreal. 

To do this, Major General Randal Rumley’s 2nd Division would mount a limited, holding attack from Berthierville south toward the Chaloupe River, where the lead elements of McCook’s force were dug in; at the same time, a flanking force would march to the northwest, and then split, with Lord William Paulet’s Aldershot-trained 1st Division driving on the Americans from the flank and Major General C. Hastings Doyle’s 3rd Division pushing to the southeast, forming a new vanguard and stopping any American reinforcements marching north from Lanoraie. The Americans to the south would also be vulnerable to the fire of the Royal Navy’s gunboats in the main channel of the Saint Lawrence; those on the Chaloupe would not be, because of the shallows of the Chenal du Nord, but being outnumbered 2-1 and hit simultaneously from the north and northeast, the American vanguard was not expected to hold. Once those troops were pushed into the channel and forced to surrender, the 1st and 2nddivisions would engage in another flank march to take the Americans at Lanoraie, while the 3rd Division played the role of the holding force. Major General David Russell’s 4th Division, with the battalions defeated at Rouse’s Point rebuilt by drafts from Britain and Ireland and three battalions of Canadian volunteers, would provide a reserve and defend the lines of communication north along the Chenal du Nord to Lake Saint Pierre. Major General Lord George Paget’s Cavalry Division, with two brigades, would operate on the right flank to the north; a third cavalry brigade would operate on the south side of the Saint Lawrence, while a detachment of RN gunboats bombarded Sorel to fix the American and Canadien forces there.

Very precise, limited, and achievable goals. Especially with communications in 19th century warfare being what they were. Logically, the British headquarters is at Berthierville itself, and so is only a few miles from the main fighting at the Chaloupe. So far this all makes sense in the handling of a battlefield in the 19th century. And Williams should have a very short lag time between his front line forces and his headquarters.

However, the campaign widens and becomes progressively more difficult to understand as the fighting goes on.

The fight on the Chaloupe goes well, but the author's liberal mixing and matching from historical battles makes it difficult to figure out just how the battle went. He claims that Wood's Division has a series of field works in place but also suffer a flank attack, which should have driven the Americans from their field works and put them at a disadvantage. This is supposed to have shattered Wood's Division, but is somehow only "somewhat less shattering" for the British despite the British achieving tactical surprise and taking the Americans on their flank. This is somewhat difficult to understand, as upending the Union flank should help the British more than favor the Americans on the defence, but I digress.

Now the British forces pursue the shattered American division south towards Lanoraie (which is 11 miles south of Berthierville, and 10 miles south of the Chaloupe roughly), where the 1st and 3rd Division of XII Corps under McCook are gathered. However, this begins to rapidly break sense, Williams should be moving with his army to support such an attack, not staying 10 miles distant in Berthierville. Then we told that while Wood's Division had a fortified line on the Chaloupe, McCook's forces have dug a fortified line some 8 miles from Lanoraie to Saint-Thomas.

This is confusing. McCook's force shouldn't have the strength to man such a line (he only has 18,000 men), and with British gunboats supporting the attack their flank should be turned almost immediately by Doyle's assault since apparently McCook has to telegram Stringham who is all the way back in Montreal when the British attack hits. So the Union starts with precisely zero naval support.

The Union also appear to have adopted tactics from the Western front in 1916 by making multiple trench lines, or have somehow been expecting a massive British assault and so have completely entrenched along a wide front, but don't have the numbers to hold it.

Even worse Grant is over 14 miles away from the fighting, at Saint Charles Borromee, meaning that his ability to coordinate his troops should be virtually non-existent and McCook is completely on his own.

This of course runs contrary to the strategic/tactical knowledge of the time where each side would concentrate its forces for battle to try and force an engagement with the other side. William's has done so, and it should be used to great effect. Grant on the other hand, seems to have balked at such an idea (which is nonsense when one looks at his battle record historically) and instead dispersed his forces on a front some 30 miles in length, making it impossible for them to support one another and completely impossible for Grant to communicate with them once the action commences. He, unlike the commanders in the 20th century, does not have access to radio and not even telegraphs can fill that void. He is completely isolated from the greater part of the battle and so is impotent in the direction of his army.

