British Militia: Missing in Action

We've already seen that TFSmith has deleted from his TL almost all Canadian militia, based on mis-readings of historical sources and a misfounded belief that the Canadians were yearning to shake off the British yoke. However, he appears to have also deleted the British auxiliary forces from his TL. The reasons for this are unclear- it may be another misunderstanding, or it may be a deliberate attempt to invent sufficient strategic difficulties for the British to allow him to justify their pitiful deployment in North America.

In Chapter 15, part 1, we are told that the British have raised 48 new regular battalions, of which 20 are providing overseas garrisons and 28 have been retained in the UK to provide a 'strategic reserve and home defence force- other than the militia.' We are not told why it is considered necessary to provide a home defence force other than the militia, when the British were perfectly happy for the militia to perform this role historically. On 1 April 1856, the British had nine regular infantry battalions at home and 109 embodied militia regiments at home.


At the same date, the British also had 10 embodied militia regiments in the Mediterranean. This was not limited by the number of available regiments, as 33 English, four Scottish and twelve Irish battalions volunteered for service. As such, it would have been perfectly feasible to fulfil all the garrison requirements with militia rather than new regulars.  By TFSmith's own estimates, therefore, the British could have sent 20 garrison battalions and 19 of their 'strategic reserve' battalions to the Americas.

Moreover, in 1856 the British had not yet formed their Rifle Volunteers, whose role was explicitly to act as a home defence force. The presence of the Rifle Volunteers, numbering 162,935 in 1863, would have dramatically simplified Britain's home defence requirements. In the Boer War, the number of British regular battalions at home also fell to nine; however, the existence of the Rifle Volunteers meant that 68 militia battalions could go overseas. Here, the British have 28 regular battalions, all the militia, and all the Rifle Volunteers at home, with no commensurate threat to face- at the same time as they risk losing Canada.

The militia is also overlooked when it comes to battle casualty replacements. In version two of the TL, we are told that 'even keeping the two armies [in America] up to strength means recruiting men off the street here and in Ireland and Britain'. This is amended from version one, which simply stated that 'even keeping the two armies up to strength means recruiting men here and in Ireland and Britain'. Unfortunately, this amendment makes even less sense. Historically, 41,419 militiamen joined the army or marines between 1854 and 1856 and 30,123 between 1856 and 1859; in 1889-1902, 74,217 militiamen did so. In TFSmith's timeline, there are 162,935 Rifle Volunteers, perhaps 90,000 militia, and perhaps 30,000 newly-formed regular troops in the UK. Yet none of these already-trained troops are volunteering for service in the Americas, and the British are recruiting untrained men in Canada and thrusting them into the ranks.

This whole situation is complete nonsense. Its entire purpose is to distract the reader: to create non-existent problems for the British, which in turn overshadow the very real problems the Union has. The British struggle to meet their strategic requirements in a one-front war: the Union have no problem switching troops away from fighting the Confederacy to attack the British. The British complain about 'recruiting men off the street,' leading the reader to forget that the Union has no way to reinforce its own armies other than to recruit entire regiments of men off the street. Throw enough dust in the eyes of the reader, and you can get away with almost any nonsense.