In various points during Burnished Rows of Steel, we are told about the cancellation of some Union offensives and the pullback of others. Specifically, Port Royal is evacuated, New Orleans is cancelled and the North Carolina expedition is also cancelled.
This does not garner any actual benefit to the Confederacy or the British (who continue to act as though there are large Union garrisons in these locations requiring months of work to slowly defeat) but significantly benefits the Union.
While garrisons do in most cases remain in place, we are told
specifically (chapter 5, part 1) that these garrisons are absolutely
minimal: "What we have – or had; communications are delayed,
obviously – at Ship Island, Pensacola, Key West, Port Royal, and
Hatteras amount to corporal’s guards, a few companies or
batteries." Yet these areas hold out far longer than is feasible
with such small garrisons, tying up inexplicably large numbers of
troops.
Port Royal
The Port Royal expedition is abandoned in the winter (chapter 5, part 2: 'Brig. Gen. Thomas W. “Tim” Sherman, 49, (USMA, 1836) an artilleryman who had won a brevet in Mexico and commanded the successful Port Royal expedition in ’61 before being brought north, with most of his division, in the winter.') However, the rebels are besieging both Port Royal and Hatteras Inlet as late as May 1862 (chapter 5, part 1: 'are currently besieged by the rebels, at least at Pensacola and in the Carolinas').
Ultimately, both fall not because of Confederate operations but because of the British navy and troops can only be moved away from the Carolinas in June/July 1862 (chapter 7, part 1: 'troops detached from Lee’s command in the Carolinas and Georgia, where both Port Royal and Hatteras Inlet had fallen because of British naval strength'). This is despite the Confederates having almost ten thousand troops present for duty in North Carolina alone as of December 1861, with a further seventeen thousand in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida (not counting state troops or militia).
Ship Island
When Ship Island first came into Union hands in September 1861, it received a Union navy garrison. However, the Navy did so only on the understanding that an Army force would replace them, as 'a sufficient force cannot be spared from the ships without impairing their efficiency'. They were ordered to occupy the island because they would be replaced by Butler's expedition. Although TFSmith cancels Butler's expedition, he also enables the Navy to garrison the island without impairing the efficiency of their ships: a clear example of the Union having its cake and eating it.
Despite the Confederate Department No. 1 having almost seven thousand men present for duty in December 1861, and the garrison of the fort being two hundred, Ship Island only falls by April 1862 (chapter 6, part 2: 'The surrenders of the Yankees at Ship Island and Fort Pickens had allowed Duncan’s forces at New Orleans and Bragg’s in Florida to move north').
Fort Monroe
In the first version of the TL, Fort Monroe falls in April (chapter 10, part 2) or May 1862 (chapter 12, part 2). We learn that its commander, Major-General Wool, was 'ordered to withdraw most of garrison [sic] in the winter of 1861-62' (chapter 11, part 1). These troops are combined with Burnside's expedition to form IX Corps. There is, however, a significant problem with this. In February 1862, Burnside had fifteen regiments assigned to his division; In January 1862, Wool had eleven infantry battalions assigned to his Department. Even if we assume that all Wool's eleven battalions were evacuated, 26 battalions do not make a normal three-division Union corps, which typically required 36 or more battalions; TFSmith is fudging the figures again.
Against whatever token force was left behind, the Confederates initially have Huger's division- the one that obligingly evacuated Norfolk so that Burnside could demolish it (Chapter 6, part 1). They subsequently inflate this into the two-division Army of the Chesapeake, which is still not sufficient to force the surrender of Fort Monroe without the aid of the Royal Navy. In version 2 of the TL, even the Royal Navy is not enough to overcome the defences: Fort Monroe never surrenders.
Needless to say, the British and Confederate inability to reduce these small garrisons is not mirrored on the Union side. If it had been, we could have expected the defenders of Prescott to hold out for months despite being outnumbered 15-1 (chapter 8, part 1).
Port Royal
The Port Royal expedition is abandoned in the winter (chapter 5, part 2: 'Brig. Gen. Thomas W. “Tim” Sherman, 49, (USMA, 1836) an artilleryman who had won a brevet in Mexico and commanded the successful Port Royal expedition in ’61 before being brought north, with most of his division, in the winter.') However, the rebels are besieging both Port Royal and Hatteras Inlet as late as May 1862 (chapter 5, part 1: 'are currently besieged by the rebels, at least at Pensacola and in the Carolinas').
Ultimately, both fall not because of Confederate operations but because of the British navy and troops can only be moved away from the Carolinas in June/July 1862 (chapter 7, part 1: 'troops detached from Lee’s command in the Carolinas and Georgia, where both Port Royal and Hatteras Inlet had fallen because of British naval strength'). This is despite the Confederates having almost ten thousand troops present for duty in North Carolina alone as of December 1861, with a further seventeen thousand in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida (not counting state troops or militia).