Trying to direct a decisive battle over 30 miles is an impossibility in the 1860s. This appears to be Grant attempting to maneuver to battle, while the British are already in place to fight a battle with their flank screened and a reserve in place to protect themselves. Compare Grant's "battle" here to any other battle in 1862, his frontage is a full ten times greater than even that at Antietam and twenty times that of Shiloh.

Grant's forces are completely split between McCook's corps on the river, and Sherman's attempting a flanking march. This simply means that the British plan to defeat Grant in detail would be remarkably easy to achieve in light of Grant's dispositions.

Let us take a brief look at Grant's plan:

On the same morning that Wood’s men were making their stand on the Chaloupe, Grant was almost 15 miles away, at Sherman’s XV Corps headquarters at Saint-Charles-Borromée, yet another of the parish crossroads that dotted this part of Lower Canada. The village, on the banks of the L'Assomption River, was smaller even than Berthierville and Lanoraie, but resembled it: a crossroads, parish church, a handful of houses, and flour and saw mills on the stream – but it controlled the roads in this part of the province, and was large enough to house Sherman’s corps staff and Grant’s personal staff. Most importantly, it controlled the roads south from the woods. These were – even two decades after the saw mill that had brought Saint-Charles into existence - still thick enough to have given an Army corps a hidden route northeast into Lower Canada. As Grant had observed, with luck an enveloping force could fall on the right, or northern flank, of Williams’ Army of Canada, cutting its supply lines northeast to Trois Riveres, 40 miles down the river toward Quebec. 

Grant’s goal – much like that of Williams – was to win a signal victory. Grant’s design, however, was to do so against the British in British territory, to push the frontline farther north, bring the Canadiensfurther into the war, damp down any trend toward guerilla warfare by the Anglophones in Canada West, and generally, make it clear to the British that whatever they might accomplish at sea, in the interior of the continent, even along a riverine highway like the Saint Lawrence, they could not prevail against the strength the Americans could bring to bear.

In the fine days of autumn, even as the maples and elms turned into a riot of red and gold, Sherman’s forces, screened by Kearny’s horsemen and the Canadiens, made a series of forced marches north and east from Lavaltrie to Saint-Charles-Borromée. The march, first slanting away to the north and then to the northeast, was parallel to the Saint Lawrence but far enough away to avoid alarming the British. The movement brought the XV Corps’ headquarters to Saint-Charles-Borromée, 15 and half miles from Lavaltrie.

By the time the battle was opened by the British on the Chaloupe, Sherman’s command was split into thirds, each of an infantry division led by a cavalry brigade, on three roads that led south towards the river from as many of the little country parishes that defined the geography of Lower Canada. Nine miles from Sherman’s headquarters at Saint-Charles-Borromée, at the crossroads of Sainte-Élisabeth, was Hurlbut’s 1st Division, led by Garrard’s 1st Cavalry Brigade; about seven miles farther northeast at Saint-Norbert was Reynolds’ 2nd Division, with Kennett’s 2nd Cavalry Brigade in the lead; while eight miles farther off at Saint-Cuthbert was Prentiss’ 3rd Division, with Buford’s 3rd Cavalry Brigade leading. Kearny and his divisional staff were riding with Buford, not – as the general said – “because I’m worried about you, John; General Grant just wanted me out on the left flank in case the British show up…”

In sum total, Grant has split his forces as though he is maneuvering to battle, when the British have already brought the battle to him. Not only that though, his entire force is out of communication with itself, Grant being miles away from the action and unable to coordinate his men, and having no reserve to speak of. Grant should at best learn of the defeat of Wood's Division late in the evening, while the British are assaulting McCook who is stunningly too far away to support his own vanguard. Then the gaping holes between Sherman's divisions leave them all open to defeat in detail, or would compel them to withdraw if trouble struck.

