The War in Canada East

Now we have extensively examined the campaigning in Canada East before. However, there are some interesting facts to bear in mind which effect even those considerations.

What I intend to look at here is the progress of the campaign from its opening at Rouse Point, up till the Battle of Berthierville in September, and all that happens in between.
First let's consider how the invasion of Canada East begins. We know from Chapter 5 Part 3:

“We have protected our major ports from any sudden descent by the British, and have defeated them at Rouse’s Point and across Upper Canada thanks to Grant, Sherman, and McCook; Hamilton holds Prescott, and, as I have learned just this morning, General Heintzelman has accepted the surrender of Fort Lennox from the British commander,” Blair said, breaking a rare smile. “So there is nothing stopping Heintzelman’s forces from laying siege to Montreal, if the matter is pressed; there are British ships in the Saint Lawrence, now with the ice going, but most of their Army is still split between Maine, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Lower Canada … very few of the reinforcements have reached Montreal yet, apparently; according to Heintzelman’s intelligence, just about all Russell has in the city is what was he had left after Rouse’s Point, and the militia that has since mustered-”

Essentially by mid May it seems that Prescott has been seized, and Grant and Hamilton are marching on Kingston, while in Canada East Heintzelman has just captured Fort Lennox. For some reason, the British forces are not in Lower Canada despite the ice having broken up on the St. Lawrence at Montreal by the 28th of April and earlier at Quebec. In essence the British should be able to easily reinforce Montreal, but apparently choose not to.

This is made more confusing by the author's own notes. On page 45 of the original draft he gives us the Order of Battle for the British Army of Canada, which also conveniently notes the arrival times of each division.

One should note that the 1st and 2nd Divisions have been in Canada since April and March respectively, and therefore should easily have been able to move overland by May to stymie Heintzelman's advance. The 3rd Division arrived in May, and the 4th Division is just the remnants of what was at Rouse Point and Montreal. The only force which is (somewhat bizarrely) unorganized until July is the Cavalry Division, the British only having shipped the troopers over in May and June, and just having gotten around to organizing the Canadian horsemen again (of course the author chose to neuter them rather than let them form a reasonable core of mounted troops). However, this simply means that even if we allow for the author ignoring geography to allow Montreal to fall we should note that by the author's own admission the British have three fresh divisions ready by at the latest June, with gunboat support, to potentially take the fight to the Union.

Heck the American forces after the fall of Montreal are in no position to do much as Heintzelman has only "Heintzelman’s 30,000 troops began to dig in around Montreal" and that might be smaller subtracting the forces Heintzelman would have to remove in order to protect his supply lines north or garrison places like Fort Lennox. Even if we accept that Russell's division has less than 10,000 troops (we will assume 5,000 for the sake of extreme casualties to match the narrative) then the British have (assuming the author's full 9,000 man division strength plus cavalry and artillery, and engineers) roughly 38,000 men in Canada by June with gunboat support, something the American forces lack.

This becomes very problematic very quickly. The reason being is that Grant is stuck in Canada West until July besieging Kingston. Meanwhile the British have 30+ days to make some sort of advance on Montreal, against a most likely outnumbered opponent.

Though the two sides have rough numeric parity this counts for little in the face of British control of the St. Lawrence. The story establishes the Americans have very little presence on the river until late September with new build gunboats, rams, and ironclads, and the British have at least eight gunboats (of course in the story the British squadron obligingly separates and sees itself defeated in detail). However, here there should be no trouble using such vessels to escort and sustain some 33,000 fresh troops up river to cut off Montreal and place themselves between the city and Grant's forces. With reinforcements arriving in July and August the fall of Montreal and the complete stall of the American advance should be relatively trivial, so long as the British control the waterways.

Curiously, the author seems to forget the Grand Trunk Railroad can be used in this period. Though there are some allusions to partisans blowing it up, the simple truth is that even with railroad delays the British should be able to rapidly move troops in the early months down the St. Lawrence Valley to counter the American advance. One wonders how the British can have much trouble using it in spring, while the Union has little trouble expanding it mid-winter mid-campaign.

In short, Heintzelman's army would surely find itself besieged, prolonging the siege of Kingston, and forcing the Union to commit its forces haphazardly against the dug in British. Instead, the author delays any action for four months because of his chosen narrative style, rather than risk writing something that might make the Union look bad.

The next question though, is how does this effect the campaign in Maine?

Even allowing for the stalling of the British attack on Portland, by August troops have been dispatched to reinforce the British lines there, and then in Chapter 8 American troops are dispatched overland to reinforce Portland, largely drawn from Heintzelman's original troops. Instead Portland would be on its own, and most likely fall. The British could then free up forces to move against Augusta and take the whole state of Maine. Or perhaps they could simply sit idle, and send another division to Canada to reinforce the army there.

It seems as though the author must press hard on the scales in order to make the story work as he wants it to. This explains the delay in fighting in Canada East rather nicely. If the British move on Heintzelman's isolated forces in June, the Union loses any chance of holding Portland, and the Americans have no chance to contest the St. Lawrence and march to Quebec. If Grant is delayed even slightly, or commits his forces piecemeal, he risks a great defeat.

This of course simply would not do, and so the author blithely ignores strategic and narrative sense to create these scenarios which result in British defeats.

Back to Canada though, in the time which develops between the fall of Montreal and the Battle of Berthierville in the story, little really changes. The British beef up their forces considerably, and the Union does the same, to the point each side has some 50,000 troops ready for duty. It is evident that the Union really needs this time though, as previously mentioned they have no presence on the St. Lawrence until early September.

Little mention is made of even minor actions taking place, and the war just stalemates apparently. This allows for victories in Maine, and the West as the Union moves troops around at will to face whatever particular problem crops up.

In short, the war in Canada East is merely one set piece situation to another, and makes no real allowance for any hiccup in the fine timeline of American plans, and depends on all other actors being non-entities. Nothing new in the story here I'm afraid.