Outside Quadrat Problem

In the preamble, TFSmith states:

Not everything used as inspiration occurred exactly as written, but the events so referenced were generally all within a reasonable time period – say, a professional man’s career – of two decades (either side) of the story that follows.

This is already a problematic idea, as it has turned out to mean that any incidence of incompetence for two decades either side of the Civil War is fair game for appropriation and adjustment to fit.
There is one in particular, however, which is far more egregious than this – for it certainly falls outside the two decade limit.




This takes place in a section of the timeline which has not been revised, at least not on my usual source, and is part of the December 1862 battle south of New York.

Farragut was able to cross Hope’s T, raking the two British flagships from almost straight ahead with his seven largest ships, while the ironclads steamed into the gaps between the British ships; this is what led to the losses ofGalena and Monitor, but also forced the nine British ships to deal with close-range fire from the ten smaller American ironclads while the big ships under Farragut and Bailey put in shot and shell from more than 100 guns, steaming east to west across the top of the British formation.

Galena was simply blown apart, and Resistance, with her ram bow, had intentionally struck Monitor, leaving the little turret ship flooding; as Resistance, under Capt. William C. Chamberlain, backed away, however, the three British ships following behind, Erebus, Terror, and Thunderbolt, had turn aside to avoid collision. Even so, Worden’s and Taylor’s ships were suffering heavily when damage to Warrior’s unprotected steering gear sent the big frigate into a looping turn to starboard and towards Cochrane’s line; Resistance, moving around the sinking Monitor to catch up with Cochrane aboard Defense, was struck by Warrior. The big 9000-ton frigate, moving at almost 13 knots, crashed into her smaller 6000-ton consort; the collision left both ships dead in the water and sinking, their destruction hurried along by intense fire from the American ironclads whose guns could bear on the two British ships. Warrior’s captain, Commander George Tryon, had been her second-in-command since the big ship was commissioned; when her captain, Capt. Hon. Arthur Cochrane, CB, was promoted to command the inshore ironclad squadron, Tryon was the obvious choice to take command, despite his age. As Warrior sank, Tryon went down with his ship, his last reported words being “It is all my fault.”

This causes several questions to arise.
One of them is where on earth the US got ten ironclads, since in reality at this time the Passaic class was just entering commission and had been dreadfully rushed to do so; another is why Warrior was moving at full speed (faster than the other ships in the British fleet); another is that the tactical situation involves Farragut comprehensively outmanoeuvring the British and the British not simply turning to open their own broadsides. (The intended parallel is Lissa, but at Lissa the ships who attempted to cross the T were the ones to make major screw ups.) It also falls foul of "Trafalgar Syndrome", where all fictional British naval battles are (often failed) attempts at Trafalgar again.
But the biggest point of complaint is that this is an essentially direct parallel – verging on parody – of the loss of the Victoria. This event took place under Tryon's command in 1893, and involved a misjudged turn which sent one ship (Camperdown) ramming another (Victoria) and the loss of the Victoria. (Camperdown survived the impact, and indeed was broken up in 1911.)



The set of contrivances to achieve the double sinking of the Warrior and Resistance is remarkable. Firstly, the Warrior's captain must be promoted and the second-in-command elevated (when in reality Cochrane commanded Warrior for her entire commission, and when at this point Tryon was thirty.

Secondly, the steering gear of Warrior must be heavily damaged, enough to lock her on a turning course at full speed. This seems unlikely, not least because Warrior is supposed to be under control and staying in line with the slow Crimean ironclads – the reason the incident with the Camperdown took place is that the ships were supposed to be passing very close together, so nobody realized they should reverse engines until just before the collision. Here Warrior is hit and randomly swerves out of line at full power - something which may not actually be possible, if Warrior did not have full steam power on.
(Even if the Union gunners were aiming for the stern, Warrior is not especially vulnerable – only a relative handful of ironclads had a full length armoured belt, and no wood-sided ships did – and the actual steering gear is below the waterline, so protected from damage.)

Thirdly, Warrior must be retroactively fitted with a ram. The Warrior class possessed no rams, and the form of their stem is quite turned down – there is nothing projecting below the waterline to act as a ram. The impact should cause a lot of surprise, but has no way to put Resistance in a sinking condition or to damage her engines beyond shock.

Fourthly, the concussion of impact must also disable Warrior's engines – engines several hundred feet from the actual contact point – and put her in a sinking condition as well. This is hard to understand.

Fifthly, the high-freeboard, compartmentalized British ships must be sunk quickly when in the original incident the watertight hatches and doors of the low-freeboard Victoria were open due to the heat. This is unlikely to be the case in December in 1862 – and even if the bow of Warrior was completely ripped open, she would only sink about a foot. She is even still fightable – to sink the Warrior you have to hole her below the waterline inside her armoured box, and enough to defeat her compartments. (Resistance has compartmentalization as well.)

And, finally, this incident is thirty-one years early. It is too far out of place even for TFSmith's mission statement of taking anything exploitable from twenty years either side.



This display of rank, ahistorical incompetence and outrageous ill luck is not the sort of thing that has a place in a realistic timeline or view of history. It is simply the British putting two of their powerful ironclads into battle – ironclads which have spent the last several months just sitting outside Maine and doing nothing – and crashing them into one another like dodgems. This done, they promptly sink by themselves, thus granting the Union a major strategic victory it is unable to achieve by itself.