Rebel without a corps

With TFSmith having already deleted large numbers of British troops, as well as increasing the number of Union troops over the historical amount, it should not be surprising he also tweaks the numbers of the third major combatant - the Confederacy.

The readers are invited to guess which way this one went.






In April-May, the West-of-the-Appalachians command has 70,000 troops

Army of Tennessee – Gen. A.S. Johnston (in direct command) – 45,000
First Corps – Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk
1st Division - Clark
2nd Division - Cheatham
Second Corps – Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg
1st Division - Ruggles
2nd Division - Withers
Third Corps – Maj. Gen. William Hardee
1st Division – Hindman
2nd Division – Breckinridge

Fort Pillow and Memphis had been organized as follows:
Army of Mississippi – Gen. PGT Beauregard – 25,000
1st Division – Price
2nd Division – Lovell
3rd Division – Duncan

At roughly the same time, the CSA has about 130,000 troops in the eastern theatre. This consists of two divisions facing Fort Monroe, seven in the main field army, and four in the valley under Jackson.

In total, the rebel forces in Virginia numbered some 130,000 officers and men, including volunteers, conscripts, and militia; these were the equivalent of 13 divisions raised along the lines of those under General McClellan’s command, and were organized thus:

Army of Northern Virginia (J.E. Johnston)
First Corps (Jackson) – 4 divisions
Garnett’s, Ewell’s, Whiting’s, D.H. Hill’s divisions
Second Corps (Longstreet) – 3 divisions
Anderson’s, Early’s, Pickett’s divisions
Third Corps (Magruder) – 3 divisions
McLaw’s, Jones’, Griffith’s divisions
Reserve (Light) Division – A.P. Hill
Cavalry Brigade – Stuart
Artillery - Pendleton

Army of the Chesapeake (G.W. Smith)
Huger’s Division
Holmes’ Division

(TFSmith states this twice in two successive chapters, identical to the letter.)


The situation remains more or less the same at least until July. From this we can determine that the total available force TFSmith credits the Confederacy with is 200,000 men - they have, after all, nothing else to do as their coast is effectively guarded by the Royal Navy.


Fortunately, we have a return from June-July 1862 which gives the strength of the Confederacy's armies; however, it is incomplete in several respects:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=consolidated abstract;rgn=full text;idno=waro0127;didno=waro0127;view=image;seq=1188

This details the strengths of the Confederate armies on or about June 30, and has a total of 170,000 Present For Duty and 225,000 Present. However, a number of caveats must be applied.

Firstly, this return includes the Distict of the Gulf, of Middle and Eastern Florida, and the Trans-Mississippi, which were not in the above enumeration of Confederate strength - however, with no credible Union threat to the Gulf then these should have been sent northwards, and indeed TFSmith says they have been:

The surrenders of the Yankees at Ship Island and Fort Pickens had allowed Duncan’s forces at New Orleans and Bragg’s in Florida to move north, which assisted immeasurably in building up the strength of our field forces.

(Chapter 6 part 2)
Secondly, this return also includes the Department of South Carolina and Georgia and the Department of North Carolina - the same applies here. (The list of forces does not include militia, who would suffice to defend the coasts.)
Thirdly, the return is missing departments. These include the Department of Henrico and Army of New Mexico, which were small and not relevant, and the Department of Southwestern Virginia, which was close enough to matter.
Fourthly, the return excludes "the divisions of Jackson and Ewell, the forces in the Shenandoah Valley and Northwestern Virginia, for all of which there are no returns of an approximate date" - this would amount to roughly 20,000 to 25,000 troops, counting Heth's brigade and both divisions.
Fifthly, the return is made up of data from after the battles of the Peninsula Campaign and the Seven Days. This period historically cost the Confederacy nearly 30,000 casualties, and did not happen in BROS.
Sixthly, BROS similarly eliminates other battles such as Shiloh (which saw 11,000 Confederate casualties), Corinth (1,000 Confederate casualties) and Island Number Ten (7,000 Confederate casualties).

Roughly speaking, then, the return's values of 170,000 PFD and 225,000 Present are after the Confederacy suffered roughly 50,000 casualties and are also excluding at least 25,000 troops who should be counted. What this means is that the Confederacy should have approximately 275,000 troops available, not 200,000 - and this is taking the average of PFD and Present, while we have seen that TFSmith is quite happy to use the Aggregate Present as the strength of the Union at a given date.
Supporting this is Livermore's estimate of the total size of the Confederate Army as of April 1862. Excluding militia (aside from the Missouri State Guard) and stripping out units such as those in the trans-mississippi or those captured TTL, the total recorded is roughly 290,000 PFD.

In short, in assigning Confederate troops to face the Union, TFSmith has removed approximately 75,000 from the total Confederate strength at the time. Assigned to either East or West these would make a huge difference - he has a close fight between 70,000 CS troops and 72,000 Union troops in Tennessee, and the two armies fighting in Virginia are not more than 40,000 apart in size total - but of course TFSmith's way of ensuring a Union victory is to produce Union troops from thin air and delete large numbers of enemy troops.

This is why the Union can manage a two-front war so easily - the enemy forces deleted are so severe that the Union is not actually fighting any more enemy troops than it did historically. (75,000 deleted Confederates, as against roughly this many British and Canadians to the north.)



EDIT:

In a later chapter, TFSmith states:

General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Northern Virginia. The army had been boosted to almost 110,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, a mix of veterans from 1861, conscripts called up in 1862, and 20,000 militia, old men and boys, pulled from every corner of the Old Dominion. The volunteers and draftees came from all eleven of the seceded states, including as far away as Texas; there was even a regiment of Marylanders who had crossed the Potomac to join the rebel army. 

This puts an exact number on the militia supposedly required to reach this strength count as being 20,000. Since the OR report from above does not include militia, this means that in effect 20,000 more CS troops are being erased to be replaced with militia (as opposed to how it is done in the Union, where militia are invented out of nowhere).


Recapitulation:
If using PFD
Historical Confederate PFD, June/July 1862: 170,000
+ Valley troops (excluded from the historical PFD): 25,000
+ historical casualties from battles that did not take place in this timeline: 30,000 + 11,000 + 7,000 + 1,000 = 49,000
+ smaller departments excluded from historical PFD (1,000 or more)
= 245,000

If using TFSmith's actual measure of Union strength, Aggregate Present:
Historical Confederate AP, June/July 1862: 225,000
+ Valley troops (excluded from the historical AP): 25,000
+ historical casualties from battles that did not take place in this timeline: 30,000 + 11,000 + 7,000 + 1,000 = 49,000
+ smaller departments excluded from historical AP (1,000 or more)
= 300,000


Total Confederate strength in all listed theatres: 180,000 non-militia
Troops deleted from Confederate OOB: 65K-120K (22%-40% of CS army)