La Résistance(2)

In the last chapter we saw the Canadians ahistorically revolt in order to help a Union invasion, and then move to establish a "Provisional Government" in the recognized capital at Ottawa. We had to brush under the rug what legitimacy and funding they were supposed to have and instead move on to their next mention.  This does not take place until Chapter 9 Part 1 when we are laying the scene for the Berthierville campaign.


The first act of the author is to spell out his erroneous view of French Canadian loyalty:

Although the country people were devout Catholics and deeply conservative, the prewar connections with the States made a difference when war broke out in April; very few of the sedentary militia had responded with enthusiasm to their call-ups, and the percentage of Canadiens in the volunteers – always low since the force’s organization in 1855 as an Anglophone-dominated service, with many traditions drawn from the units that had helped put down the 1837 and 1838 rebellions - had not risen significantly. The reality of how the war began, with the failed British attack at Rouse’s Point, had done even less to carry French Canada to the cause; unlike 50 years earlier, the Americans had not attacked first, and there were already thousands of men of Canadien extraction in the U.S. forces by the winter of 1861-62.

Factually, we know this has a faulty basis. We know the Trent Affair historically outraged citizens across Canada, French and English, and that even the nominally "radical" party was opposed to an American invasion. Here, as was pointed out before, an American ship fired on a British ship, so there's no question of who shot first, and the idea the British "started it" is absolutely ludicrous with the author having to jump through numerous hoops to make this feat of mental gymnastics work.

From there the author offers this little tidbit:

The subsequent months of crisis and then war had split Francophone Canada, as it had split the Anglophone community in the Province; for every ultramontane like Étienne-Paschal Taché, who declared his loyalty to the crown publicly from the steps of Notre-Dame de Québec - with the archbishop in attendance - and tried to rally the militia where the British flag still flew, there was a patriote like Louis-Joseph Papineau, pursuing the age-old dream of “Canadien” nationalism and rallying his followers, in many cases under the green-white-red tricolor of the ’37 rising.

The author is trying to have it both ways. He seems to think that there is something like an even split amongst radicals and loyalists in the Province, or that there was something like that all the way back in 1837. This is a piece of fiction, one easily dismissed.

Even at the height of their power and popularity in 1837-38 the leaders of the rebellions (William Lyon Mackenzie, and Wolfred Nelson, Papineau ducked out instead of fighting) managed to, between them, raise approximately 3,000 Canadians to fight for their cause, Some 2,500 in Canada East and 500 in Canada West. This is absent the many Americans recruited to keep the fight going through 1838 by a series of ineffectual skirmishes. As a note, accurate numbers are hard to pin down since few records were kept by the rebels themselves, and at the battles many rebels would slip away before the fighting began.

The loyalist militias on the other hand, raised some 33,000 men in response to raids of 1837-38. That's roughly ten times the number who were willing to take up arms against the crown. So perhaps a more accurate quote would read like so:

The subsequent months of crisis and then war had seen a schism in the Province; for every patriote like Louis-Joseph Papineau, pursuing the unclear goal of republic and rallying his followers, in many cases under the green-white-red tricolor of the ’37, there were 10 ultramontanes and loyalists like Étienne-Paschal Taché, who declared his loyalty to the crown publicly from the steps of Notre-Dame de Québec - with the archbishop in attendance - and rallied the militia where the British flag still flew.

 However, since this would completely undermine the skewed story the author is attempting to tell, one can see why he would like to gloss over this piece of history. The rebels being outnumbered 10-1 by loyalists wouldn't be a suitable enough force for the Americans to exploit.

Next though we get a concrete look at just who is apparently running the government:

In this, Grant and Webster both worked closely with Papineau, currently serving as deputy premier to John J.C. Abbott; both were in Ottawa trying to pull together a government from various factions of Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, but focusing on the signatories of the 1849 Annexation Manifesto, ranging from the Montreal business magnates John Redpath and William Molson to the Canadien legislator and Parti Rouge stalwart Antoine-Aimé Dorion.

In essence, the author falls back on this laughable group as his only plausible form of government. vague allusions to different French and English factions are kept that way as undoubtedly the author could find no one who would fit the bill to sign up to be an American stooge.

This set up for a government is deeply problematic. The men who signed the manifesto had no real love for one another, proven by how quickly the businessmen jumped ship in 1854, and men like Abbott, who was pro-Anglophone, would have difficulty working with men like Papineau, who couldn't even keep his own followers in check. This is a house built on sand, and one which only represents the geographic area around Montreal, any authority outside that zone is laughable, the businessmen and landowners of Toronto and Ottawa would have no incentive to take orders from them, and zero inclination to support them. The only way their decrees could be enforced on on the points of American bayonets, but more on that in Part 3.