Since the time table for the battle is very vague (the fighting either begins on the 27th or 28th) we can't quite calculate how long the engagement lasts from start to finish. Assuming the fighting begins on the 27th then Grant would require the remainder of the night to divine how bad things are. Next (assuming for the sake of argument that McCook's men held out for the night) he would have to decide whether to withdraw Sherman's corps to McCook's aid or to go ahead anyways and risk disaster. Even with the fog of war and the chaos of battle the American accomplishments here seem incredible.

From here the battle proceeds exactly as Grant has planned, except the British make a clean get away because of their cavalry screen and Russell's division stymies Sherman. However, in reality this should be the set up for a rather stunning reversal for Grant's forces, or at the very best a stalemate which compels him to withdraw towards Montreal.

The author seems to have simply assumed a 20th century ability of armies to maneuver and coordinate during a battle. Though to his defence there were generals who split their forces in such a way on campaign (Lee obviously) but the author has missed what Lee always set out to do with those forces. In the Seven Days Battles Lee would split his forces, only for them to concentrate at another location to give battle. In the Maryland Campaign Lee divided his army into four parts, moving towards Frederick Maryland in a sweeping movement to bring McClellan to battle.

Though the exact reason why Lee chose this risky strategy is lost to history, the idea it was meant to secure his lines of communication and supplies through the Shenandoah makes sense, while Grant's decision to leave a 15 mile gap between his two corps and at least half a days lag time in communication with his men when he apparently knows the British have concentrated their force on his front reads like stupidity rather than genius. Indeed it appears to be more a copy of Lee, but speaking of Lee we next come to the great battles of October 1862 at Chantilly and the Occoquan.

Though first a postscript from Berthierville:

It was a time of opportunity for the rebels and great peril for the United States. British entry into the conflict in March had opened two vast new fronts, in Canada and in New England; the campaigns in Upper and Lower Canada and in Maine had siphoned away a quarter of the available U.S. troops, which had led to the mixed strategy the Lincoln Administration and General-in-chief Joseph K. F. Mansfield had adopted in the spring. Essentially, the U.S. chose to defend in New England and Virginia and attack in Canada and the West, seeking to stake out the largest possible claims to the north and south while guarding essential points along the Atlantic Coast against the slowly assembling might of the Royal Navy. That strategy had paid mixed dividends; although Missouri, Kentucky, and western Virginia were firmly in American hands and the British invasion of Maine had been stymied, the offensive in Tennessee had stalled in the defense of Nashville, while Grant’s invasion of Canada had simply been stopped, both because of the bloodletting at Berthierville and the rapid approach of winter.
The British withdrawal to Three Rivers after Berthierville, however, gave the battle the appearance of an American victory (although the British would argue they had to, simply to go into winter quarters somewhere other than the bogs of the Saint Pierre Archipelago and the farmlands of Lower Canada)

But meanwhile Lee has been evidently sitting on his hands in Virginia:

As it was, the 1862 campaigns in the Southeastern Theater had been, for the most part, a series of American retreats and defensive battles, from Burnside’s withdrawal from the ruins of Norfolk in February to Fitz John Porter’s defensive stand at Kernstown in June against Jackson. That had been followed by the encounter battle between McClellan’s army and that of General Joseph Johnston at Centreville in July, and Johnston’s abortive attack at Manassas Junction in August. This last false start had led to Johnston’s relief by Lee in September and his dispatch by Davis to Tennessee to replace A.S. Johnston, killed at Richland Creek the previous month.
Lee had spent much of September reorganizing and rebuilding the battered Army of Northern Virginia; by the end of the month, his forces numbered some 104,000 men, organized into 13 divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. These, in turn, were organized into four corps, three of three infantry divisions each and one of four, plus the cavalry division under Stuart and the army artillery.

Now like many other failings of the story the author is constrained by his narrative style. He can't have Lee's attack take place in September because that would  make Chapter 9 too long, and so now he has to move it to October, despite that not making very much sense.

