Camping it up

When TFSmith describes the Army of New Brunswick, he notes that its brigadiers 'all had distinguished careers, connections with Horse Guards, the Palace, or both'. However, these men were not picked by the British government: they were picked by TFSmith. So did the British historically use similar criteria to TFSmith when it came to selecting officers for active service? Let's find out.

TFSmith makes it clear why he used the names he did- because it was easy:

When a brigade-level formation did not have a commander, or an obvious candidate, I used the ADCs to HRH, who all seem to have been distinguished combat and support arms colonels, almost all professionals, not doing much of anything else particularly important, and in (roughly) the right age range. Seemed a better method than me simply trying to guess, and the lists do seem to fit neatly into an expeditionary force OOB.

Had he not simply taken the list of ADCs, he might have actually had to research British officers - and this would never have done.

Of the 20 regular ADCs on the list for December 1861, TFSmith sends eighteen to Canada or North America. This includes the Royal Marine Colonel Thomas Holloway, who is given command of a brigade which is two-thirds regular infantry. The only two which escape commands in the field are Colonel Sir Thomas Troubridge and Colonel Edwin Wodehouse, both of whom are given positions on the staff at home.

TFSmith is so keen to avoid having to do any research into the British army that he also takes all six of the Indian army officers who are ADCs to the Queen and brings them onto the home establishment. These transfers include Neville B. Chamberlain, who at this point historically was in charge of the Punjab Irregular Force, and might be considered to have rather more important things to do. It is also is a sharp contrast to his policy of retaining proven generals such as Codrington and Hope Grant in Gibraltar and India respectively. Clearly, the only British generals too important to move are those who might actually affect the course of the war.

When TFSmith begins to run out of ADCs, he faces a difficult choice. However, the prospect of reading any more of the Army List - where there are plenty of colonels who are unattached or serving with depot battalions - clearly proved too arduous. He therefore speculates about the possibility of promoting some of the militia officers listed as ADCs to home commands. It was at this point that he should probably have stopped and asked what the role of 'ADC to the queen' actually represented.

Contrary to TFSmith's belief, the ADCs to the queen were not an inferior British copy of the German General Staff. It was a honorific role, and most regular officers who were given it were being honoured for bravery. Colonel Sir Thomas Troubridge, for instance, received his appointment as ADC to the queen in a bath chair because he had lost his left leg and right foot in the Crimea a short time before.

The list was by no means intended to reflect those chosen for future command, and a substantial proportion of its members were there for their social status or political influence. This explains the presence of those titled militia and yeomanry officers who so confused him. However, picking the British command team for Canada on the basis of the list makes about as much sense as sending the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms into the field.

TFSmith could have disabused himself of his false impression with some fairly simple pieces of research. He claims that the TL is based firmly on historical precedent, though this claim turns out to be fairly ropy in practice. As such, he could have seen how often these ADCs were sent on expeditionary wars in his chosen period of 1841-1881. As he didn't bother, we'll do it for him, taking the Crimea and Egypt as our two case studies.

Crimea

• The total pool of officers studied was 25, and included senior staff and divisional, brigade and divisional artillery commanders.
• Of these, six held staff posts: these were Master-General of the Board of Ordnance, Military secretary to the General Commanding in Chief, Adjutant General, Inspector-General of cavalry, Deputy QMG in Ireland, and Assistant QMG at headquarters.
• Thirteen were doing duty with their regiments, and six were unattached.
• Of the 21 regular ADCs on the list for December 1853, four were sent to the Crimea: Colonel Sir Colin Campbell (2nd Brigade, 1st Division), Colonel John Pennefather (1st Brigade, 2nd Division), Colonel Henry Bentinck (Guards Brigade, 1st Division), and Colonel William Eyre (2nd Brigade, 3rd Division). Only one of these four, Sir Colin Campbell, was unattached at the start of the war.
• Five of the twelve brigades were commanded by the senior battalion or regimental commander, compared to four commanded by ADCs to the queen.
• Needless to say, none of the Indian officers on the list were sent to the war.

 Egypt

• The total pool of officers studied was 31, including staff at both army and divisional level and all combat commanders of brigades and upwards.
• Of these, nineteen held staff appointments before the war. These roles included the Quartermaster General, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, and the Governor of the Royal Military Academy; two brigade commanders at Aldershot; four Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster Generals, at Portsmouth, York, Devonport and Aldershot; and various staff roles such as Deputy Quartermaster General in the Intelligence Branch, Assistant Director of Works for Barracks, and a Member of the Ordnance Committee.
• Of the 20 regular ADCs on the list for December 1881, only three were sent to Egypt. These were Major-General HRH The Duke of Connaught as commander of the Guards Brigade, 1st Division; Colonel Sir Baker Creed Russell as commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; and Colonel Redvers Henry Buller as Wolseley's intelligence officer. However, the Duke of Connaught was commanding a brigade at Aldershot before the war, and Redvers Buller was a Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General in South Africa.

We can see clearly here how any poverty of talent among the command staff in Canada results from TFSmith's laziness and ignorance, and not from the available officer pool. Too idle to trawl through the list of available British colonels when he could be minutely researching the background of American officers, and too foolish to see what the role of ADC to the queen actually meant, he bases his selection almost exclusively on royal links. Not even those making appointments to the Army of the East were as myopic as him.

Bear this and other such instances in mind when you see TFSmith decry the standard of British generals. He picked them, and he had no incentive to pick well.