Though another group who is supposed to support this government is the Institut Canadien de Montreal. An institution founded by former patriotes who wanted to continue the radical dream. A seemingly solid ground to oppose the British from you would think. Unfortunately, the Insitut suffered a schism over loyalty with the Church in 1858 when they had books which were on the banned list. Bishop Ignace Bourget published a pastoral letter denouncing them, and in response 158 members left to form their own institution in Montreal, and they would be followed by others as the schism grew worse.

One doubts their resolve in the face of invasion if the Church sides with the Crown.

Next there is a long series of justifications for the formation of "Canadian Volunteers" who end up serving in the American forces, a copy pasted version of the execution of Duffie, and the impossible acts of Col. Baker, but on to the organization of this force:

 General-in-chief – Major General Philippe Regis Denis de Keredern de Trobriand; brigadier general, United States VolunteersAdjutant General – Brigadier General Gustave Paul Cluseret; colonel, United States VolunteersJudge Advocate – Col. Frank Cassidy (Canadian Volunteers)Provost Marshal – Col. Joseph Coursol (Canadian Volunteers)Intendant General – Brigadier General Thomas Brown (Canadian Volunteers);Inspector General – Capt. Robert Charters; captain, United States VolunteersChief Engineer – Major Tom Keefer (Canadian Volunteers)Chief of Military Railroads – Major David MacPherson (Canadian Volunteers)Surgeon General – Dr. Fred Nelson (Canadian Volunteers);Chief of Chaplains – The Rev. Charles Fabre (Canadian Volunteers)

Obviously the force is commanded by American officers (the amateur military men from Canada are with the British) but its composition is more than a tad confusing at times.

Frank Cassidy is presumably Francis Cassidy (why his name is changed I can't say), which fair enough, he was a member who didn't schism.

Joseph Coursol is presumably Charles-Joseph Coursol, which makes little sense. He was a Reform politico through and through, and actually joined the militia in response to the Trent Crisis historically, and led mounted troops during the Fenian raids in 1866. Why he suddenly switches sides is a bit of a mystery.

Tom Keefer is apparently Thomas Keefer, no reason given for the name change, and I can't find a reason why he would be on this list other than that he's an engineer.

Brigadier General Thomas Brown is presumably Thomas Storrow Brown, a curious pick. He's notable for being an ardent patriote, but more notable for abandoning his own men at the Battle of Saint-Charles then hoofing it for the border. After than he had trouble integrating himself with the rebels in Vermont, and simply faded into obscurity. One presumes he was appointed because no one else volunteered for the job.

David MacPherson is another who signed in 1849 but ducked out in 1854.

Fred Nelson is presumably the fiery old Wolfred Nelson who dislikes Papineau. Certainly capable of serving on a staff. Why he would throw away the gains he had made through the Reform movement from the 1840s and 50s to throw his lot in with a man he dislikes is an open question.

Fabre just seems to be a filler.

Finally we get to something that the Provisional Government offers the Americans in the lead up to Berthierville:

At the same time Wolseley, as the deputy assistant adjutant-general under Lysons, serving as such at the theater level in Quebec, was responsible for a wide variety of administrative tasks for the field army – including, notably, intelligence and information gathering. At this remove, it is clear the British effort was lacking; by autumn, the Americans and the Abbott-Papineau government in Ottawa had widespread support among the Francophones, and Grant’s senior officers responsible for gathering information – notably Brigadier General Philip Kearny, the cavalry commander, and Brigadier General Regis de Trobriand, a French-born American soldier who had successfully been running agents north of the border since before Rouse’s Point – had a much better understanding of the British strengths and weaknesses than the British did of the Americans. If the battle that was shaping up had been fought south of Montreal, in Anglophone and largely loyalist country, that would have been different; as it was, Berthierville and the surrounding country was largely in the Canadien camp

This is curious. Historically the rebels had most of their support in the Six Counties, a region which lies south and east of Montreal. This was where the wellspring of rebel support in 1837-38 came from, there were practically no disturbances outside this region, least of all Quebec City. So the idea that the country surrounding the British would be in the rebel camp is dubious to say the least.

Not to mention that with the numbers we have already established, there should be loyalist rebels aiding the British and making life unpleasant for the American troops in their advance. The British should have a good, if not better, understanding of what is going on than the Union.

So we see the author has appropriated or completely fabricated many incidents to make this so called "rebellion" plausible. Twisting the facts to suit his purposes, and leaving more vague so it cannot be scrutinized beyond "just because" reasoning.

In Part 3 we will take a look at the back and forth the author does on the issue of needing to garrison Canada.