In any case Lee's plan reads as follows:

Lee would take three of the corps, the cavalry, and the artillery north from Manassas Junction toward Chantilly, looking to flank McClellan’s army; the remaining four divisions, organized into a fourth corps (known as the “Army of the Chesapeake”) would finally launch the amphibious turning effort Lee and the British, notably Admiral Milne, had been discussing for months. The precedent of Scott’s seaborne invasion of Mexico as a parallel to Taylor’s overland invasion was widely discussed; this led Davis’ decision, finally, to approve the operation. The amphibious force, organized as a strong detachment of four divisions, was to land at Occoquan Bay, a branch of the Potomac, forcing McClellan to split his forces between two widely dispersed flanks - the Anglo-Confederate goal was to force a breach in the American line south of the Potomac, drive at least half of McClellan’s troops into the city in disarray, and force the other half to withdraw into Maryland or face the same fate. The strategy was to end the war on the Allies’ terms, before the rapidly changing nature and costs of the conflict forced a settlement

It is an interesting plan. Accurate inasmuch as Milne seemed inclined to work with the Confederate Army historically, but I would think both sides should realize attempting to force such an action late in the year is chancy at best, and the British already have keep fears about coalition warfare brought on by the Crimea as witness Burgoyne's letter of December 14th:

The war between the North and South States, so long as it shall continue, will greatly relieve our conflict with the former: our proceedings will be in some degree in concert and mutual support with the efforts of the South; but generally it will be well to avoid as much as possible any combined operations on a great scale, (except as far as the fleet may be concerned), under any specious project, such as for an attack on Washington or Baltimore;-experience proves almost invariably the great evils of combined operations by armies of different countries; and in this case, the advantage to the enemy of the defensive station will far more than compensate for the union of forces against it.

Now it's not completely out of bounds for such an operation to take place, but one taking place so late in the year and with so little apparent pre-planning seems extreme.

Going in to battle:

General Lee had determined to make October 1 the decisive day; after almost four months of indecisive but bloody campaigning by Joseph Johnston and George McClellan, Lee – under the orders of Jefferson Davis and with the aid of the Royal Navy - was going to commit every man under his command to an all-out attempt to cut the Army of the Potomac in two and, as Lee said, ”destroy those people.” 

Some 48,000 men, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of Jackson’s and Longstreet’s commands would attack the westernmost corps of McClellan’s army at Chantilly, while Magruder’s Third Corps, 24,000 strong, kept the federal troops farther to the east diverted. At the same time, Smith’s army of 32,000, conveyed and supported by the guns of the British navy’s Inshore Squadronunder Hutton, would land at Occoquan Bay, pulling whatever reserves the federals had toward the Potomac. Additionally, Dunlop’s Chesapeake Squadron would push north of the Annapolis narrows to draw Goldsborough into battle. This would, Davis, Milne, and Lee expected, allow the Army of Northern Virginia to crumple the federals from the northwest south toward the river, and then into Washington City itself.

Again the author's weird narrative style puts the attack on the date of October 1st, which like so much else in this story fails to make good sense. However, in total this whole plan does sound like a more limited version of Lee's more lofty goals from 1862, and one which is supposed to force the Union Army across the river, or at least into the arms of its opponents.

Of course the author takes pains to point out:

Such was the plan; but plans, as always, rarely survive their first encounter with the enemy

Readers would do well to contrast this attitude with how plans made by the Union work out.

In any case the battle goes on. Unfortunately, since it is doled out in one large lump it's hard to get a very good idea of how exactly the battle itself goes. The geography of each sides movements is not laid out, nor is each sides starting positions put forward in detail so understanding how the battle progresses is an exercise in futility for a reader who doesn't have access to a detailed map of the region. Even with one I find myself at a loss to understand it.

However, we come to the crux of the problem with this piece here:

The problem for the rebels was, as always, that the U.S. forces, even with those detached to Maine and Canada, still outnumbered Lee’s forces, even reinforced by the rebel troops withdrawn from the Carolinas and points south. If McClellan’s army had been on the offensive, the likelihood of Lee winning a victory would have been higher, but because the Army of the Potomac was on the defensive, in country it had fought on since the previous year, and could fall back on fieldworks that had been strengthened and made deeper since the winter, the rebel offensive was already a gamble. How much of one it truly was became clear when the leading elements of Jackson’s corps, Stuart’s cavalry division, rode up on Ox Hill, northeast of Chantilly.

