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After several months of total inactivity in the Eastern Theatre of the Civil War, the first major engagement that takes place east of the Appalachians is the Battle of Kernstown, between “Stonewall” Jackson (CSA) and Fitz John Porter (USA).



Needless to say (for anyone who has noticed the pattern) it is a flawed battle in terms of description and execution.










Why?
The first question that needs to be asked is why there is a battle taking place here at all. The OTL Battle of Kernstown took place in March of 1862 because the Confederacy wanted to divert Union attention from their dangerous Peninsular Campaign, and Jackson was sent with a small force to draw off as much Union attention as possible.
Here, however, the Confederate armies are still in a forward position around Centreville in June, a strong position (albeit one with potentially vulnerable flanks) and there is much less direct danger to Richmond. Furthermore, there is no clear description of Jackson's concept of operations, except that when Centreville does become threatened he withdraws south – thus indicating his intent was not to take pressure off the main Confederate army. This is particularly odd in light of how the real movement by Jackson was to protect the flank of the Confederate army as it withdrew from Centreville.
It seems, instead, that Jackson is attacking north (in June, not earlier) because that is when the Union is ready to fight him.






Who?
We are told that the total Confederate force in Virginia is 130,000 officers and men, organized in thirteen divisions, and that Jackson has four of these. We are told a little less about the Union force, except that it has 170,000 officers and men in total in Maryland, DC and Virginia; it is possible to identify seventeen divisions making this up, and we are also told that the two forces have the same pattern for their divisions.
The Union V Corps (i.e. 5^th corps – TFSmith is making a common error in referring to corps with roman numerals, arabic numerals were still in use in 1880 as shown on page four of Fitz John Porter's letter here) consists of three divisions. Thus we can assume that there are 40,000 Confederate troops in the valley and 30,000 Union troops. (It is also notable that the 5^th Corps in the valley is under the command of Fitz John Porter – this is because Banks has been deleted from history, to avoid his incompetence getting in the way.)
Apart from anything else this is quite odd – Banks was the most senior Major-General of Volunteers as of the beginning of 1862 and ranked fifth in the army, while Fitz John Porter was the 4^th most senior Brigadier General of Volunteers and ranked 21^st in the army. (In reality FJ Porter was not promoted to the position of Major-General until the 4^th of July 1862, for his performance in a campaign which does not happen in this timeline; it is unclear if he has been promoted here.)



When?
In keeping with the normal pattern for Burnished Rows of Steel, things happen either at the very start or the very end of the month. Jackson's men quit the battlefield the day after the battle because of the Battle of Centreville (and turn up on the flanks during the battle), which takes place in a “July” chapter, but the Kernstown battle itself is in a “June” chapter; thus we might expect the battle takes place in the last few days of June.
However, we are also told that the movements by the Union are “early in the month” and “in concert with General McClellan's plans… to advance upon Centreville”, and later we are told that the initial skirmishes are on June 2 – so it is anyone's guess what is going on.
The reason why it matters that this is June is that it means there has been no offensive operation against the Confederacy in the east for essentially the first half of the year. When one compares this long period of absolute idleness on the part of the Union (and Confederacy, for that matter) with the equivalent period in OTL (which saw McClellan, constantly criticized by politicians for being too slow and hesitant, take the Army of the Potomac to roughly five miles outside Richmond) then it rather beggars belief that the Union has done nothing (despite still having the numerical advantage, at least by TFSmith's count); nevertheless, it is what happens in the timeline.
The excuse used for Confederate inertia is “the weakness of the rebels' internal communications and transportation”, though since the Union has paused their offensives into Confederate territory and has had the blockade broken one would think that the rebels' internal communications and transportation would be considerably better than OTL. (There has been no capture of Corinth or Chattanooga.) One would also suspect that such a problem would have also been present OTL, which makes the original battle of Kernstown (which took place in March) a source of confusion – apparently it was conducted by forces the Confederacy could not support?






The setup



Most of the detail of the battle comes in Porter's voice:

The action began with cavalry skirmishes between Bayard’s men and Jackson’s cavalry, under Col. Turner Ashby, on June 2, during which engagement Shields was wounded with a broken arm from an artillery shell fragment. Despite his injury, Shields sent part of his division south of Winchester and one brigade marching to the north, seemingly abandoning the area, but in fact halting nearby to remain in reserve. He then turned over tactical command of his division to Col. Kimball, although throughout the first day of the battle to come, he sent numerous messages and orders to Kimball. Confederate loyalists in Winchester mistakenly informed Turner Ashby that Shields had left only a single brigade (about 3,000 men) and that these remaining troops had orders to march for Harpers Ferry in the morning. Ashby, who normally had a reputation as a reliable cavalry scout, inexplicably did not verify the civilian reports and passed them on to Jackson. Jackson marched aggressively north with his staff and Garnett’s 9,000-man division, reduced from its peak as stragglers fell out of the column, and unaware that he was soon to be attacking an equally-sized force under Shields, with another 20,000 men coming along quickly under my personal command.

