Centreville Cannot Hold

In Chapter 7 Part 1 we come to the great dust up between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. Now one would expect an author who self-professes to know much about American history and military history could deliver an exciting battle with an interesting twist on historic events.

Sadly, in this case we can expect the exact opposite.


After the confusing events at Kernstown the story picks up again with McClellan's Army of the Potomac moving to confront Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia:

I detached Porter’s corps to guard the northern reaches of the Shenandoah, where he successfully repulsed Jackson at Kernstown in June; Jackson’s force had split, with some of his troops withdrawing to the south and some east toward Johnston’s position. In July, we moved south with some 90,000 men toward Johnston’s force of some 70,000, and expected to find him at a disadvantage in numbers, although his fortifications and batteries were very strong. However, I expected that additional troops, including Huger’s and Holmes’ corps under Smith, would be relieved in their positions of defense against our troops at Norfolk and Fortress Monroe by troops detached from Lee’s command in the Carolinas and Georgia, where both Port Royal and Hatteras Inlet had fallen because of British naval strength, and so could be sent north to reinforce Johnston. I also expected British warships under Milne and Dunlop would be active, both on our left flank on the Potomac and against our positions farther north on the Chesapeake, but that responsibility was in the capable hands of General Ord and Flag Officer Goldsborough.

Now there's some things of note here, namely that for some reason in July, Fort Monroe and Norfolk remain in Federal hands, despite British warships operating on the Potomac, which would cut off both those locations from evacuation and resupply. In a logical world they would have surrendered after spending some 3 months under siege (and probable bombardment) leaving the Confederate forces free to swing north and confront McCllelan, but instead they are tied up besieging these positions because the author has realized he would put the Confederates at a numerical advantage if they were free to act. This would most likely result in a (heaven forbid) defeat at Centreville for McClellan's forces.

Earlier in the Chapter he notes that the Union has 170,000 men in the department (many tied up in garrisons) and the Confederates have 130,000 men. The Confederates have three organized corps (something of a anachronism as the Confederate forces didn't formally organize a corps structure until after the Seven Days Battles) and the makings of a fourth with their forces in reserve. However, the Confederates have detached a significant amount of their strength for no good reason, which leads to the campaign here:

We moved forward on multiple roads, largely by corps; McDowell’s on the Chantilly Road headed almost due south; Keyes from Fairfax Court House, marching almost west; and Franklin advancing from Fairfax Station, to the northwest. Cooke’s cavalry came southeast from Gum Springs, and it was on the Gum Springs Road where our horsemen became engaged by Stuart’s cavalry and thus began the actual fighting at Centreville. At this point, as we approached Johnston’s position, I decided to engage in regular siege operations, using our heavy artillery and engineers to sap approaches and overwhelm the enemy positions in detail. As we learned later, Johnston agreed this strategy was the most threatening to his army, and the foundation of his decision to withdraw to the Rappahannock; to do so, however, required time to move his army stores and supplies south, which led to his decision to come out of his entrenchments to attempt to strike Keyes’ corps, which was the closest to his forward positions.

To help track this action I would suggest consulting this map:

Johnston's positions at Centreville and Manassas Junction can be seen, and you can somewhat track McClellan's supposed route. But one should see McCllelan's suggestion to "engage in regular siege operations" does not make any particular sense. For one thing he can't engage in siege operations since he does not surround Centreville (Johnston can withdraw after all) and he only apparently makes trench lines to Jonhston's already existing positions, which means that he would need to defend his flanks very well to avoid being caught by a counter attack which would disrupt his assault.

In fact, it's really just McCllelan's operations against Yorktown superimposed on to a ficticious assault on Centreville. However, unlike Yorktown where the two sides faced each other over trench lines, here it should be an open battle, which it seems to devolve into but without any regard for the work of trenches each side supposedly possesses or would be necessary for a siege operation.

Instead the battle degenerates into a series of engagements along the flanks and Johnston successfully withdraws to the Rappahannock, leaving McCllelan with something of an empty victory. However, this drives the Confederates back far enough to take the pressure off Washington, and so each side settles down for a few months more inactivity while we wait for the author to deliver another copy pasted Union victory.