Battalions
While in the earlier portion of the timeline TFSmith harps on the way in which the British Army is unable to scrape together a dozen battalions to fight in North America by the thaw, in the later sections there is a smooth transition to a British Army so overwhelmed by the demands of war in America that it is having to recruit Canadians off the street.
The men – from Britain and Ireland, the Canadas and the Maritimes - who filled the ranks of Williams’ four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry had been assembled at great expense in the wide valley of the Saint Lawrence; the assembly would have been faster, except the British found themselves in what amounted to a two-front war, creating and sustaining both Williams’ force and Pennefather’s Army of New Brunswick, itself operating in Maine with three infantry divisions and a brigade each of cavalry and Marines. The total, some 26 brigades, was more than twice the size of the Army of the East that had fought in the Crimea, and the strain of sustaining expeditionary forces of such size was telling. Other than men, food, fodder, and some of the thousands of horses and draft animals necessary to sustain both armies, British North America could supply very little; shipping the vast majority of the necessary munitions and supplies across the North Atlantic, at the same time the Royal Navy was blockading the American coasts, escorting troop and supply convoys, hunting down American raiders, and maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean, East Indies, and around the world, was extremely costly. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Ewart Gladstone, is supposed to have quipped to Palmerston over the summer: “We may very well bankrupt the Americans, but we will most certainly bankrupt the Bank of England if this goes on.”(Chapter 9, part 3 – September 1862)
Quite apart from the question of bankruptcy (given that a Union bank run and near financial collapse took place even without a Trent war) or the characterization of the British as being in a two-front war (a reversal of reality that boggles the mind, due to the Union being manifestly in the middle of a two-front war and blockaded to boot) the picture of the British Army is distinctly odd.
We are told that the British Army is having to raise new battalions to avoid leaving places as diverse as India, Oahu and Ireland uncovered. In this light it may be instructive to look at the situation as of 1855 (during the Crimean War, well into the Siege of Sevastopol). For now no consideration of the Rifle Volunteers will be made, and infantry will be examined.
During the Crimean War, the British Army consisted mostly of 1 battalion infantry regiments numbered up to 99. There were eight total Guards battalions (with three forming the Brigade of Guards and the rest at home) and the 1st, 12th, 60th and 91st had two separate battalions. In total there were 105 infantry battalions aside from the Guards (but counting the two battalions of the Rifle Brigade).
The force at home in Britain consisted of the Guards (5 battalions), along with the 51st Foot, 56th Foot, 80th Foot and 82nd Foot (4 battalions). The rest of the duties of garrison were handled by the militia, and some of the militia regiments were under orders for foreign service.
The force in the Crimea consisted of the Guards (3 battalions) along with the 1/1st, 4th, 7th, 9th, 14th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 34th, 38th, 39th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, 46th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 68th, 71st, 77th, 79th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 1/91st, 93rd, 95th and 97th, and both battalions of the Rifle Brigade (41 battalions) – total army size 44 battalions. (Later another few would be sent, see below.)
Elsewhere in the world were a total of 50 battalions, plus local troops.
ED: As per a comment, later there were 51 battalions at the maximum.
Light Division: 7th, 23rd, 33rd, 34th, 2/RB; 19th, 77th, 88th and 97th (9)
1st Division: 3/Gren Gds, 1/Coldsm Gds, 1/SF Gds; 9th, 13th, 31st and 56th (7)
2nd Division: 3rd, 30th, 55th, 95th; 41st, 47th, 49th and 62nd (8)
3rd Division: 4th, 28th, 50th; 18th, 38th and 44th (6)
4th Division: 17th, 20th, 21st, 57th, 63rd; 46th, 48th, 68th and 1/RB (9)
Highland Division: 42nd, 79th, 92nd, 93rd; 1/1st, 2/1st, 71st, 72nd and 90th (8)
Warren's Brigade: 14th, 39th, 82nd and 89th (4)
This would reduce the "rest of the world" figure to somewhere in the forties. (It is not a straight reduction of seven since, as we can see from the above, the 2nd regiment at least raised their 2nd battalion during this time.)
During BROS, there are seven British infantry divisions in North America. It is not clear how many of these are locally raised Canadian troops, but we know from the Berthierville orders of battle that there are at least some.
