Diplomatic Maneuvering

In the marginila of the TL the author lays out his reasoning on how America "Benefits" the European powers in the era. Saying So, all in all, there would have been reasons for the French, Spanish, Prussians, and the Russians to remain "correctly" neutral in an Anglo-American war in 1862; they all had opportunities that are far more likely the longer the British, especially, are involved in North America. Notice of course how they are stated as remaining "correctly" neutral.

The author has laid out each point numerically, so we shall address them as such.

1. France - they allied with the British against Russia in 1854-56 and in China in 1860-61; in neither case, did France get a lot out of it, despite (quite clearly) carrying by far the heaviest load in the Crimea and, in terms of ground forces, in the Baltic as well. Obviously, NIII got a de facto alliance and recognition out of it (although the naval building race, from Napoleon to Lave to Gloire to Couronne suggests pretty clearly who the French Navy was geared to fight in the 1850s and 1860s), and, arguably, the British stayed out of the 1859 war, but little more than a year later, the British did not back the French play in Mexico ... and of course, the British quite clearly stayed out in 1870-71. So much for la belle alliance. If, in the winter of '61-62, the US says "we will not oppose your policy in Mexico" (as the US did not oppose the Russian policy in Poland in '63, for example) that suggests, at least, the French would have rather had that statement than not. Given the French wanted Mexico for the strategic depth and the imagined impact on the Austrians, a US that is turning a blind eye to French actions in '62-63 is worth something, and if the French remain "correct" with all parties, at least they don't have to worry about the USN as they build up their expeditionary force, first for the failure in 1862 and then for the (expected) success in 1863.

Unfortunately, the author does not elaborate on what "carrying the heaviest load" means precisely. Does he mean in terms of troops shipped to the Crimea? Ships dispatched, supplies delivered? He clarifies that he means in the Baltic with ground forces, but beyond that it seems to be the familiar gripe of the British army being tiny.

Oddly he claims that France got little out of the 1860 expedition in China, he of course is referring to the Second Opium War, which the US was actually involved in (much to its own benefit). It is odd to say that the French got nothing, as this opened up China's markets and gave European nations access to the lucrative markets there. Then they received 2 million in silver (increased to 8 million in 1860), and religious rights in China from the Treaty of Tientsin, and indirectly this paved the way for the French expeditions to Indochina a few years later. Hardly small gains for a minute effort on the part of the French.

That Britain stayed out of the war in Italy is obvious, but what is equally obvious as usual is that Britain did not back out of the French play in Mexico. They too were signatories of the Treaty of London in 1861 which paved the way for the French intervention. Historically both Spain and Britain backed out when French intentions became clear, but Britain made no move to stop the French from mucking around in Mexico giving their tacit consent to the matter. The US of course, protested, but could do absolutely nothing about it. Indeed historically they could do nothing about it until the summer of 1865.

The idea then that the Union in 1862 saying they approve the French policy in Mexico gains them any points in diplomatic circles should be considered absolutely laughable. That Napoleon would give a fig what the USN would do while it is fighting for its life against the RN shows only a gross misunderstanding of the whole French intervention in Mexico. The simple truth is the Union would be impotent to do anything. Sadly this kind of misunderstanding is to be expected.

Of course, he compares it to the Union giving moral consent to the Russian crushing of the Poles in 1863, but the Union was in the position to do precisely nothing about the Poles and scored a cheap diplomatic nicety with Russia at no cost to themselves. Giving the French a free hand in Mexico merely destroys the Monroe Doctrine and exposes how weak the United States is in 1862. Hardly a win win scenario.

 2. Spain - Note that the Spanish (historically) intervened in Santo Domingo and against the Peruvians and Chileans in the 1860s; they had not "quite" given up on the idea of a Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere. Again, if the US says "we will not oppose your policies" in 1862, that is something useful.

Spain is an interesting case. Historically they had much to gain from being complicit in aiding the Confederate blockade runners from Cuba. They also blithely ignored the Monroe Doctrine as it suited them, whether it was going into Mexico in 1861, occupying Santo Domingo in 1861 (and fighting a bloody war to try and keep it), as well as fighting an expensive war in South America from 1864-1866.

How one can rationalize the US telling Spain to keep doing what they were already doing as being a diplomatic victory beggars belief. The previous examples show Spain was happy to ignore the Monroe Doctrine if it suited them (as they did with Cuba until 1898), and the US acknowledging they are impotent in enforcing it would simply be seen as a sign of weakness.

With both the RN and USN distracted, there's not a damn thing the US could do to stop Spain and France from doing as they please.

3. Prussia - Once Bismarck was firmly in control (as demonstrated by the Iron and Blood speech, historically in September, 1862) Prussia was going to find iyts palce[sic] in the sun or die trying; the confrontation with Austria was pretty much pre-destined, and that with France was hardly unexpected. So, if the one nation with the potential to put a break on Prussian policy that could not be dealt with by force of arms (in the last extremity) is mired 3,000 miles across the North Atlantic, so much the better for Prussia in the short to medium term. The long game that [user] points out above is farther out, but the reality is Bismarck was only 47 in 1862; the possibility of an Anglo-American rapprochement was certainly something to consider.

Prussia here is a confusing case. We see later on in story that Bismarck hosts American diplomats, but to what end is clearly an open question. Hinted here of course is the opportunity for future Anglo-American warm relations, but why Bismarck would be worried about that having just grabbed a hold of the office of Prime Minister, attempting to properly reform the military, and before even the 1864 and 1866 wars have insured Prussian dominance, why on earth would he be worried about Anglo-American relations?

The United States is on the other side of the ocean and in no place to help or hinder Prussia. There could be no possible advantage in talking with feathered generals and insane soldiers from North America.

This all appears to come from the authors fundamental misunderstanding of great power politics.

4. Russia - US-Russian relations were quite friendly in the 1860s; the Russians had no ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, and nowhere did US and Russia borders rub up against each other, so it was obvious. Given the realities of the strategic situation the Russians had faced only six years earlier, their desire to see the British and the French neck deep in the Western Hemisphere is obvious. As far as their needs to modernize, that is undoubtedly true - however, it is also clear that they were capable of facing the Ottomans with a rough equality, even in 1853-56 (as witness their victories Sinope and Kars, as well as the failure of the Russian Danube Campaign and the Turkish victories in Wallachia); so, presumably, if the British and French are occupied, the Russians could take a shot at the Turks, at least in the Balkans and presumaby[sic] in Transcaucasia.

This section is about the only accurate reading of a Great Power and its motivations as it relates to real life. Possibly because the Russians and Americans never fought a war at any point in their history before becoming rivals with the overthrow of the tsar.

All that can really be said is that it is accurate to say Russia had good relations with the Union, and desirous eyes on the Ottomans.

In short, the author appears to believe that the Union of 1862 was as important on the world stage as the United States of 1914. That even second string powers like Spain flouted it in this period should be obvious proof against that.