However, TFSmith (as is customary) has to greatly exaggerate the real scale of the achievement, thus making it seem like building a large modern navy was quick, easy and inexpensive - and that the Union could quickly surpass the British.
TFSmith at one point (in an Irene Musicant section) describes the US Navy as "the prewar force of some 50 assorted ocean-going frigates, sloops-of-war, gunboats and the like, including some 30 steamers" and that it had been joined by April by "more than 200 additional vessels, a mix of converted steamers and new-build gunboats well-suited for coastal and blockade duty".
The first section is tricky to evaluate - it includes ships not in commission, but does not appear to include all of them.
By the list of United States vessels of war in commission March 4, 1861, there were:
Home Squadron 7 steamers, 4 sail, 1 storeship
East Indies 4 steamers, 2 sail
Mediterranean 3 steamers
Brazil 2 steamers, 1 sail
African coast 4 steamers, 3 sail, 1 storeship
Pacific 4 steamers, 3 sail
This totals 24 steamers and 13 sail, plus two storeships, and contains no allowance for "ocean-going" qualities.
The second section is easier to categorize; it is false.
Of the ships added to the Union navy by April 1862, it is true that many were converted steamers or new build gunboats; however, there were also a considerable number of sail vessels. Examining all the ships in service by the middle of April, the number purchased was 158 of which 55 were sail and one had no power source at all; the number of vessels obtained via construction, capture and transfer from other roles was 54, of which eight were sail.
There is no way to tally up 200 or more steam ships in the Union navy at that time without ahistorical construction or purchase - counting all sources (and including prewar navy ships, storeships and receiving ships) there are 184 steam vessels, 93 sail and one unpowered barge. This presents a much less rosy picture of Union naval might and mercantile sophistication than the way it has been presented in the timeline, and is presumably intended to help convince the reader that the cavalcade of ahistorical vessels and successful commerce raiders would have been easy to achieve.
It is remotely possible that this is an intentional error by "Irene Musicant", but any editor who had a modicum of understanding of the topic would notice that "Irene" has forgotten about roughly one third of the Union Navy (or, worse, recast them as steamers).
It is also the case that not all the vessels the Union purchased were "well-suited for coastal and blockade duty" - at least until early 1862, the Union was buying everything it could get its hands on (from whaling vessels to captured blockade runners, including sail) and transferring in revenue cutters, survey ships and lighthouse board ships, simply in the need for more hulls. A vivid portrait of this lack of depth is the Young Rover, a purchased vessel which was technically a steamer (and which is counted above as such) but which was described by her commander as "entirely unfit" for blockade duty, and as having to caulk up her gun ports in a fresh breeze.
What makes this especially inexcusable is that the very next section of "Irene"'s book - two paragraphs later - gives the strength of the Royal Navy. One section considerably overstates the sophistication of the Union's navy, the next drastically underwrites the size of the Royal Navy. When this is combined with the other sections of the Musicant book in the timeline, it becomes clear that TFSmith is using it as much to rewrite inconvenient real-world history as to present his new one.
One might argue that "more than 200" additional vessels, described as being almost all steam, reflects some ahistorical Union preparation for war. This is flawed on two grounds, however; first, as the Union was clearly desperate for ships in late 1861 and early 1862, purchasing several ships which were not able to function adequately for the purpose. Secondly, this ahistorical preparation is once more contrasted with the distinctly ahistorical lack of preparation shown by the British Army, the Canadians, and the Royal Navy.
Oddly, in later chapters of the old version of the timeline, TFSmith alters his claim a little - increasing the number of prewar steamers to forty, reducing the number of new steamers to eighty and making them "only" suited for coastal service instead of "well" suited. Though the timing is not quite the same, this is more accurate:
As a point of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s blockade of the southern ports required patrolling some 3,500 miles of rebel coastline and 180 possible ports of entry, the largest effort ever attempted; when the war began in 1861, the Americans had some 90 purpose-built warships, including some 40-odd steamers, in commission or laid up. By the end of 1861, another 140 vessels – mostly converted merchantmen, and suitable only for coastal and inshore service - were added, including another 80 steamers. Even then, with some 160 vessels assigned to blockade duty (the remainder were operating in support of the Army, or assigned to other tasks), and no real rebel navy in opposition, the U.S. Navy’s campaign was widely seen as partially effective, at best. Although purely commercial shipping had stopped, fast blockade runners, often built in Britain, were operating freely out of Cuba, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.
However, we must consider the numbers in the new version as canonical. The bigger question is why Irene Musicant keeps getting her own numbers mixed up - perhaps proofreading is a lost art in the world of BROS.
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