The Full Monty

At the risk of boring the readers of this blog, there are some more problems with the battle at Rouse's point which we really need to talk about. These articles will be kept as short and punchy as possible, but there really is a lot wrong with this battle. These articles will proceed in a hopefully reasonably logical progression, through the Union defences to the British plans and the course of the battle. Our first concern is the Union position at Fort Montgomery.

This series of articles will attempt to avoid discussing the problems which have already been highlighted; however, for the benefit of those who are not already familiar with these problems, links have been provided. These problems include:

• the complete absence of historical British reinforcements 
• the misuse of historical precedents in framing the battle
• the non-existence of Canadian militia formations
• numerous mistakes in the descriptions of Union formations 
• the existence of a railway between Plattsburgh and Rouse's Point
• reinforcements arriving by steamer across a frozen lake.

Fort Montgomery

Fort Montgomery was constructed slowly, between 1841 and 1871, in the border town of Rouse's Point, for the purpose of securing Union control over the upper end of Lake Champlain. It has a relatively standard layout:

• The causeway connects the fort to the mainland
• The covered face is an earthen mound built up to protect the landward face of the fort
• A bridge spans the moat between the covered face and the fort itself, entering through a guardhouse.
• The stone fort contains guns in mountings on the ramparts (barbettes) and holes in the walls (embrasures and casemates). 
• The protrusions on the corners of the fort (bastions) allow guns and riflemen to shoot across the face of the walls, to prevent attackers from hiding.

In Chapter 3, part 2, we are told that

The frozen ground made extensive earthworks almost impossible, but Fort Montgomery – what amounted to an artificial island in the northwest corner of the lake – had been put into order, as had the covered face, a half-built but existing earthwork that defended the shore approaches to Montgomery.

Chapter 3, part 1 earlier clarified that

Men in blue greatcoats stood guard on the stone ramparts of the fort... The muzzles of artillery pieces shone in the embrasures

The latter comment is confirmed later, when we are told that the ground is 'well covered by artillery emplaced in the fort, on the reverse of the covered face, and in the village.' However, when you dig into the sources, it rapidly becomes clear that it would simply have been impossible to cover the land with guns from the fort. In fact, the landward face was the least advanced section of a fort that was not ready to mount any guns whatsoever.

The fort was designed for 76 10in guns, 10 32pdrs, 40 24pdr howitzers, and 10 mortars. In 1859/60, it 'could be put in a condition, at short notice, to receive thirty-four howitzers and twenty-six guns'; however, it would require 'regular appropriations' and 'four years' to bring the fort to completion. In November 1861, the Chief Engineer was asking for $100,000 to 'prepare the fort for most of its armament': however, despite an infusion of $900,000 to fund the northern defences, by October 1862 the fort mounted only one third of its guns. It was not until 1866-67 that the final and topmost layer of defences, the barbette platforms on the ramparts, had their masonry laid.

Could Fort Montgomery have mounted guns when TFSmith suggests it could? Not according to the Chief Engineer. In December 1861, he reported that 'by the opening of the lake [it] will be prepared to mount a number of heavy guns'. However - as has been made clear - the lake was not open by the time of the battle. It matters little whether this means that the weather was too bad to work on the fort itself, or if the frozen lake made it impossible to bring heavy guns up the lake and into the fort via its piers: in the midst of panic, the Chief Engineer did not consider that the fort could be made ready.

We can also conclude that the landward defences were still incomplete. In 1858/59, only the foundations of the guard-house had been laid; little progress was made in 1859/60 and 1860/61, and in 1861/62 most work went into Curtain II and not the landward Curtain III. At the start of the war, the landward walls were only 18 feet high: the parapet of the landward side would be completed in 1866-67, in line with the four years which the Chief Engineer had expected it to take.


Unfortunately, TFSmith is not content with magically completing the landward face of Fort Montgomery. He has to demonstrate Union ingenuity by explaining how they 'emplaced several rifled guns in embrasures cut into the covered face', which do terrible damage to the British. However, this is a terrible idea which suggests that TFSmith does not understand contemporary fortifications.

The covered face has two purposes. Firstly, it  protects the masonry walls of the fort by absorbing fire from landward siege guns. Secondly, it provides cover for riflemen covering the causeway. It is not intended to mount artillery, and contemporary illustrations make it clear why this is the case. Firstly, it would be almost impossible to manoeuvre heavy artillery pieces one at a time across the narrow bridge and back into the fort in the heat of combat. Either the enemy would capture and spike them before this could be done, or the guns would have to abandon their position so early that it would be a waste of time cutting the embrasures in the first place. Secondly, the covered face is so narrow that the recoil of a typical artillery piece would likely send the guns toppling into the moat when they were fired. The narrowness of the covered face, and the unsuitability of the bridge, can be seen in Sgt. Thomas Bourke's south view over the moat

However, this is not the only howler which TFSmith commits in respect of improvised Union defences- as we shall see shortly.