La Résistance(1)

Now throughout the story we are assured that there are multiple deep and dangerous fractures within the Province of Canada, and there was little which could be done to stop this. Though why take the author's word at this, he hasn't been very on point with Canadian personalities and politics before, so let's examine this.

As previously mentioned, the trio that supposedly found this resistance is an unlikely one. Composed of two Lower Canadian politicians who have zero to few connections in Canada West, and it seems largely based around the Francophone minority. Lincoln makes mention of "friends" north of the border, but who they are is left vague and mysterious. The only serious look we get at this rebel group at first comes from the fall of Montreal:

…as Heintzelman’s forces advanced northward along the Richelieu and Grant’s eastward along the lakes and then the upper Saint Lawrence, the same divisions within the province’s elites that had led to the 1837 and 1838 rebellions, the destruction of Parliament in 1849, and the Annexationist Manifesto the same year – the same divisions, ultimately, that could be traced to the conquest in 1763 – arose yet again. The split between Anglophones and Francophones, the opposing interests of the countryside and the towns, and divisions between loyalists and Patriotes – led by les rouges – became manifest. The opinion that Britain had blundered into a war that would be fought almost entirely in the countryside of the Province was widespread, among both Anglophones and Francophones; even the statements of loyalty by Canadien leaders like Tache were couched in terms like “conservative values.” Political opposition to the proposed Militia Act and provincial funding of an active duty force had continued up to the very day of the battle of Rouse’s Point, and although a high percentage of Anglophones turned out for the various militia musters, Francophones were much less active; the provincial troops’ defeat at Limestone Ridge generally dampened militia spirit across the province. The supposed statement by Monck that “once we start the war, they will fall into line” turned out to be rumor – but it was believed because so many suspected that was exactly why London had ordered the invasion.

The result, of course, increasingly was chaos, encouraged and expanded by the efforts of the Patriotes and their American allies; the American decision to free all Canadian militia prisoners on parole was a masterstroke, while the activities of de Trobriand’s ring, operating from Plattsburgh, are well known. The execution of Duffie after his arrest accomplished the triple feat of giving both the Americans, the Canadien rebels, and the French a martyr; nothing could have more poorly thought through, and the recriminations after the fact between the British military, the Governor-General’s staff, and the provincial civil government and militia staff only reinforced the confused state of leadership and politics in the province. Additional executions would come, especially in Canada East (Lower Canada), as they had in 1838, which however lawful under the laws of war, only deepened the divide between Anglophone and Francophone populations in the province.

 Now this section is highly confusing. As we have seen, the supposed leaders of this "movement" are an unlikely duo, one who was never apart of it OTL, and the other in self enforced exile and had been for the last 8 years. Where they get the resources to recreate the long dead Patriote movement seemingly overnight, is somewhat baffling. Mind you, the author has mis-characterized the rebellion of 1837-38 as a "blood bath" for some reason. Despite the United States executing more men of the Saint Patrick Battalion in Mexico in one day than the British executed in sum total for the rebellion.

However, these are traitors against the United States, so it is obviously justified.

Apparently the execution of Duffie, which is only mentioned now, gives Americans, Canadiens, and the French(??) a martyr. This is a curious case, since he was neither American nor Canadien, and most likely the French would have been rather non pulsed at his execution. Alfred Napoleon Duffie was a deserter from the French army, and known more for getting in trouble with the provost martial than anything else in 1862. Quite frankly he probably would have made a terrible spy. Why a great number of Frenchmen in France would care about him, or Canadiens for that matter, is beyond me, especially if he's hung as a spy.

We are also told about a British officer and a French woman, but as previously pointed out, such an interaction would be impossible by the author's own timeline. So what awful actions are supposed to drive the French to rebellion I'm not sure.

But unfathomably it takes place anyways:

 As Heintzelman’s 30,000 troops began to dig in around Montreal, Bishop Ignace Bourget’s pastoral letter was read in the city on 24 May, echoing Bishop Lartigue’s in 1837, and urging the Quebecois “not to be seduced by those who want to entice you into rebellion against the established government, especially to the benefit of these foreign puppets and American Protestants.” In response, 1,200 Patriotes massed in front of the cathedral, singing the Marseillaiseand Lavallee’s Entendez-vous les gens chantent? before chanting “Long Live Papineau!” 