We are told that Jackson makes a mistake and attacks a Union force of a division, while thinking that it is a single isolated brigade. Oddly enough, Jackson himself only has a division with him as well, and it is apparently his smallest (at 9,000 when they average 10,000 each).
This is intended to be a copy of the original First Kernstown – indeed, here is the Wikipedia entry:

His cavalry, under Col. Turner Ashby, skirmished with the Federals on March 22, during which engagement Shields was wounded with a broken arm from an artillery shell fragment. Despite his injury, Shields sent part of his division south of Winchester and one brigade marching to the north, seemingly abandoning the area, but in fact halting nearby to remain in reserve. He then turned over tactical command of his division to Col. Nathan Kimball, although throughout the battle to come, he sent numerous messages and orders to Kimball. Confederate loyalists in Winchester mistakenly informed Turner Ashby that Shields had left only four regiments and a few guns (about 3,000 men) and that these remaining troops had orders to march for Harpers Ferry in the morning. Ashby, who normally had a reputation as a reliable cavalry scout, inexplicably did not verify the civilian reports and passed them on to Jackson. Jackson marched aggressively north with his 3,000-man division, reduced from its peak as stragglers fell out of the column, unaware that he was soon to be attacking almost 9,000 men.

It appears that Porter has a time machine - the plagiarism is so complete that TFSmith includes a rare date!
Jackson's army marching divided to this extent is very odd – he should have another 31,000 men present – and should also be aware of the presence of a full Union corps in the area. Nevertheless, it is an odd feature of the way TFSmith has edited things that Jackson's force during the initial battle is roughly three times the historical size (3,000 has become 9,000) while Shields' force present at the field is the same size as it was historically; this will presumably not affect the course of the battle.



The Battle

In the afternoon, Garnett’s division – built around Jackson’s old “Stonewall” brigade, now commanded by Charles S. Winder; Jones’ old brigade, commanded by R.H. Cunningham; and Fulkerson’s brigade – attacked the 2nd Division at Pritchard Hill and Sandy Ridge. With equal forces, steady commanders, and reliable artillery emplaced on the heights, the result was a bloody repulse in which Kimball’s and Tyler’s brigades distinguished themselves. Both sides moved in more troops in the afternoon and evening; I arrived at dusk, with General Morell’s division; General Sykes’ regulars followed, and both divisions fell into line, the 1st Division to the west of the Middle Road and the 3rd to the east of Crawford’s brigade on Pritchard Hill. Bayard’s cavalry was in reserve, and as Petherbridge’s corps artillery came up shortly before sun-up, we led it into position on Sandy Ridge, relieving Daum’s batteries there, which shifted over to Pritchard Hill and re-supplied.

This is a very odd course of action for Jackson to conduct. Historically he attempted to turn the Union position by marching around the Union right flank to get into their rear, and this resulted in a nasty battle where Garnett's (CS) brigade held off Tyler's numerically superior (Union) forces as they attacked (until the Confederates ran out of ammunition).
With three times the Confederate troops present, this turning movement could be replicated on both flanks at once – one brigade moving to the Union right flank and another to the left – and the Union would be compelled to make an attack against equal numbers behind a stone wall as a defensive line. Instead, all we are told is that Jackson attacked “at Pritchard Hill and Sandy Ridge” - thus, as with most battles, the Union is permitted to fight on the defensive without their enemy attempting turning movements.
Over the course of the evening and night two more divisions arrive, thus resulting in a full Union corps dug in on a fortified hill position.

The result was that by mid-morning, the federal position resembled a U with slanted sides, with the base facing south across the Hill and the Ridge. The 1st division formed the right of the position, looking south and angled off to the northwest; the 2nd division the base, and the 3rd Division the left of the position, slanting off to the northeast. Petherbridge’s corps artillery and the 2nd division’s artillery were in the center, with some 48 guns. It was a very strong position, and we expected Jackson – whose battered infantry and cavalry had been reinforced by Ewell’s and Whiting’s divisions (D.H. Hill’s was still on the road from Staunton) to attack. By mid-day, when Whiting’s division had come up, General Jackson did just that.