Ship Island
When Ship Island first came into Union hands in September 1861, it received a Union navy garrison. However, the Navy did so only on the understanding that an Army force would replace them, as 'a sufficient force cannot be spared from the ships without impairing their efficiency'. They were ordered to occupy the island because they would be replaced by Butler's expedition. Although TFSmith cancels Butler's expedition, he also enables the Navy to garrison the island without impairing the efficiency of their ships: a clear example of the Union having its cake and eating it.
Despite the Confederate Department No. 1 having almost seven thousand men present for duty in December 1861, and the garrison of the fort being two hundred, Ship Island only falls by April 1862 (chapter 6, part 2: 'The surrenders of the Yankees at Ship Island and Fort Pickens had allowed Duncan’s forces at New Orleans and Bragg’s in Florida to move north').
Fort Monroe
In the first version of the TL, Fort Monroe falls in April (chapter 10, part 2) or May 1862 (chapter 12, part 2). We learn that its commander, Major-General Wool, was 'ordered to withdraw most of garrison [sic] in the winter of 1861-62' (chapter 11, part 1). These troops are combined with Burnside's expedition to form IX Corps. There is, however, a significant problem with this. In February 1862, Burnside had fifteen regiments assigned to his division; In January 1862, Wool had eleven infantry battalions assigned to his Department. Even if we assume that all Wool's eleven battalions were evacuated, 26 battalions do not make a normal three-division Union corps, which typically required 36 or more battalions; TFSmith is fudging the figures again.
Against whatever token force was left behind, the Confederates initially have Huger's division- the one that obligingly evacuated Norfolk so that Burnside could demolish it (Chapter 6, part 1). They subsequently inflate this into the two-division Army of the Chesapeake, which is still not sufficient to force the surrender of Fort Monroe without the aid of the Royal Navy. In version 2 of the TL, even the Royal Navy is not enough to overcome the defences: Fort Monroe never surrenders.
Needless to say, the British and Confederate inability to reduce these small garrisons is not mirrored on the Union side. If it had been, we could have expected the defenders of Prescott to hold out for months despite being outnumbered 15-1 (chapter 8, part 1).
Time and place
The odd thing about it all, however, is that these pullbacks take
place over the first few months of 1862 - before the declaration of
war.
What this means is that the Union has abandoned its plan to defeat the current enemy, in order to secure an advantage in a second war which may or may not happen. While prudent (especially if the Union has read the timeline's author notes) this seems like it would have negative consequences for the ability of the Union to fight the Confederacy since it grants the CSA full economic access to the world's markets. Instead, as per the author's post on how the timeline would end, the Union actually defeats the Confederacy taking exactly as long as they took historically:
What this means is that the Union has abandoned its plan to defeat the current enemy, in order to secure an advantage in a second war which may or may not happen. While prudent (especially if the Union has read the timeline's author notes) this seems like it would have negative consequences for the ability of the Union to fight the Confederacy since it grants the CSA full economic access to the world's markets. Instead, as per the author's post on how the timeline would end, the Union actually defeats the Confederacy taking exactly as long as they took historically:
a re-run of the historical 1862-65 campaigns of the US against the rebels get underway, except delayed by roughly 12-18 months, at which point the rebels surrender unconditionally in 1866-67.This portrays the Confederacy as incredibly, outrageously passive - they just sit there and wait for the Union to get around to defeating them. Of course, since the British do much the same thing (waiting for months outside Portland for the Union to schedule another glorious victory, sportingly not moving any troops until war has been declared) and since other nations continue on their historical tracks until a Union sympathizer talks to them, then it simply reinforces the general feel of the timeline; to whit, the Union is the Player Character and everyone else is a passive NPC.
What would really happen
In a realistic timeline, the garrisons of most of the posts would surrender promptly that the Union withdrew most of the men – that is, if the Union left anyone there at all. For Ship Island, taking the island would require the withdrawal of the Union naval force or its destruction by the Royal Navy; for Fort Monroe, the fort would be lost almost immediately upon the withdrawal of most of the garrison.
This would produce a significant improvement in the Confederate military position. In the OTL, during 1862 the Union had only a few thousand troops in any kind of coastal defences while the Confederacy had upwards of sixty thousand troops engaged in containing Union incursions along the coast -Livermore gives roughly this number of state troops/garrisons/militia in the Carolinas and Georgia in April, and there were about another 25,000 in southern Virginia in December (Norfolk and facing Fort Monroe) along with several thousand around New Orleans. With no prospect of further Union offensives along the coast but plenty of risk of British coastal attack, the numbers should probably be reversed, or close to.
These troops, needless to say, would be quite useful for the Confederacy. It would also mean that keeping the talented Lee down watching the coast would be impossible to justify.
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