Niagara Fails

It is sometimes impressive for a knowledgeable reader of Burnished Rows of Steel how many mistakes can be put into a single ship's description. Today, as the title might suggest, we are looking into the US frigate Niagara.




This is her description in the TL, where she is the lynchpin of a US squadron protecting the upper Chesapeake (thus preventing the British from materially helping the Confederacy).

Goldsborough’s flag flew in the big, 5,500-ton steam frigate Niagara (52), Capt. William McKean, with her masts and rigging removed and temporary armor added in Baltimore to make her a “chainclad,” along with her half-sisters Minnesota and Roanoke, each 3,300 tons and 44 guns.

(chapter 10, set in October 1862)

Here we are told that Niagara carries 52 guns, a dramatic shift from her historic armament. The real Niagara started her Civil War service as a twelve-gun frigate armed with the Dahlgren XI inch gun. That is to say, she carried twelve 11” guns on her spar deck, able to fire about 2/3 of them to either port or starboard due to the arrangement of the pivot mounts. Though low in numbers, this was a heavy armament weighing 1,680 cwt, and necessitated her gun deck being empty in order to free up weight.

Nowhere are we told what exactly those 52 guns aboard Niagara are intended to be. It is possible that TFSmith intends the number after the name of a ship to be a measure of her firepower, with any cannon being much the same as any other cannon. This fits with his stated dislike for 'the typical "17 inches of oak backing 6 inches of iron can/can't be penetrated by a 60-pound shell containg [sic] x kgs of powder using the formula XYZ" kind of grognerdish [sic] merde that comes up again and again'. 52 guns is one more than the typical British heavy frigate, and two more than the British super-frigate HMS Orlando: therefore it is better.

Unfortunately, the question of Niagara's armament is a little more than 'grognerdish' - unless a ship being on top of the water or underneath it is an academic consideration. During the Civil War, the Union did up-gun Niagara: not to 52 guns, but to 32. These consisted of twenty 11” guns on the gun deck and twelve 8” Parrott rifles on the spar deck. Carrying a total 4,564 cwt of guns proved disastrous:

'her commanding officer, Thomas T. Craven, wrote secretary Welles: 'The batteries are entirely too heavy for the ship... her midships port was 5 feet 6 inches above the waterline... On our passage here, although there was little swell and the ports were lashed in- the gundeck was awash with water- demonstrating that in a gale of wind she would be exceedingly uncomfortable if not a dangerous ship and that under the most favourable circumstances, only two or three of her XI inch guns could be used... I would suggest that her main deck battery be taken out."... ordered from New York to search for the raider Talahassee, but at this point her immense armament betrayed her. She attempted to stand out of the harbour under steam against force six winds. Her log states: "The wind being too strong to handle the ship [we] returned to anchorage. At precisely this point, Secretary Welles's telegram ordering the removal of her gun deck battery arrived and the guns were unshipped immediately.'

(Canney, Old Steam Navy vol. 1 p.57)

With no details of this armament, there are three possible scenarios:

1) Niagara carries fifty-two guns of the size she was originally built for (11in Dahlgrens), and she would sink instantly under a total gun weight of 7,280 cwt.

2) Niagara carries fifty-two guns, with a more realistic composition of 50 broadside 9” Dahlgrens and two pivot 11” Dahlgrens. However, with a total armament weight of 4,280 cwt, the ship would be as unable to use her guns as she was when upgraded historically.

3) Niagara's main battery consists of 32 pounder guns or 8” shell guns, leading to an armament weight of between 3,150 cwt and 1,404 cwt depending on the precise distribution of gun models. However, this would completely go against all US Navy prewar doctrine, which was based on a small armament of shell guns of 9in calibre and above. This ship would also risk being unable to penetrate the side-walls of a contemporary British wooden steam battleship.

The question of naval architecture in general is one that seems to bemuse TFSmith. Elsewhere, he gives his opinion that the British frigate HMS Orlando was “a flawed design; too long for the materials available and subject to hogging”, in order to justify his decision to have her ignominiously defeated in the TL. However, the ships were broadly comparable:

Niagara: 5,540 long tons displacement, 328 feet 10 inches long
Orlando: 5,493 tons displacement, 336 feet 9 inches long overall

The only difference between the two was that Orlando was far more heavily armed than was Niagara, with her 12 68pdrs and 38 8in shell guns representing an armament weight of 3,610cwt. When Niagara was asked to carry a similar weight, the ship almost experienced structural failure. Yet nowhere does TFSmith criticise the American design, or acknowledge that his proposed rearmament would cause exactly the same problems that Orlando experienced historically.

TFSmith carefully glosses over any problems with Niagara. For instance, we are told that in October 1862 Niagara is in active service in the upper Chesapeake. In reality, in October 1862 Niagara was actually in drydock undergoing repairs, and would not re-enter commission until October 1863. For someone who constantly notes how the strains of operations off the US coast and attendant maintenance cycles would render the British unable to sustain a blockade, it is odd that the Niagara is immune to this problem.

Furthermore, we are never actually told when Niagara's refit and conversion to a chain-clad took place. If it took place after the opening of the war, it would create a period of considerable vulnerability when at least one of the powerful US frigates defending Baltimore was unable to fight, if not all three. But if the conversion took place before the declaration of war, this would mean the US Navy deliberately destroyed the ability of three of their most powerful ships (Minnesota, Roanoke, Niagara) to maintain the blockade if the crisis abated.

This point is further reinforced by the other appearance of the Niagara in the timeline. She is protecting the landing at Norfolk by Burnside in December, about which more elsewhere. However, her historical blockade station was actually the Gulf – forming one of the two ships of force on the station. One wonders how she got to Hampton Roads so quickly when the British take months to sail reinforcements across the Atlantic.

This, then, is TFSmith's idea of the Niagara. A ship which can be upgraded with forty extra guns without trouble, which is able to go without refits for years longer than she did historically, and which can shift from the Gulf of Mexico to the Chesapeake Bay at the drop of a hat.