If these seven divisions are on the British pattern, it should be 14 brigades of infantry; however we have seen in the past that TFSmith has trouble with this concept and it should be assumed there are 21 brigades present (63 infantry battalions) - with the cavalry division, cavalry brigade and marine brigade also mentioned, and assuming three cavalry brigades per division, there are 26.
This, as we can see, is not twice the size of the Army of the East. It is perhaps twice the size of the force which landed at Eupatoria (which contained 31 infantry battalions) but TFSmith has deleted the 20 reinforcement battalions which arrived over the course of the siege. Instead, it is merely 12 battalions stronger - about a 25% increase.
The British Army as of 1861 and 1862 OTL was considerably larger than the army of 1854. Due to the expansion of the army post-Mutiny and post-Crimea, the British army's infantry component was structured as follows in 1861:
The Guards were as strong as before (8 battalions)
The 100th regiment had been raised. (100 battalions)
The 1st through 25th regiments of foot were 2 battalion regiments (25 “second” battalions)
The 60th was a four-battalion regiment (3 battalions of the 60th not designated “first”)
and the Rifle Brigade was four battalions strong (4 battalions)
The total number of non-Guards battalions at the end of these changes (which do not incorporate the amalgamation with the East India Company troops) was 132 – an increase of 27 over the situation during the Crimean War. As such the army described above by TFSmith (which at 63 battalions would actually be five British army corps and a spare brigade, if composed entirely of British regulars – which it is not) is entirely within the capabilities of the British Army at a “Crimean” level of commitment.
During 1862 another nine battalions were added to the list (101st through 109th foot) – these being old HEIC troops. "Sepoys" or regiments of Indians were not part of the regular army list.
We are also told in BROS that, for want of troops, the depots are being raided in order to raise extra battalions – in quite startling profusion:
“Correct; simply to replace the battalions stripped from the Mediterranean for North America, and those taken from Africa and the East for service in the Eastern Pacific, requires ten battalions; replacing the one taken from the Channel Islands, adding any more to the force in British Columbia, reinforcing the armies in North America, and rebuilding some sort of reserve here at home requires scores more,” Cornewall-Lewis said. “The only way to do so was to tap the depots and their staffs, call up officers from half-pay and the reserve, and pensioners for non-commissioned officers, and then fill up the battalions with new recruits and volunteers from the Yeomanry and Militia.”(December 1862)
“And that has not been simple or economical, has it?” Stanley asked.
“No, not at all; there are 23 infantry depots; even raising two new battalions from each depot, which provides a second battalion to the 26th through 59th and the 61st through 72nd regiments of foot, gives us 46; add those to the three remaining regular battalions, and we have 49,” Cornewall-Lewis said. “And the depots still have to provide replacements for the battalions overseas, of course.”
Stanley was quiet for a moment.
“Forty-six new battalions in eight months – even with cadre from the depots, and veterans of one stripe or another, they are not the equivalent of the regulars, are they?” he asked. “Where are they being sent?”
“No, they are not,” Cornewall-Lewis replied. “As during the Russian war, we will be using them to fill up the garrisons, here and elsewhere, for the most part. Six battalions to the Mediterranean, six more out east, one to the Channel Islands; the other 36 to form four new divisions, of nine battalions each, plus a brigade of artillery, which gives us a force here at home to form a reserve worth the name.”
There is no logical reason for the British to retain 36 battalions at home during a war - as we've seen, in the Crimea they stuck with the Guards and a single overstrength brigade at home. There's also no practical reason for them to send six east and six to the Mediterranean, and the battalion sent to the Channel Islands is simply baffling – Jersey is a depot, not a garrison station, and no battalions were present there during the Crimean War (not even militia).
In any case, if the British had raised an extra 46 battalions of infantry in 1862 over their OTL numbers of 1861, then (at 178 battalions of non-Guards infantry compared to the Crimean tally of 105) the British Army in North America should quite comfortably consist of roughly a hundred battalions – an amount which allows for 17-24 more battalions to be around the world as garrison than took place during the Crimea. With the incorporation of the HEIC troops, that number of “excess” rises to 28-35.
