Dis-raeli Bugs Me

 As we have seen many times, TFSmith has no real liking for British politics. It is not an integral part of his story: it is something that gets in the way of him writing the story of the Union victory. This is why we find such easily avoided errors as Sir George Cornewall Lewis acquiring a double-barelled name as Sir George Cornewall-Lewis. It is also the reason why we get passages like the following:

“It’s happened, father, gentlemen,” said Henry Adams, his father’s private secretary, confidant, and all-around legman. “There’s been a vote of no confidence in Palmerston – brought by Disraeli; the final vote was 313 votes to 295, with everyone from Cobden and Bright to Palmerston's old enemies from Aberdeen’s day – even Gladstone came over, finally; it appears he is to be prime minister in a coalition with Disraeli as foreign minister. Russell is out as well.”

This is a straight reversal of the vote of confidence over the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864, when the vote was won by 313-295 thanks in part to the votes of Cobden and Bright. To overcome a majority of 18 requires 9 MPs who voted for Palmerston to vote against: though this does not seem like an insurmountable margin, it is almost certain that TFSmith has absolutely no idea where these nine votes would come from.

For a start, we have a mention of 'Palmerston's old enemies from Aberdeen's day'. Who exactly are these meant to be? They can only be the Peelites, a section of which left Palmerston's government in protest at the creation of an inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean war. However, many of those particular Peelites were dead, like Sir James Graham and Sidney Herbert, or had reconciled with Palmerston, like the Cabinet ministers Edward Cardwell and William Gladstone.

TFSmith would have been better specifying that the defectors were pro-America radicals like W.E. Forster. Unfortunately, this would be distinctly less striking than Palmerston being unable to win support from his fellow MPs after the best part of a decade rubbing shoulders with them in the corridors and lobbies of Parliament. Of course, if TFSmith dislikes Palmerston, everybody else must have done as well!

What TFSmith fails to recognise is that if Liberals can go into the other lobby, so too can Conservatives. There were certainly some who voted against the government over Denmark who might well have supported the government in fighting against America. In particular, Conservative members of the Southern Independence Association - a pressure group instituted to support recognition of the Confederacy - seem likely candidates to ignore the whip and back the government. There were fourteen such Conservative members who voted for the motion of censure, and another three who abstained.

However, even if we grant that the opposition win the vote and Palmerston and Russell are both turned out of office, we still have a problem. The Liberals had around 356 seats at the 1859 election; the Conservatives around 298. Gladstone must bring thirty Liberal MPs with him in order to create a coalition with the barest possible majority. As such, Gladstone becoming Prime Minister makes about as much sense as the 2010 election resulting in Nick Clegg becoming Prime Minister and David Cameron becoming Deputy Prime Minister. Technically, it makes less sense: Nick Clegg had not defected from the Conservatives earlier in his political career, resulting in them hating his guts.

This Conservative dislike for Gladstone cannot be understated - unless, like TFSmith, you have never read anything about the period. In 1855, when Gladstone was offered a place in a putative Conservative cabinet, no fewer than 80 Conservative MPs threatened to withdraw their support. In January and February 1857, Conservative backbenchers made similar threats. In 1858, in response to an invite to the Conservative cabinet, Gladstone himself observed that

There is a small but active and not unimportant section, who avowedly regard me as the representative of the most dangerous ideas. I should thus, unfortunately, be to you a source of weakness in the heart of your own adherents, while I should bring to you no party or group of friends to make up for their defection or discontent.

How little Gladstone had to offer the Conservatives is shown by the coalition proposals of 1859. In that year, Disraeli wrote to Palmerston saying that, in return for bringing over 'a following of about 20 or 30' Liberals, he could decide foreign policy, propose his own reform scheme, and be made leader-in-waiting of the Conservative party. At the same time, Gladstone was only offered the India Office. As Chancellor of the Exchequer under Palmerston, Gladstone's financial rigour won him many allies among the Radicals. However, if he was capable of controlling 30 votes by 1862, they would have abandoned him the moment that he suggested that they go into coalition with the Conservatives.

For the Conservatives, Palmerston out and Gladstone in would be the single worst possible outcome. Conservative strategy in 1860-1 had deliberately focused on making demonstrations against the Government's financial measures with the hope of getting rid of Gladstone but leaving Palmerston untouched. In fact, P.M Gurowich highlights secret conventions between the Conservatives and Palmerston designed to keep him in office if Russell, Gladstone and the Radicals resigned. 

The move does not even have the merit of internal consistency. Not only do the Conservatives already dislike Gladstone, but he is described as  'publicly... a strong supporter of the war' in chapter 9 part 3 and 'advocating for an intensified war effort' in chapter 15 part 1. Why would they depose Palmerston and make Gladstone Prime Minster, when TFSmith's version of Disraeli has opposed the war since December 1861? In essence, this whole narrative makes about as much sense as McClellan launching a military coup in order to depose Lincoln and replace him as president with Frederick Douglass. 

I have chosen to save the most gaping hole for last. Edward George Geoffrey Smith-Stanley, 14th Earl of Derby, had been leader of the Conservative party since 1846. He had kissed hands as Prime Minster in 1852 and 1858, and would do so again in 1866. If the Conservatives had somehow managed to defeat the government over their handing of the Trent War, the only likely government to be formed is a Conservative minority with Derby at its head and Disraeli as Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the Commons. This was the government that was formed in 1858, and would be the government formed in 1866. Yet, instead, we have the bizarre union of Disraeli and Gladstone, with the weaker partner taking the senior role.

What happens to Derby? Who knows. He passed on Sir James Fergusson's letter in Chapter 3 part 1, and then disappeared altogether from the timeline. Is it coincidence that TFSmith only mentioned Derby three times during his brief sojourn on AH.com, compared to nearly thirty mentions of Disraeli, and that the only reference to him in the BROS thread is when someone else brought him up? Could it be that TFSmith's knowledge of the British political system in the mid-1860s extends only to knowing one of the two main party leaders? The conclusion seems inescapable.