Unaccounted for and not present

“As of February 15, our forces present for duty numbered 498,153 officers and men... it does not include those sick, absent, or on detached duty, or any state troops, militia, or auxiliaries...

“These numbers are from before the troop movements that began this past week, but on the 15th, the Department of the Potomac reported 212,000 present for duty; the Missouri, 109,000; the Ohio, 73,000; and Western Virginia, 17,000…”

This is not true, or at any rate not historical.

The Union Army used several terms to refer to their unit strength. The ones used officially in reports were “Present for Duty” (men with the regiment at the muster, including those who would be detached to some other duties instead of being in the fighting front), “Aggregate Present” (which includes other troops on other duties, those who were away for multiple days for example) and “Aggregate Present and Absent” (which was everyone still formally part of the regimental numbers; that is, those who had not died or been discharged).

The 15 February 1862 report of strength gives very similar numbers to the ones TFSmith quotes as Present For Duty, but as “aggregate” (i.e. Aggregate Present and Absent or Aggregate Present).

The number on page 891 shows that the 498,153 number is the sum of several smaller numbers, including 92,221 for the Army of the Ohio. However, on page 890 we can see that the number of 92,221 for the Army of the Ohio includes sick and absent, and separates them out in a different row – TFSmith has reduced the count for the Army of the Ohio to 73,000 to account for this, but in his grand total he adds them back again. This shows that he knew the 498,153 number must include at least some sick or absent.

Even using the 73,000 figure for the Army of the Ohio, however, does not accurately represent the real Present for Duty – men on logistical duty would be considered Present (not Absent) but not Present For Duty.

This example, and the language in the report, show that the 498,153 number is somewhere between Aggregate Present And Absent or Aggregate Present. It also shows us that there are no additional volunteer troops raised by the middle of February – as such, all formations should be either historic or cannibalized from existing fortifications.

The implications of this are hard to overstate. It means that it is possible to calculate the theoretical sizes of the Union and Confederate armies based on historical numbers – and it means that TFSmith's claim of the 498,000 Present for Duty overstates the reality by roughly 75,000 men, a force equal to or greater than that dispatched to fight the British and/or conquer Canada.

Not only is TFSmith overstating the regulars here, but in other places we also see him overstate the militia (e.g. Vermont, Maine and New York) in order to make the Union a harder target – no US army troops are sent to the coast to defend it. On top of this, we also know that TFSmith's approach to handling the armed forces of Canada is to minimize their contribution. His approach to handling the British Army is to delay them by months and then insist that no more can be sent – while also removing most of the militia.

It appears that TFSmith's answer to the problem of how the Union fights a second opponent at the same time as the Confederacy is to produce roughly 120,000 well-trained, well-armed and well-motivated troops from thin air (as well as upgrading most existing troops to being well-trained and well-armed), while at the same time delaying or deleting 50,000 British infantry, most of the British militia, and removing between 50,000 and 100,000 British North America militia from existence.

Needless to say, this would not work in a real war, and TFSmith's claims of accuracy take a fatal hit when the whole is considered. Strategic problems tend to go away if the favoured side gets a net advantage of roughly 200,000 troops (or more) over the historical position.