In short, if the British Army is under greater strain than it was in the Crimea, during BROS, then there should be nearly twice as many troops in America as we are shown – and this is before counting the Canadian militia and volunteers who should have shown up.
The truly amazing thing about this is that, in his efforts to present the British Army as small and overstrained, TFSmith has created a situation where the British Army has nearly two hundred infantry battalions (irrespective of the colonial forces). This is larger than the British Army just before the Boer War (153 counting Guards and some colonial forces).
Logistics
The logistics picture is little better. We are told that Canada can supply
men, food, fodder, and some of the thousands of horses and draft animals necessary to sustain both armiesand that this is a minor detail. In fact, it is anything but; food and fodder are the largest draw on the logistics of an army of the Civil War period, with munitions being a minor matter by comparison – indeed, on campaign the Army of the Potomac of 1863 used half their wagons for food and half for everything else.The logistics line from Britain to Canada is essentially the same length as that from Britain to the Crimea, and the British have the additional benefit of a local population able to perform some simple duties (like carpentry). There's also the amusing point that a lot of the supplies the British would be using in this war are the ones they sold to the Union.
Real numbers
In fact, it is not very hard to find 63 battalions for North America. If one is willing to draw down the Mediterranean and other quiet garrisons, it is quite possible to put together 63 battalions even without incorporating any Canadian volunteers:
Pre-crisis 6 + RCR
1/17th
30th
47th
4/60th
62nd
63rd
RCR
Ordered out OTL 18
1/GG
2/CG (my mistake from earlier)
2/SFG
1/10th
1/11th
2/12th
1/15th
1/16th
2/16th
2/17th
2/20th
36th
45th
55th
58th
76th
96th
1/Rifles
Running total 24
Second wave (troops up to strength not alerted OTL) 17
1/8th
2/18th
2/19th
2/21st
2/25th
26th
29th
31st
32nd
41st
49th
53rd
1/60th
61st
78th
84th
86th
Running total 41
Third wave (troops recruiting up to strength OTL) 9
2/1st
1/2nd
1/3rd
1/5th
1/24th
37th
64th
73rd
87th
Running total 50
Troops from the Mediterranean (leaving four regular battalions) 11
2/2nd
1/9th
2/6th
2/7th
2/8th
1/25th
2/3rd
2/15th
1/22nd
2/23rd
4/Rifles
Running total 61
Odds and Sods
2/5th (from Mauritius, leaving one battalion)
85th (from the Cape, leaving three battalions)
Total 63 battalions of regulars, of which roughly forty can be in Canada as soon as there are ships to carry them and militia to replace them. India has not been touched, nor have any colonies actually at risk.
If TFSmith had shown a proper appreciation for the size of the British Army, then Burnished Rows of Steel would not only have been more accurate but also more exciting and less predictable. It would, however, have been a lot less of a walkover for the Americans.
ReplyDeleteLight Division: 7th, 23rd, 33rd, 34th, 2/RB; 19th, 77th, 88th and 97th (9)
1st Division: 3/Gren Gds, 1/Coldsm Gds, 1/SF Gds; 9th, 13th, 31st and 56th (7)
2nd Division: 3rd, 30th, 55th, 95th; 41st, 47th, 49th and 62nd (8)
3rd Division: 4th, 28th, 50th; 18th, 38th and 44th (6)
4th Division: 17th, 20th, 21st, 57th, 63rd; 46th, 48th, 68th and 1/RB (9)
Highland Division: 42nd, 79th, 92nd, 93rd; 1/1st, 2/1st, 71st, 72nd and 90th (8)
Warren's Brigade: 14th, 39th, 82nd and 89th (4)
= 51 Bns
Originally the 12 battalions sent in winter 1854/5 were intended to be two more divisions, but the British prioritised keeping divisions at fighting strength. Instead of making extra formations as the winter took its toll they added the new battalions to existing formations.
This equates to 17 brigades or 8 divisions and a spare brigade, or the infantry of 4.25 corps de armee.
Ah, I must have been using a Stations of the Army from before some of the reinforcements arrived. It of course strengthens the argument even more as it means the nation-crippling 63 battalions is only twelve over the Crimean maximum.
DeleteCorrecting now.