The response, from the British point of view, was disastrous: a company of volunteer militia from the recently organized 4th Volunteer Rifle Battalion (Chasseurs Canadiens) was ordered to disperse the crowd; pushing and shoving led to a fistfights and clubbed rifles, and some of the Chasseurs refused to act against the Patriotes; instead, a company of the Anglophone 3rd Volunteer Rifle Battalion (Victoria Rifles) marched into the square with fixed bayonets. Within a few minutes, shots had been fired; eventually, more than 100 Patriotes and soldiers were dead or wounded; rioting spread across the city, and Russell had to pull troops from his perimeter to try and quash the disorder within Montreal.

A pro-Papineau crowd is rather confusing. 1,200 of them is overly generous to boot. However these "riots" are an interesting occurrence in a besieged city, one which wouldn't have much reason to love the Americans. Historically even mutinous riots within the district were quelled rather easily, whether it was the Lachine Riot in 1812, or even the numerous street fights in the post rebellion era (and notably the most violent one of all was led by Tories who were angry about clemency for the rebels in 1849!). With the post-rebellion period government in place, the victory of Reform politicians from the 1840s onwards, and Papineau's self imposed exile, who precisely is holding aloft the torch for rebellion here?

We get one hint at the end:

Papineau entered the city. Walking across the Place d’ Armes, in concert with Grant, Heintzelman, Hooker, Kearny, de Trobriand, de Joinville, Abbott, McCaul, Dessaulles, and Dorion, he marched to the cathedral’s steps, turned, and proclaimed:“Vive le Quebec! Vive le Canada Libre! Vive les Etats-Unis! This is a day of destiny!”

So we've got the usual Abbot, and McCaul, odd ones out already. Then we get some other hints at whose running this rebellion. We have Antoine Dorion, leader of the Parti Rouges in Canadian politics, and  Louis Antoine Dessaulles, one of the editors of the Rouge newspaper Le Pays.

Neither are particularly surprising or inspired sources. Dorion is a tad surprising as he was risk adverse after the collapse of his government (infamously falling in 3 days, an event known as the Double Shuffle in Canadian history) and not an ardent supporter of annexation. Dessaulles at least is a blood relation (nephew) of Papineau, explaining his faith in his discredited uncle. However, was his newspaper really behind him?

In December 1861 they posted this:

“In that case what ought the population of this country to do? To this question there can be but one answer: ‘March to the defence of our territory, provided we are furnished with arms, and our experienced militia be sustained by a regular army.’ There is no reason to fear that, in these respects, England will make default.”[1]

A far cry from welcoming invasion. Indeed the average French habitant of Canada East, through tradition and ideology, was opposed to Americans. They who were not amiable to their deeply conservative Catholic beliefs, and who had a decided history of swallowing up the French.

It is notable that in 1775 and 1812-15 they demonstrated at best ambivalence to the US troops who crossed the border, and at worst outright hostility as they joined the militia and fought them off. Why this is somehow changed in 1862 is never adequately explained, nor do we get much reason why they don't rally to the colors on the British side that makes any sense.

This is but the first case though of French Canadians acting counter to their own traditions and interest purely for the benefit of the Union. We shall get more into that at a later date.

Furthermore in Chapter 7 Part 1 we have the mention that the Papineau-Abbot government has moved to Ottawa in an effort to begin recruiting English speakers to their cause. How this government, which should be effectively broke, who have no legitimacy or authority are going to do that is never explicitly addressed. One is left to assume they only then control the area on the point of American bayonets.

Otherwise it's an amusing question how they would have dealt with the militiamen of the 1st Militia District of Upper Canada. The Ottawa rifle companies in particular. One assumes harsh language.

In part 2 we shall examine the nature of the "Provisional Government" (such as it is) as it forms and equips men at American expense.

1] Quoted from "Canadian Public Opinion on the American Civil War", by Helen G. MacDonald. pg 121-122.