Bamboo headsets

There are several occasions, in Burnished Rows of Steel, where the author has questionable decisions made - decisions which, on later examination, seem ludicrously implausible.

However, there is a model which may explain this approach. If we look at some examples, a pattern emerges.



Norton

During the battle at Norton, the similarities with the incident with the Boers (on which it is modelled) are on closer investigation superficial. There is a train (though it is a proper train and not a wagon train), there are British troops, there are militia firing at them. But the key difference is in the quality of the troops and their weapons - TFSmith has placed the British in a position where they are under fire from ambushing militia, and he has two (described) volleys from predominantly-musket armed - and non existent - militia inflict the same casualties as several minutes of firing from breechloader-armed Boer commandoes.


Berthierville

At Berthierville, the Union troops are spread over a vast area - divisions are posted several miles apart, and yet the description given is as if they are controlling a continuous line. The action takes inspiration from a real battle, though it extends the action over a far larger front - but what matters is that there are Union troops in a line, not how many of them there are to hold the line.


Rouses Point

Before and during the Battle of Rouses Point, the Union defences consist of two lines of field entrenchments. We are intended to draw an (explicit) parallel with Tell-el-Kebir (the British tactics and the British commander are the same), though in supplementary material TFSmith proudly informs us that the difference between Tell-el-Kebir and Rouses Point is that at Rouses Point there is a second line of defences - unlike Tell-el-Kebir.
What we are intended to miss, however, is the simple point that at Tell-el-Kebir there were fifteen thousand Egyptian troops with breechloading rifles in the trench line, whereas at Rouses Point the abatis lines are completely unoccupied. (This is unsurprising as the outside temperature is below freezing during the night.)
The lines of fortification are there simply so that the author can say there are lines of fortification present, thus justifying the British defeat in this manner.


Chainclads

The chainclads, as we have discussed in the past, are a panacea. Only a few Union ships could benefit more than marginally from being given chaincladding, and in that case all that chaincladding does is to neutralize an abnormal vulnerability.
But in the author's description, the simple expedient of "chain cladding" (which is not explained) makes vessels far more effective than they should be. It is a kind of armour, therefore it is good.


The answer?

To all of these, and other similar events in the timeline, there is a simple explanation. The term is "Cargo Cult" - the imitation of something superficial in ignorance of the true explanation behind it.
The original cargo cults were religious movements on Pacific Islands after WW2, attempting to recreate the wartime wealth of supplies ("Cargo") that came to their islands. In order to do this, they would construct bamboo replicas of a control tower, complete with bamboo "headsets" for the operators, next to a meticulously recreated runway.
The illusion was very good, but of course - no planes landed there.

In creating fortified entrenchments with nobody in them, in placing 30,000 men along a line it would take 150,000 to properly defend, in putting metal chains along the waterline of vessels with submerged boilers and expecting them to be well protected, TFSmith is doing exactly this kind of behaviour - make something that looks like real military tactics, in the hope it will attract plausibility.