It is not clear where the flanks of the position are, though oddly enough this one actually seems to be of the appropriate density – unlike other battles in this TL. If anything it may be somewhat over-dense.
The question that has to be asked, however, is why Jackson decides to attack again on the second day. It is now clear he is facing roughly ten times the force he was originally expecting to, and with four divisions to the Union three he has the numbers to e.g. send one or two divisions marching from New Town to White Post, then to Berryville, and subsequently aim to capture Summit Point and cut the Union rail line of communication. This is what Jackson excelled at during the Valley Campaign – using small forces to repeatedly mislead and cut off larger Union forces and force the diversion of massive reinforcements to chase him around the Valley – but here he obligingly spends two days battering his head against a strongly held position on the heights.

About noon, the enemy was seen approaching in columns along the Cedar Creek, Middle, and Valley roads, and Morell, Kimball, and Petherbridge, especially, prepared to receive them. About one o’clock the enemy advanced and opened fire from their artillery on the center and left of Morell, causing a few casualties in Morell’s division. His divisional artillery, under Captain Charles Griffin, and the corps artillery under Petherbridge opened a concentrated rapid fire, soon smashing one battery to pieces, silencing another, and driving his infantry and cavalry back in disarray. Additional attacks by brigade came in upon Morell, both on his center and left; upon Kimball’s men in the center; and upon Sykes’ right and center. In all cases, our artillery, admirably handled, and well-positioned on the heights, was generally sufficient to repel most of these efforts. When the rebel infantry pushed forward against the center in the late afternoon, Kimball’s brigades, especially Crawford’s regiments, fired from cover with a will, and sent the enemy reeling back with great loss.

The spasmodic although sometimes formidable attacks of our foe died down around 4 o’clock, at which point – as we learned later – Jackson ordered the assault to cease for the moment. About 5:30 o’clock, Hill’s arrival signaled a final, better coordinated effort, and soon afterward Jackson pressed forward his columns of infantry, first on the Valley Road against Sykes and then on the Middle Road against Kimball. I ordered Bayard’s cavalry toward the line, dismounted, to support Crawford and Tyler, and threw Bayard’s horse artillery battery onto Pritchard Hill to support Daum; the result was one of the most interesting imaginable. The havoc made by the rapidly bursting shells from guns arranged as to sweep any position far and near, and in any direction, was fearful to behold. Pressed to the extreme as they were, the courage of our men was sorely tried, but they confidently held against the best – or worst – the enemy could do.

And, of course, the Confederates show little if any finesse. They just attack and get shot to pieces “with great loss”.

By dusk, the rebels had fallen back into cover of the woods, easing back along the roads, and taking position south of the Kernstown Church road. We passed an anxious night, moving up ammunition, bringing off our wounded, and relieving the suffering of our foes where we could, but awaited the next day with some concern, not knowing if the whole of Johnston’s army was coming, or whether Jackson would attack again.

Little did we know, when the sun peeped over the Blue Ridge, that all we would find before us were Jackson’s dead and gravely wounded, and the wrack and ruin of a battlefield; the redoubtable “Stonewall,” having heard by telegraph from his chief of the looming threat at Centreville, had withdrawn south toward Strasburg, Massanutten Mountain, and the railroad.

The Battle of Kernstown was over, and the federal forces held the field.

The “looming threat” at Centreville would be all the more reason to try and divert forces from the main Army of the Potomac.



Conclusion
What we have seen here is a complete lack of understanding of Jackson's style of battle – he is reduced to a “pounder”, hammering a superior force head-on into the defences of an inferior one with great loss and achieving nothing, before withdrawing on what is apparently the 4^th of June to help reinforce Centreville against an attack which here is a “looming threat” yet which does not actually move out of its camps until “the end of June” and does not engage until some unknown time in July.

The use of Kernstown as the battle to copy (and then edit) also shows some distinct bias, as the rest of Jackson's Valley Campaign saw him running rings around several Union generals – not just Banks (who has been deleted) or Fremont (who has been reassigned to nowhere) but others as well. The Battles of McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester (the same place, but with Jackson making Banks retreat clear to Maryland), Cross Keys or Port Republic were all closer in time to this June battle, and many showcased Jackson's flair for fighting in the Valley. TFSmith has taken the only tactical Confederate defeat of the Valley Campaign and turned it into a strategic defeat as well – while either ignoring, or not noticing, details on the very same Wikipedia page he plagarized.