The issue of strengthening and deepening field works, especially ones not in continuous use, is a little more than half a century away with the coming of trench warfare in 1914. Even so, the description of the battle makes sense in the spirit of 19th century warfare. Large networks of trenches were a hallmark of 1864, with the Overland Campaign seeing Lee throwing up trenches overnight, and the siege of Petersburg, but they were not common in 1862, much less 1863. Breastworks and abatis were common, but had been for centuries. The depth of field works the author implies here is far greater than anything seen early on in the civil war.

Predictably of course, it is such an entrenched position which is thrown up that stops Lee's advance at Chantilly, predictably ending in a copy-paste of Pickett's Charge, which throws back the Confederate troops. The audacious Confederate landing at Occoquan Bay is similarly stopped. but again because "amphibious operations are hard", but only for the Union's enemies. In fairness, the operation is carried out by Confederate forces who have little experience in that style of warfare, but it is supervised by British officers, which would create chaos. It is however, just enough chaos to allow the Union to divert men to stop it.

The final notable piece of such reaching is the direction of "coffee mill" guns to the front in Maine:

This work, the “Chamberlain Redoubt” (named after Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain) was manned by some of the remaining men of the 1st Maine, commanded at this point by the colonel’s younger brother, then-Major Thomas Chamberlain. Along with their rifles and muskets, they also had the equivalent of a battery each of 12 pounders and that unusual weapon, the Agar “Coffee Mill” gun. Sixty of the generally balky .58 Agars had been purchased in 1861 and parceled out among various fortified positions, including four that had found their way to Fort Knox. The Chamberlain brothers had taken an interest in them during the regiment’s training as heavy artilleryman, and the guns had been emplaced in the earthworks built up to protect the western flank of the fort over the summer and fall. The guns had been babied for months; they tended to jam and overheat if not, but if taken care of, they could lay down a prodigious amount of fire. The British assault was just the sort of situation the guns were meant for, and as the Scots infantrymen moved forward in open order, the gunners put them to use. 

The sharp and repeating crack-crack-crack of the Agars was a different sound than the bang-ziz of standard rifles and the boom of muskets; as the Fusiliers moved forward, the guns began playing over the snow to the east of the redoubt, stopping the Scots in their tracks and leaving, an observer wrote later, “a perfect line of dead men, from one side of the vale to the other.” Combined with field artillery from the Redoubt and small arms and howitzer fire from the mountains looming over the road, the little valley turned into a charnel house. Most of the Scottish battalion fell in a period of minutes; Hill ordered the Buckinghamshires and Dorsetshires in as well, while Reid sent the Buffs and Northhumberland Fusiliers up each side of the little valley to try and clear the heights of Tillson’s infantry to the south, on Eustis Mountain, and Shepley’s to the north, on Heagan. At the same time, Reid ordered the Coldstream Guards forward to support Hill’s attack on the redoubt, even as more of Phelps’ division, including Weitzel’s 1st Brigade, slogged into the American line to the east.

These guns did exist, but were condemned for using too much ammunition, and were prone to overheating. However, other than lip service these issues are handwaved away and the guns perform flawlessly in the British assault on Fort Knox and so the British are repulsed with no difficulty. 

One wonders how precisely these guns were used. Probably they would be organized in a battery like the French attempted with their mitrailleuse in 1870, but found this was an inefficient means of deploying them. However, from the author's description they are employed in the lines, very similar to how machine guns were in World War I.

In the end, the author has reached forward half a century to help strengthen his case for Union movements and defences. Not only is the Union capable of devising military strategem's which were difficult at the best of times half a century later, but they learn all the lessons about trench warfare they need in order to maximize their power against the British and Confederates.

Rather than use tactics and strategies similar to those used in 1862, the author feels that the Union can only win if they are allowed to peek forward into the future and grasp how war is fought then. One wonders how such lessons could have been missed in real life then.